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Abstract 
 
The international detention regime has been placed under a considerable amount of 
strain in the context of the war on terror. Political elites in both the USA and UK have 
significantly challenged accepted standards of appropriateness regarding detention, even 
though these states are traditionally strongly associated with the promotion of human 
rights internationally. Such defections and contestations present researchers with an 
intriguing process to understand, as these practices, by definition, challenge our settled 
assumptions about the post Cold-war international order. This thesis examines one 
element of this puzzle, assessing how the normative constraints associated with the 
international detention regime were negotiated by the Blair government and Bush 
administration so as to allow for contestation and apparent defection in 2001-2006. 
Generally, the IR literature on norms has focused on their constraining power, 
considering simple dichotomies of compliance and defection, often drawing on pre-
defined interests to explain behaviour. Whilst constructivists have recognised the 
constitutive nature of norms, they lack a persuasive account of the micro-foundational 
processes of norm influence which prevents them from engaging with the contestation 
of seemingly embedded international normative standards. In order to address this 
problem I draw from the social identity approach in social psychology, where scholars 
focus on the multiplicity of social identities and the interactive processes of norm 
influence and contestation at a micro-foundational level. I demonstrate that by firmly 
embedding individuals in the broader social identities context and focusing on the 
management strategies employed by political elites we can better understand the nature 
of normative constraint in these cases, and whether or not an enabling framework for 
such counter-normative practices was established. This thesis aims to bridge some of 
the gap that exists between research that focuses on international norms and that which 
concentrates on state leaders, demonstrating the importance of the broader interactive 
processes of contestation, generally missing from current constructivist accounts of 
international norms.   
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 5 
Introduction 
 
'I was in extreme pain and so weak that I could barely stand. It was freezing cold and I 
was shaking like a washing machine. They questioned me at gunpoint and told me that 
if I confessed I could go home’ (Tarek Dergoul, a British citizen held in Guantánamo 
Bay, cited in Rose, 2004a) 
 
‘Nobody should feel defensive or unhappy about the quality of treatment they’ve 
received. It’s probably better than they deserve’ (US Vice President Cheney, cited in 
Kampfner, 2004: 150) 
 
The international detention regime has been significantly undermined in the course of 
the US led war on terror.1 Images of torture, abuse, and the harsh conditions of 
detention have, in certain spheres, come to dominate the representation of counter-
terrorism policies. Many of the measures sought clearly indicated a revision of 
international standards of appropriateness. What has been particularly surprising about 
such practices is the centrality of the UK and USA. Their detention policies have 
created a vast amount of controversy and normative debate amongst academics, 
lawyers, politicians, journalists, and the general public. These practices do not appear to 
fit well with the liberal democratic identities of these states, and indeed their association 
with human rights promotion and moves to eradicate torture in the world. Indeed, they 
significantly challenge our expectations due to the strong ‘negative’ association between 
torture and identity, as indicated in the statement ‘the torturer has become like the pirate 
and the slave-trader before him, hostis humani generic, an enemy of all mankind’ 
(Kaufman, 1980). 
 
The rhetoric and policies of political elites in the UK and USA, with regards to 
detention, suggest an unravelling of established codes of practice. This is in a global 
context where human rights progression has long been assumed, and for states where 
human rights have a recognized role in political preferences and policies (Hunt, 2007). 
Whilst, an overwhelming amount of anti-terror legislation has been enacted across the 
world since the September 11th attacks in New York in 2001 (Ramraj, Hor, and Roach, 
2005), the detention practices of representatives of the UK and USA in 2001-2006 are 
particularly challenging. This is because political elites from these states have 
previously been instrumental in the creation of such normative regimes, and are 
                                                 
1 For the sake of clarity, this thesis uses the term ‘international detention regime’ to refer to the 
international normative regime prescribing minimum standards for detention and prohibiting torture. I 
employ the term ‘regime’ to indicate a normative and constitutive collection of internationally recognized 
standards. This differs from the neo-liberal use of the concept, where regimes are understood in an 
institutional and regulative manner. The international detention regime that I refer to in this study is 
defined in detail towards the end of Chapter 1. 
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generally seen as norm innovators in international society. Due to their positioning, 
their policies have a significant influence on other states in terms of example-setting and 
demonstrating standards of appropriateness, challenges to which are very difficult to 
reverse (Roach, 2007). The US detention facilities and procedures at Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba, are perhaps the most visible symbol contesting the international detention regime, 
which has been accompanied by the resurrection of debates on torture and accepted 
interrogation practices. These behaviours, which are contrary to general expectations, 
create a considerable demand for researchers to understand the processes involved; in 
particular, how international normative regimes actually influence the behaviour of 
political elites given such stark examples of contestation. This thesis addresses the 
following overarching question: How have the normative constraints regarding 
detention practices been negotiated by the USA and UK in the war on terror so as 
to enable contestation of the international detention regime? For example, how can 
we account for the processes that allow for contestation at a micro-foundational level? 
How was constraint manifest in this period given that it looks like the regime failed? 
And, were the political elites in the USA and UK successful in creating an enabling 
framework to allow for sustainable action counter to the normative regime?  
 
The literature in international relations (IR) provides us with different ways to 
understand the seemingly counter-normative practices concerning detention sought by 
the UK and USA in 2001-2006. Insights from realist and neo-liberal scholars have 
focused on power and pre-defined interests to explain defections from international 
norms (Goertz and Diehl, 1994; Slaughter and Raustiala, 2002). However, such 
approaches rely very heavily on a simple dichotomy between compliance and defection, 
which obscures value conflicts and isolates states and state leaders from the broader 
normative context. They neglect to engage with the processes of contestation that 
accompany seemingly counter-normative behaviours, and debates about what exactly is 
in the state’s interests in these circumstances.  
 
Constructivist scholars have on the other hand advanced our understanding and 
appreciation of international normative regimes by recognising their constitutive, as 
opposed to purely regulative nature, and demonstrating their importance in the conduct 
of international affairs. They have not, however, provided a persuasive account of the 
processes by which these normative standards are embedded as well as contested, 
allowing for fluctuations in influence. The need to account for revisionism, defection 
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and contestation is a gap that is identified in the literature (Cardenas, 2004, Dunne, 
2007).2 Constructivist scholars are often limited in their engagement with these 
questions again due to a central focus on the dichotomy between compliance and 
defection mentioned above. How normative constraints are negotiated so as to allow for 
deviations, as well as the role of the broader social identities and normative context in 
which political elites make decisions and formulate policy, is frequently over-looked.  
 
In order to delve deeper into the processes of normative influence and advance our 
understanding of contestations of the international detention regime by the UK and 
USA, this thesis engages with insights from social psychology, drawing individuals 
firmly into analysis. Moves to utilise insights from psychology is a growing trend in 
constructivist scholarship (e.g. Shannon, 2000; Shannon and Keller, 2007; Flockhart, 
2005; 2006), however, often this seems to focus too heavily on the individual as 
opposed to viewing them in relation to their interactive environment (e.g. Shannon 
2000; Shannon and Keller, 2007).3 Again such research does not engage with the 
processes of contestation and changing interpretations.  
 
To address this gap in the literature, I draw on insights from the social identity approach 
in social psychology, where the research focus is on understanding processes of social 
influence. Many similarities exist with constructivist scholarship, for example a concern 
with social identities and the role of norms in influencing behaviour. In this thesis I 
demonstrate how the micro-foundational insights developed by social identity scholars 
significantly advance our understanding of norm influence by engaging more with the 
role of individuals. This approach focuses on the micro-foundations of the multiplicity 
of social identities, where norms function as a means by which to validate membership 
or association with these different social identities, both to self and others. By drawing 
from this framework, the research in this thesis is orientated away from general 
membership of international society, towards the multiple social identities associated 
with the state, those that are well established (although not static) as well as those that 
                                                 
2 Hedley Bull (1977) certainly provides early insights in this area, in terms of variation in the violation of 
international rules and the impact on order in international society. However, this thesis engages 
predominantly with the constructivist literature where there has been more emphasis on the functioning of 
international norms in relation to state identity.   
3 Whilst not engaging in detail with the broader structure-agency debate, due to a specific concern with 
understanding the processes involved in the contestation of the international detention regime by the Blair 
government and Bush administration, this thesis does share some of the same principles. For example, a 
recognition that separating structures and agents is problematic and that ‘agents are always contextually 
bound and do not act in social vacuums’ (Wight, 2006: 290). 
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are emerging and evolving. In this broader social identities context norm influence and 
contestation is a dynamic and interactive process. The validation of association or 
membership of social identities is not a one-way process and depends on acceptance by 
various audiences including other members. Leadership is not simply a case of having 
certain personality attributes, but is a process of doing, one of managing the different 
social identities associated with the state. IR research into norms often obscures these 
social relations, which are crucial to understanding the interactive processes of 
contestation and normative influence. Ignoring these factors can lead to inaccurate 
expectations of state behaviour, taking ‘progression’ towards human rights norms for 
granted in international society, and concealing the need for normative regimes to 
constantly be re-made. 
 
Thus, the main question posed in this thesis asks how normative constraint is negotiated 
so as to allow for the contestation of international detention standards by the UK and 
USA. As mentioned above, in order to address this question I delve deeper into the 
processes norm influence, focusing on the micro-foundational insights generated in the 
social identity approach. Doing so provides a robust framework for analysis and leads to 
the following central argument, which is advanced throughout this thesis, namely that 
the contestation of the international detention regime is an interactive and 
dynamic process embedded in a broad social identities context. There are three 
inter-related claims to this argument:  
 
1. To understand processes of contestation and influence we need to consider how the 
social identities associated with the state are constructed and managed by political 
elites   
2. We cannot expect social influence where the social identities to which normative 
regimes pertain are not deemed to be important.  
3. Validation of social identity membership, or association, is not a one-way process. 
Interaction constrains justifications of counter-normative behaviour, and the 
capacity to construct a sustainable and enabling framework for contestation.  
 
As the focus of this thesis is on understanding the processes of contestation and 
normative influence as contextually situated, I do not aim to build a predictive 
framework to test these claims. Furthermore I do not aim to isolate factors to explain 
why political elites in the UK and USA sought policies that challenged the international 
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detention regime. To do so is beyond the concerns of this thesis, and would not fit with 
the theoretical orientation outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. Instead, I focus on the question 
and arguments above in relation to the detention policies of the UK and USA. 
 
 
Method 
Case Selection 
As already mentioned, this thesis focuses on the policies and discourse of the Blair 
government and the Bush administration in the context of the war on terror. In doing so 
I do not suggest that these two countries are alone in their contestation of the 
international detention regime, or that their practices in 2001-2006 are somehow the 
‘worst’ in the world. We only have to flick through the annual reports of Amnesty 
International to realise that the contestation of basic human rights is much more 
prevalent than we may have hoped. 
 
However, given the efforts of the USA and UK to promote human rights internationally, 
involving the investment of a vast amount of time and resources, contestation by 
political elites in these states is much more difficult to understand and is likely to have a 
wider impact on detention standards across the globe. These cases are particularly 
fascinating due to the role of the USA and UK in norm creation and norm setting. An 
approach that can account for the processes of norm influence and contestation by 
representatives of these states will provide a much fuller understanding of the role of 
normative regimes in international relations. The importance of the liberal democratic 
social identity for the USA and UK, frequently stressed by constructivist scholars, also 
makes these cases very intriguing as expectations are created for norm compliance with 
regards to detention practices. Challenging the international detention regime 
compromises association with this international social identity as the latter is constituted 
in large part by observance of human rights standards. As such, these cases demand a 
framework that delves deeper into norm influence and negotiation.  
 
Sources and Analysis 
In order to examine the overarching question posed in this thesis, how the normative 
constraints are negotiated, I adopt a discourse analysis approach. There is much 
variation in how discourse analysis has been used in the academic literature. The 
processes of investigation undertaken in this thesis are predominantly informed by the 
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writings of Fairclough (1992) and Potter and Wetherall (1987). Whilst traditional 
qualitative methodologies assist researchers who aim to understand the social world as 
it exists, the purpose of discourse analysis is to examine how this comes into being, is 
challenged and evolves. Language is a site where meanings are both created and 
changed as opposed to simply reflecting and revealing social phenomenon (Wetherell, 
Taylor and Yates, 2001). Discourse analysis enables the generation of insights into how 
‘identities are constructed on a continuous, interactive, discursive basis’ (Phillips and 
Hardy, 2002: 14). Such an approach is crucial to investigate the arguments advanced in 
this thesis, which focuses on the interactive processes of social identity management to 
understand the contestation of the international detention regime. This is also 
complementary to a constructivist framework that engages with the constructive nature 
of language (Gergen, 1999), where discourses reproduce or contest the normative 
assumptions of social groups and societies. From this perspective, common 
understandings and interpretations are promoted by those with access to the media 
(Burnham, 2004); for example, political elites, as well as lobby groups (e.g. the human 
rights and humanitarian social group), and less frequently professional groups such as 
lawyers or military leaders. In line with the perspective adopted in this thesis, identities 
are seen as ‘constantly … sought after, contested, validated, maintained and so on 
through the use of language’ (Burr, 1995: 46). 
 
The benefits of a discourse analysis approach are well recognised by academic scholars. 
David Howarth for example states that through such a discursive approach we can 
examine, ‘the complexities of political identity and difference; the construction of 
hegemonic formations; … and the connection between the role of identities and 
interests in the social sciences’ (2000: 6). The purpose of this section is not, however, to 
give an in-depth account of the different approaches to discourse in the social sciences 
(see for example, Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002), but is instead to articulate the position 
adopted in this thesis. In brief, the notion of discourse is understood here as the means 
by which normative standards are articulated, communicated and contested.4 Fairclough 
(1989: 77), for example, argues that ‘conventions routinely drawn up in discourse 
embody ideological assumptions which come to be taken as mere “common sense”’, 
thus setting normative standards for social groups and societies. Therefore, normative 
standards are constructed and recognised in discourse, where discourse also reflects the 
                                                 
4 Whilst I focus on normative standards, this position is consistent with that taken by van Dijk (1998) and 
Fairclough (1989) with regards to ideology.  
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meanings attached to normative standards, whether widely seen as ‘common sense’ or 
contested, both consciously or subconsciously. 
 
As Fairclough (2001) states, discourse analysis is often used to look at how a problem 
arises and the ways in which a resolution is sought. The research in this thesis focuses 
predominantly on the latter element – how normative constraint is negotiated, thus how 
a resolution is sought to manage the negative effects of counter-normative behaviour. 
This is in terms of the restrictions such actions and policies place on the ability to 
validate association with certain social identities. The way social categorizations are 
made and how they are used in the process of the negotiation of normative constraint 
will be considered. This is not as a route to something beyond the text like attitudes, as 
social texts are not seen as a ‘transparent information channel’ (Fairclough, 1992: 160), 
but to identify what themes are apparent and what functions these serve in terms of 
management strategies. As Fairclough (1992: 225) and many other discourse analysts 
have noted, there is ‘no set procedure for doing discourse analysis’ so I shall now 
clarify what this approach means in terms of the process of investigation and analysis 
adopted in this thesis.  
 
The focus of analysis in this piece of research is on public statements, speeches, and 
publicly available policy documents, as opposed to interview data. This reflects the 
orientation of the overarching question of this thesis towards public representations. 
Chapter 3, for example, uses a variety of sources to define the social identities 
considered (understood in terms of social groups). As the aim of the Chapter is simply 
to build a basic picture of each of the social identities, I rely on publicly available 
information. Where primary sources are not available, secondary data is used to 
supplement analysis. The central defining principles and normative elements of these 
social identities are established through a process of identifying the key defining themes 
apparent in the sources and drawing from the existing academic literature. Chapters 4 
and 5 are based on a more thorough analysis of the political speeches and statements of 
the Blair government and the Bush administration, available from the Number 10 and 
White House websites.5 Also included in analysis are the arguments and concerns raised 
by the social groups considered in Chapter 3. This is to generate an interactive 
assessment of contestation. The study focuses on the time period running from January 
                                                 
5 Discourse analysts engage with a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic material (for example 
actions and images) (Howarth, 2000). However, this thesis focuses predominantly on the speeches, 
statements and press conferences of Prime Minister Blair and President Bush. 
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2001 until the end of December 2006. This covers several areas of challenge to the 
international detention regime, and is sufficient in length to track these interactive 
processes.  
 
A broad range of data is available for both of these state leaders, and is taken to be 
representative of the consensual views of their inner circles. Where appropriate this core 
of data will be supplemented with the statements of other close members of 
government. Certainly, there has been a divergence of opinion in both the Blair 
government and the Bush administration with regards to detention. However, the 
discourse of the leader is the most important voice in constructing priorities and 
establishing policies. These are not reduced to the individual, but instead are understood 
as representative of the consensus established with close members of the government 
and their inner circle of advisers. Public discourse tends to be carefully crafted and is 
generally the product of efforts far beyond the individual that delivers them. As 
Woodward (2004: 134) writes with regards to Bush, ‘presidential speeches were 
policy’.  
 
A further point to clarify before detailing the actual process of analysis is the focus on 
political elites who are seemingly distant from the actual occurrences of abuse in 
detention, for example that at Abu Ghraib. I must stress here that compliance, defection 
or contestation, are not considered to involve just the practice of torture but highly 
central are government policies that should be designed to prevent or punish the 
perpetrators of torture. Indeed as Kelman argues (2005: 124), research must go ‘beyond 
the characteristics of the individual perpetrators or even of the situations in which the 
torture is practiced … focusing attention on the larger policy context in which the 
practice of torture is embedded’. Such policies and the values that leaders promote 
certainly have a significant role in framing a culture in which torture and abuse may 
occur (Reicher, Haslam and Hopkins, 2005). As Jackson (2007: 354) states, they ‘create 
the wider legitimacy and social consensus that is required to enact policy’. Philip 
Zimbardo’s book, The Lucifer Effect provides a very good account of the ‘trickle down’ 
effect from these policies and values (also see, Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson, 
1975; and Milgram, 1974; for fascinating classic studies into dehumanization and 
obedience). This thesis considers the policies that contest the international detention 
regime on a broader basis than just torture, however most contestations also contribute 
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in some way to making the occurrence of abuse more likely. Thus, contestations by 
political elites have a much broader impact than may have been intended.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 are based on the analysis of 705 speeches, statements and press 
conferences, 345 by Tony Blair and 360 by George W. Bush. A maximum of 60 are 
taken from each year, averaging 5 a month (for Blair the number of relevant and 
available sources falls short of this target in 2001, the lower number of 45 are included). 
Those sources with less than 250 words spoken or written by the state leader in question 
are not included. Some months produce more data than others, for example in the 
aftermath of the September 11th attacks or in the build up to hostilities in Iraq, whereas 
others will be relatively quiet. Sources were selected on the basis of relevance to the 
topic of detention and the social identities assessed. This involved a broad range of 
material in order to sufficiently capture interactions with the different social groups. 
This core body of data is supplemented by material from other central members of 
government where this is available, as well as secondary material which helps to situate 
the discourse.  
 
There are several stages to the process of analysis I undertake. Initial coding of the 
source material was in very broad terms, summarizing the discourse by means of the 
social identities that are engaged with. The data was coded where the state leaders made 
reference to these social groups, addressed their core elements (as outlined in Chapter 
3), or responded to the arguments and concerns raised by these groups. This was to 
narrow down the corpus of material to focus on that which will ‘yield as much insight 
as possible’ (Fairclough, 1992: 230). This was done as inclusively as possible, 
borderline cases were included and the large body of data was managed using NVivo 
computer software. Due to the public and open nature of the discourse, certain phrases 
where categorized in relation to more than one social identity (e.g. phrases referring to 
Part 4 ATCSA, and non-refoulment are examples that concern both the human rights as 
well as legal social identities). The second stage of coding focused on identifying the 
key themes that emerged from a closer reading, in relation to the different social 
identities. Saturation point was reached when no new themes were apparent in the 
discourse for the time period and social identity considered.  A large list of these themes 
was condensed where there was overlap (definitions of these themes and examples are 
provided in the table below). This enabled the presentation of clear concepts to consider 
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in relation to the framework of management strategies provided by Roccas and Brewer 
(2002) (see Chapter 2).  
 
A key feature of the assessment in this thesis is the recognition that validation of 
association with social identities is a two-way process, thus responses and preceding 
arguments to the government’s constructions from members of the social groups 
considered are used to complement the main analysis. This is with the aim of capturing 
some of the interactions that are apparent in 2001-2006. Unfortunately, the need to use 
public discourse, which is not a direct conversation between the governments and the 
different social identities, places limitations on the degree to which this is possible; the 
analysis cannot provide an assessment of direct interactions as would be the case in 
conversation analysis. The interactions captured are those based on whether or not 
arguments are accepted, as well as changes to the management strategies and techniques 
employed. Finally, in terms of the validation of research findings, to show that the 
arguments are recognised by Bush and Blair would be very difficult indeed. Instead, 
validation in this thesis is based on the scope of the schema to make sense of the cases 
assessed.  
 
Discourse analysis of political speeches and press conferences, accompanied by 
statements from the social groups assessed in this thesis, helps to illustrate the 
interactive nature of normative constraint in these cases, as opposed to an objective and 
static approach (with fixed meaning and application), to defection and compliance. As 
this analysis is based on an interpretive approach I acknowledge my own role in the 
research process. I certainly bring to this project my own normative leanings, which I 
must clarify. For example, I believe that compliance with the international detention 
regime would benefit the objective of tackling terrorism and that torture does much 
more harm than it can ever do good. I reject the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario (popularised in 
shows like 24), and instead agree with the historical accounts and more recent 
psychological studies on interrogation that show that torture does not work (see Holmes, 
2006; Arrigo and Wagner, 2007). Furthermore, I think that resorting to such measures 
damages the reputation and moral standing of states, alienates communities, and 
increases the future risk of attacks. This is in addition to the intrinsic moral objections to 
harm production. However, due to these beliefs I am very keen to understand how 
contestations evolved in both the UK and USA. In order to overcome the potential bias 
in my representation I shall document the analysis in a clear and transparent way to 
 15 
readers, demonstrating in an open way how I reach certain conclusions. To do so I 
remain close to the texts that I analyse, drawing on numerous examples in the Chapters 
to support the points I make. The main themes this process generates are detailed in the 
table below. I only use one example to illustrate each technique in the summary table of 
key concepts. However the process of research is based on the emergence of the theme 
across a range of statements. As such the singular example does not illustrate the whole 
of the technique and definition for all inclusions in the table.        
 
Table 1: Key Concepts 
Management Strategy Technique Definition Example 
Merging 
(all diverse social 
identities are held 
despite their lack of 
convergence) 
Blurring of 
boundaries 
 
Centrality 
Ideas and social identities are 
combined 
 
The importance of the social 
group to all aspects of the 
state and the life of citizens is 
stressed 
‘the moralists and the realists 
are partners’ (Blair, 2001zv) 
 
‘the role our legal system plays 
in the lives of every American’ 
(Bush 2001l) 
 
Dominance 
(the subordination of 
the relevant social 
identities to one super-
ordinate group 
identification – all 
techniques are based 
this super-ordinate 
identification) 
Directing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Challenging 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Denial 
 
 
 
Dismissal 
 
 
 
 
 
Re-assuring 
 
 
 
Blaming 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Threatening 
 
 
 
Re-framing or articulating a 
new purpose for the social 
identity based on super-
ordinate identification, as 
interpreted by political elites 
in the context 
 
Strongly questioning the 
normative basis of the social 
group, the relevance of their 
arguments, and/or 
constructing them as a 
restraint on appropriate policy 
 
Refusal to acknowledge self-
engagement in counter-
normative behaviour 
 
Rejection of the arguments 
and criticisms articulated by 
the social group on the basis 
of super-ordinate imperatives 
 
 
Stressing the rightness of the 
social group’s actions in the 
face of criticism  
 
The social group has forced 
the government or 
administration to act outside 
of international normative 
regimes, or to legislate further 
to bring themselves back in 
 
Circumstances are framed as a 
test for the social group, with 
warnings of future damage to 
authority  
‘[w]hy doesn't the United 
Nations stand up as a body and 
show the world that it has got 
the capacity to keep the peace’ 
(Bush, 2003c) 
 
 
‘NGOs and pressure groups 
with single causes can be 
benevolent but can also 
exercise a kind of malign 
tyranny over the public debate’ 
(Blair, 2006zf) 
 
‘the analogies with things like 
internment are just fatuous 
frankly’ (Blair, 2005zr) 
 
‘my experience of these 
debates is that very swiftly a 
civil liberties issue turns into a 
national security issue’ (Blair, 
2003zw) 
 
‘the sacrifice [of the military] 
has been worth it’ (Bush, 
2006zzh) 
 
‘[the DTA] provides more 
clarity for our professionals 
[than Geneva III]’ (Bush, 
2006zv) 
 
 
 
‘that the greater danger to the 
UN is inaction’ (Blair, 2003n) 
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Displacing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Embedding 
 
 
 
 
Leading 
 
 
 
Dividing 
 
Criticism is transferred onto 
others  
 
 
 
 
 
Firmly grounding the social 
group in the mission and 
context as defined by the 
government or administration 
 
Emphasis is explicitly placed 
on the position of leading the 
social group 
 
Constructing distinct 
categories and boundaries in 
the international sphere  
‘America has no interest in 
being the world's jailer’, 
however, ‘many countries have 
refused to take back their 
nationals held at 
[Guantánamo]’ (Bush, 2006zt) 
 
‘You [the US Military] are 
bringing a long tradition of 
duty to this new and urgent 
task’ (Bush, 2003zc)  
 
‘America is leading the world 
with confidence and moral 
clarity’ (Bush, 2004zp) 
 
‘a struggle between fanaticism 
and extremism on the one 
hand, and people who believe 
in freedom and in tolerance on 
the other’ (Blair, 2003zy) 
Intersection 
Representation 
(focusing on the area of 
overlap between 
diverse social 
identities) 
Bolstering 
 
 
 
 
Unifying 
 
 
 
 
 
Utilising 
 
 
 
 
 
Defence of 
group 
Stressing areas of overlap, 
often praising the social 
group’s role and influence, as 
well as their normative basis 
 
Stressing areas of consensus, 
drawing divergent opinions 
together 
 
 
 
Drawing on the credibility of 
the social group to establish 
authority 
 
 
 
Supporting their actions in the 
face of criticism by stressing 
shared objectives and vision 
‘I care deeply about the civil 
liberties of this country’ (Blair, 
2005zm) 
 
 
Focusing on the ‘Millennium 
Development Goals on 
poverty, on education, [and] 
across a range of indicators for 
Africa’ (Blair, 2005l) 
 
‘what you have now is a 
United Nations 
process…which all sensible 
people should be backing’ 
(Blair, 2005ze)  
 
‘the actions of the people in 
that prison do not reflect the 
nature of the men and women 
who wear our uniform’ (Bush, 
2004t) 
Compartmentalisation 
(social identities are 
seen as applicable in 
different circumstances 
or in relation to 
different issues)  
Context 
dependent 
 
Emphasising the nature of the 
situation to justify action 
counter to the normative basis 
of the social group 
 
‘it is important that we never 
lose sight of our basic values. 
But we have to understand the 
nature of the enemy and act 
accordingly’ (Blair, 2001q) 
Separation 
(withdrawing or 
keeping apart from a 
social identity) 
Distancing 
 
The government or 
administration is presented as 
separate from the social group 
and a degree of distance is 
established 
‘We believe that the just 
demands of the international 
community must be enforced, 
not ignored. We believe this so 
strongly that we are acting on 
our convictions’ (Bush, 2003t) 
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Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 provides a theoretical grounding for this thesis in the literature of IR and 
outlines the constitutive elements of the international detention regime. I consider 
mainstream approaches to the study of norms and norm defection, focusing 
predominantly on the constructivist research programme. I argue that the latter does not 
have a convincing account of the micro-foundational dynamics of norm influence and 
defection, and is thus unable to provide a suitable framework from which to 
comprehend the processes of contestation regarding the international detention regime, 
as is examined in this thesis.  
 
These limitations provide the impetus for an engagement with psychology, which is the 
subject of Chapter 2. I consider the ways that insights from the discipline of psychology 
have been used to explain events as well as advance our understanding of the issues of 
concern in IR. After critically assessing the use of psychology in constructivism, I argue 
for an enhanced engagement with research conducted within the social identity 
approach in social psychology. Chapter 2 provides the framework for analysis in this 
thesis, focusing on the micro-foundational dynamics of the multiplicity of social 
identities, and the interactive processes of norm contestation. I argue that to understand 
the negotiation of normative constraint, and fluctuations in social influence, research 
needs to focus on the interactions of political elites with the broader social identities 
context.  
 
Chapter 3 provides an account of the different social identities associated with the UK 
and USA that will be assessed in this thesis. These are based on the following large 
social groups; human rights and humanitarian, legal, military, the United Nations, and 
the liberal democratic international social identity. Definitions of these social identities 
and justification for their inclusion will form the basis of Chapter 3.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the management strategies employed in relation to this social 
identities context, highlighting the interactive processes of the contestation of the 
international detention regime. Chapter 4 focuses on the Blair government, whilst 
Chapter 5 assesses the discourse of the Bush administration. These Chapters highlight 
the value added of an engagement with the social identity approach, which, I argue, 
allows us to, (1) reject the simple dichotomy between defection and compliance that 
permeates norms research in IR, (2) provides us with a micro-foundational framework 
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from which to understand and examine the contestation of the international detention 
regime, and (3) bridges some of the gap between political elites and international 
normative regimes. This approach widens our understanding of the nature of normative 
constraint as contextually situated, and in doing so, allows us to assess the processes of 
contestation by the UK and USA that challenged accepted standards of appropriateness 
and our expectations for rightful conduct.   
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Chapter 1: Norms, Influence and Expectations 
 
Examining how the normative constraints regarding detention practices have been 
negotiated by the USA and UK first requires a definition of norms and in particular how 
we expect them to be influential in international politics. Norms feature heavily in 
research across the social sciences as well as in IR however what we actually mean by 
the concept clearly varies depending on our theoretical orientation, as does the 
significance attributed to their role. This Chapter provides a definition of norms 
grounded in the constructivist research programme. I justify this position with reference 
to both realism and neo-liberalism. The first section of this Chapter draws out the 
central principles governing the realist, neo-liberal and constructivist approach to norms 
in IR. I argue that a constructivist understanding provides the best framework for 
analysis as this captures many facets that the other perspectives neglect, for example, 
the constitutive, as opposed to purely regulative, nature of norms. The second section 
considers variations within constructivism regarding norms, comparing research from 
both the conventional and thick ends of the constructivist spectrum. From this basis 
section three provides an outline of the theoretical understanding underpinning this 
thesis, as situated within current constructivist debates. Building on this framework, the 
third section also establishes what is meant by the international detention regime and 
what expectations this generates for behaviour internationally. Throughout the Chapter I 
highlight some of the challenges presented by the cases examined in this thesis. This 
provides the motivational basis for a subsequent engagement with psychology.  
 
 
1. Norms and Theoretical Divergence in IR 
Norms have a highly significant role in international relations scholarship, largely as a 
result of the growth in regime theory and the surge in constructivist literature over the 
past two decades.1 Definitions have centred on norms as collective understandings of 
appropriate behaviour. There is however much divergence regarding the details of such 
a definition, as well as the expected influence of norms on behaviour. I argue that a 
constructivist approach is the most illuminating with regards to norms, and indeed takes 
into account a number of highly significant insights from the broader social sciences, 
for example, those provided by Wittgenstein (1958), Winch, (1970a; 1970b), and Searle 
                                                 
1 Whilst norms are also a feature of the earlier English School literature, this approach did not theorise, to 
the same degree, the processes of influence on state actions, but focused more on the role of norms in the 
constitution of international society.   
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(1995). Whilst scholars, such as these have, for a long time, highlighted the importance 
of norms to social life,2 this section is predominantly concerned with how norms are 
characterised in the literature of IR and therefore focuses on the key perspectives of 
realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism.    
 
Scholars from the various approaches to IR differ greatly on how they conceptualise 
norms, what they expect norms to do, and the manner in which norms are deemed 
relevant to the study of international politics. This has profound implications for our 
understanding of defection and contestation, and in particular, the questions raised by 
the empirical cases examined in this thesis. The different perspectives provide diverging 
explanations as to why and how norms influence behaviour, if indeed they do, as well as 
under what conditions. This section justifies why the constructivist approach to norms is 
privileged in this study, and indeed informs the central driving questions.  
 
1.1 Realism 
Realism attaches the least significance to norms in terms of their influence on behaviour 
in the international sphere. States are not considered to be bound by norms, and when 
other overriding imperatives (such as those generated in the domestic sphere) take 
precedence, they are simply thought to give way. This approach to IR presides on the 
assertion that ‘[i]nternational politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power’ 
(Morgenthau, 1985: 31). The most important factor in explaining or predicting the 
actions of states is therefore the distribution of power in the international system. 
Norms, consequently, are epiphenomenal. Where they do feature in analysis they are 
presented as an adjunct to realist explanations (Desch, 1998), as opposed to being 
granted any independent value. The behaviour of actors in the anarchic system is not 
thought to be altered in any fundamental way, by changes in the normative context 
(Fischer, 1992).  
 
Norms, from a realist perspective, are deemed to be the preferences of the most 
powerful state or states in the international system. They will thus be modified or 
replaced in accordance with changes in the interests of powerful states, or shifts in the 
fundamental distribution of power in the system, as in neo-realism (Waltz, 1979). The 
                                                 
2 Theoretical interest in norms and social rules is certainly not new. Winch’s key insight, that all human 
behaviour is rule-governed, as rules provide meaning to human behaviour, provides a fundamental basis 
for certain strands of the constructivist approach to norms. Such an approach indicates that we can only 
understand social life if we can understand the rules that give it meaning.  
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functioning of norms is largely limited to that of the ‘convenient tools’ of statecraft for 
those states in positions of power; firstly in providing a moral slant to justify behaviour, 
and secondly to induce compliance in weaker states, in a way that falls in line with the 
interests of the powerful.3  
 
Great powers are thought by realists to deploy norms to justify their behaviour. In this 
sense, they are able to choose among norms or indeed create new ones. This is partly a 
consequence of the nature of norms, which, as Krasner suggests ‘can be 
contradictory…and there is no authority structure to adjudicate such controversies’ 
(1999: 6). Hurrell (2002) gives the example of the detention of ‘illegal enemy 
combatants’ at Guantánamo Bay and the tensions between different legal, moral and 
political norms governing behaviour. Value-conflicts are understood here to reduce the 
influence of norms on powerful states, as opposed to provoking a process of 
contestation whereby states negotiate competing normative constraints.   
 
Whilst powerful states have an important role in norm-setting I argue that this does not 
make them somehow separate from the normative context in which they are situated. 
That states can simply justify their behaviour with reference to conflicting international 
norms negates the importance of the audience, and acceptance of such claims. 
Competing norms and the power to construct dominant narratives determining 
appropriateness are key considerations, however, reducing the influence of norms in 
international politics to an account of power leaves a great deal out of assessment (such 
as the role of identity), which has been shown to be highly significant for the analysis of 
behaviour in the international realm. Such research will be considered later in this 
Chapter.  
 
International norms are also often studied in close association with alliances and 
institutions. From a realist perspective, states are thought only to enter such collective 
agreements based on self-interest, for example when they desire restraint on specific 
issues and joining is seen to be to their advantage. Mitigating the uncertainty of the 
security dilemma as well as establishing mechanisms to enhance trade to the benefits of 
                                                 
3 Gilpin (1981: 35) suggests that the ‘primary foundation of rights and rules is in the power interests of 
the dominant groups or states in a social system’. Indeed a convergence can be seen between international 
norms and the national interests of the powerful, in terms of norms promoting free trade (Goertz and 
Diehl, 1994: 106). Norms in this sense can be seen as a means by which to create an international order in 
favour of the powerful states in the system.   
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the powerful (Goertz and Diehl, 1994), provide two such areas. Underlying political or 
economic factors are considered to drive actors to enter into agreements, resulting in 
abandonment when the regime no-longer fulfils the self-interests of the state. The USA, 
due to its great power status, is often considered to be able to pursue such a strategy. 
Many criticisms and counter-arguments have been presented concerning the realist 
perspective on regimes (e.g. Haas, 1983; Stein, 1983; Krasner, 1983; Linden, 2000; 
Glaser, 2003; Desch, 2003) however these are beyond the scope of this Chapter, where I 
mean only to briefly highlight the central concerns of a realist understanding of norms.      
 
To sum up, realists do recognise a role for norms in international politics however this 
is always subordinate to power. Crucially for realists, norms are not considered to be 
binding upon states when they are in opposition to their interests (Dunne and Wheeler, 
2004). As such they tend to be considered as largely superfluous to action, and the focus 
has fallen on the use of norms as a rhetorical moral guise for the actions of powerful 
states, for the purposes of inducing compliance in weaker states, and, in terms of 
regimes, reducing uncertainty and the conditions of the security dilemma when this is in 
the interests of powerful states. For realists then, power and not norms are the important 
concept in international behaviour.  
 
If we were to agree that, ‘patterns of international interactions can be satisfactorily 
analysed in terms of power’ then the employment of norms in our explanation does 
indeed become ‘superfluous’ (Kratochwil, 1989: 47). However, this conceptualisation 
creates certain problems, for example can it really be said that those who hold power 
can simply choose to comply, defect, or choose freely between different norms? Surely 
this would have implications in terms of undermining the legitimacy of powerful states 
and their ability to set the international agenda. Furthermore, even if powerful states 
create norms in their interests, it seems logical to suggest that they would still be 
constrained by these if they hope to retain influence and power over those they expect to 
comply? These questions largely come down to our understanding of the concepts, 
whether we see norms or power in social or purely material terms (see Reus-Smit, 2004 
for a discussion of social power). I would question whether without legitimacy and 
social influence we can really hold power in terms of being able to influence and 
enforce our will upon others, and be successful in the process.  
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The very fact that norms are employed to justify behaviour suggests that there are 
limitations to the choices available to states; not all action can be justified in terms of 
conflicting norms in a way that will be accepted as legitimate by significant others. We 
can certainly see many problems with the USA’s appeal to norms of security in relation 
to their detention policies in the war on terror. Despite their many claims to be acting 
appropriately in the context, the Bush administration has not been able to gain 
legitimacy internationally for such practices, or even domestically for that matter if we 
look at the campaign promises of the Obama and McCain camps in the build up to the 
2008 presidential election.4 Interpretations of conflicting norms as well as legitimacy 
claims are restricted by the shared understandings and practices of others (Hurrell, 
2002). Defections and contestations are not a simple one-way process. 
 
Furthermore, scholars have demonstrated that war itself, which features heavily in the 
conflictual world of realism, is subject to regulation and limitation (Farrell, 2005a). In 
this context, the use of certain weapons or practices is deemed illegitimate (such as 
chemical or biological weapons) and state practice has largely followed suit (Legro, 
1995; 1997). Even the possibility of war is socially constructed as opposed to purely the 
result of shifts in the balance of power (Alkopher, 2007; Finnemore, 2003). Realism 
therefore struggles to comprehend action by states that does not appear to be in their 
material interests, based on a desire for power, but instead is considered to be socially 
appropriate for their position in the hierarchy of states.5  
 
1.2 Neo-Liberalism 
Scholars falling within the research domain of neo-liberalism, tend to accept many of 
the principles of realism (as outlined above), particularly neo-realism (Keohane, 1986). 
However, neo-liberals give more weight to the role of norms in international politics. 
Indeed, institutions and regimes are deemed to have some independent value and 
influence over state members after their construction (Keohane, 1984). Institutions and 
not merely the balance of power structure affect state preferences. However, whilst the 
neo-liberal approach does allow a greater role for norms, generating more insights into 
their functioning, this is limited to a rationalist and instrumental standpoint.   
 
                                                 
4 Obama in particular, focused on the need to close the detention facilities at Guantánamo Bay.  
5 The role of norms in the calculation of state interests is also negated.  
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In contrast to realist and neo-realist enquiry, neo-liberals ask the question of how the 
development of norms can reduce the competitive nature of the international system and 
result in cooperation. A central purpose of international regimes is arguably to ease the 
creation of ‘mutually beneficial agreements among governments so the structural 
condition of anarchy does not lead to a complete “war of all against all”’ (Keohane, 
1983: 148). Neo-liberals suggest that the role of norms and the emergence of regimes is 
down to the desire of actors to overcome the dilemmas of common interests and 
common aversion by (in certain circumstances) forgoing independent decision-making.6 
Regimes emerge when the costs outweigh the benefits (Martin and Simmons, 1998).7 
 
Neo-liberals also propose that regimes may alter the preferences of actors over time. 
This is an area where neo-liberalism significantly advances our understanding of norms 
from that of realism. Norms are influential because they ‘not only reflect, but also 
affect, the facts of world politics’ (Keohane, 1984: 57). Waever’s (1998) example of 
NATO is appropriate here. States may have formed the alliance in line with the 
predictions of neo-realism and balancing power against a common threat, however 
members’ preferences have generally developed beyond these initial interests to favour 
mutual cooperation in line with the values of the institution. The costs of non-
compliance, resulting in a lack of cooperation, consequently weigh in heavily. 
Compliance with norms, as embedded in political institutions, is however approached in 
an instrumental fashion, where they are assessed by means of cost-benefit calculations. 
Norms are presented as ‘intermediate factors, or “intervening variables” between 
fundamental characteristics of world politics such as the international distribution of 
power on the one hand and the behaviour of states and nonstate actors…on the other’ 
(Keohane, 1984: 64).    
 
Whilst neo-liberal scholars tend to recognize that preferences may change, they also 
generally contend that ‘vital national interests … [are] unlikely to be modified or 
relegated in the face of institutional imperatives’ (Simpson, 2000: 458). Interests are 
still predominantly exogenously given and influence the processes of cost-benefit 
                                                 
6 An illustration of this can be found in ‘The tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). An example that 
seems to fit this model can be drawn from disputes over fishing in certain areas, alongside agreements to 
stop the depletion of resources (Stein, 1983). Scholars recognise that in order to achieve this, the regime 
must be specific about what constitutes cooperation and cheating in order for states to feel assured enough 
to participate and strive for sub-optimal independent gain. 
7 More recently Dai (2005: 364) has noted the importance of considering games such as the Prisoners 
Dilemma in the domestic as well as international realm as governments may face an ‘entirely different 
strategic environment domestically’.  
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calculations with regards to international norms. Thus, in terms of defection from the 
international detention regime, there would be the assumption of a ‘cost’ to compliance, 
and that this is counter to state interests in certain circumstances. Cost-benefit analysis, 
would therefore override a concern with compliance. This reasoning, however, misses 
several points. For example, are the costs of compliance really that clear? Why do 
certain states view non-compliance as the most beneficial course of action and others do 
not, particularly given the many studies that suggest there is little utility to torture (see 
Ross, 2005)? Primarily, why do they view such action to be in their interests? The 
international detention regime for example, includes prohibitions on torture which have 
arguably shaped state interests to prefer compliance due to the detrimental affect non-
compliance would have on state identity. The importance of these ideas will be explored 
in greater depth throughout the course of this Chapter.     
 
In addition to asking why certain practices come to be seen as in a state’s interests, other 
empirical research has further highlighted the limitations of a neo-liberal approach to 
norms by demonstrating the ‘effect’ of norms which are contrary to states’ strategic and 
economic interests. Klotz (1995) provides the example of South Africa and the 
introduction of sanctions by the great powers in the 1980s. Sanctions were imposed by 
the ‘United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth, the European Community, the Nordic 
states, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States’ even though they held 
strategic and economic interests against such action (Klotz, 1995: 451). This case 
demonstrates a modification of competing global norms in favour of those promoting 
racial equality, and a subsequent reformation of state interests in terms of these 
international norms. Klotz furthers this point by stating that ‘international actors – even 
great powers such as the United States – inherently are socially constructed; that is, 
prevailing global norms, such as racial equality, partially define their interests’ (Klotz, 
1995: 460).  
 
By focusing primarily on norm influence as a ‘straight forward result of rational 
adaptation to strategic circumstances’, neo-liberals miss many dynamics of state 
behaviour, for example, the factors involved in the construction of the ‘nuclear taboo’ 
(Tannenwald, 2005: 7), or indeed, the more recent construction of a treaty banning the 
use of cluster munitions (BBC, 2008; Landmine Action, 2008). As Hawkins (2004) 
further points out, those that rely on power and interests as explanations for behaviour, 
are often extremely limited in their capacity to account for changes in the process of 
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treaty negotiation, particularly when there are costly implications for sovereignty.8 In 
terms of this thesis, the emphasis on pre-defined interests and a simple dichotomy 
between compliance and defection again misses the interactive processes of 
contestation. 
 
Thus, there are significant limitations with both the realist and neo-liberal approaches to 
norms, primarily due to their negation of social power, consideration of vital national 
interests as exogenously given, and their concentration on the regulative function of 
international norms. As I argue below, a basis in constructivist understandings, with an 
emphasis on co-constitutive dynamics, provides greater depth to our understanding of 
the international detention regime, and is essential to examine the overarching question 
of this thesis; that is, how have the normative constraints regarding detention 
practices been negotiated by the USA and UK in the war on terror?  
 
1.3 Constructivism and Constitutive International Norms 
Constructivism diverges significantly from the above perspectives of realism and neo-
liberalism. Instead of limiting international norms to purely regulative functions, 
constructivists privilege the social nature of international norms, how they constitute 
identity (particularly state identity), and consequently the very interests of states.9 
International norms are therefore fundamental to our understanding of international 
politics. From such a perspective scholars are able to account for a greater range of 
compliance behaviours than the above utilitarian positions allow. In the course of this 
section I will outline why I find this a more convincing position to take with regards to 
the study of international normative regimes. This will lead us into section two of this 
                                                 
8 Hawkins provides a very interesting account of negotiations regarding the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), particularly with regards to 
provisions for universal jurisdiction. The author identifies the norms of precedence, that international 
cooperation is the best way to tackle most ‘identifiable social problems’, and the need to prevent bodily 
harm as providing a more informative context within which to understand the treaty negotiations. The 
role of identity in this process is deemed to be crucial (2004: 786).   
9 The social foundation to norms is by no means unique to constructivism. Indeed I mentioned the work 
of Wittgenstein and Winch at the beginning of this Chapter, who along with scholars such as Habermas 
and others, have provided the roots for some of the more critical perspectives of IR. There has also been a 
long tradition of research referring to the social nature of norms evident in the English School; indeed 
there has been much overlap between this and certain strands of constructivism with some scholars 
seemingly claimed by both traditions (see Adler, 2005 for an assessment of their differences). Certainly 
research on international society (where international norms are a key characteristic) provides the 
backdrop to much constructivist research; indeed the existence of an international society is an 
assumption without which much research on international norms is likely to prove futile. Writings in this 
domain undoubtedly predate the rise of constructivism in IR by several decades. However, it is largely 
those working under the banner of constructivism that have brought questions concerning the functioning 
of norms, particularly regarding their influence and relationship to identity, to the fore in IR research in 
more recent times. 
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Chapter where I assess variations in the constructivist approach in order to outline the 
theoretical basis to this thesis.  
 
Constructivists have defined norms, at a basic level, as standards for appropriate 
behaviour for actors with a given identity. The crucial difference to the previous 
perspectives is the inclusion of identity in the analysis of norms in international politics. 
International norms are shared understandings founded in an international society, 
where members can judge the appropriateness of each others’ actions (Risse and 
Sikkink, 1999). They are social as they are based on the agreement of other members, 
whether implicitly or explicitly, as to the dynamics of the norm – i.e. what behaviours 
the norm covers and when it is applicable. International norms are understood, by 
constructivist scholars, as expectations that are in a sense generated by membership of 
international society.10  
 
Some international norms have been shown to place significant demands on the foreign 
and domestic policies of member states, for example in terms of the emergence of an 
environmental regime (Eckersley, 2007). Others have served to guide practices, for 
example through their influence on the development of military doctrine (Farrell, 
2005b), understandings about the appropriate use of force (Alkopher, 2007; Finnemore, 
2003) and determining what actors can be legitimately involved in warfare (Percy, 
2007a; 2007b). This is not based on a utilitarian calculation founded on exogenous 
interests; instead international norms inform the interests of states and place demands 
on behaviour through being constitutive of identity. The role of social practices in the 
establishment, reproduction and challenge to international norms has also been heavily 
emphasised. As Kratochwil puts it, ‘[a]ctors are not only programmed by rules and 
norms, but they reproduce and change by their practice the normative structures by 
which they are able to act, share meanings, communicate intentions, criticize claims, 
and justify choices’ (1989: 61). The degree to which this co-constitutive process is 
accounted for in constructivist research certainly varies, however, it remains a 
fundamental principle to this approach. 
 
                                                 
10 This does not mean they are restricted to the international realm, indeed, in terms of detention and 
prohibitions on torture such normative standards are very much part of the domestic sphere for certain 
states. How this manifests itself and the interaction between normative regimes will be examined in the 
empirical Chapters of this thesis. 
  
 28 
Constructivists consider international norms to be constitutive in the sense that they 
form the rules of the game and the options available to actors within it; indeed they 
‘create the very possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain kind’ (Schauer, 1991: 6). 
International norms are enabling as well as constraining, for example in terms of 
facilitating warfare in international society (Alkopher, 2007), or legitimizing the 
participation of previously disempowered actors (Klotz, 1995; Finnemore, 1996). Such 
an account is neglected in neo-realism and neo-liberalism.  
 
Thus, a constructivist approach to the study of norms provides a much fuller account of 
their fundamental role in international politics. Any assessment of how the international 
detention regime is negotiated by the USA and UK in the war on terror would be 
limited without the means by which to account for the importance of identity. Indeed, 
such a question requires an approach that moves beyond a reliance on material power 
and pre-defined interests. In order to provide a more in-depth assessment, this thesis is 
anchored in a constructivist approach to norms.    
 
 
2. Variations in Constructivism 
This section builds on the above insights by focusing on variation in constructivism 
with regards to the study of international norms. As this thesis is grounded in the 
constructivist research program a more detailed assessment is required than has been 
provided in the previous section. Whilst constructivists may largely agree on a basic 
definition of international norms as outlined above, there is much divergence in the 
literature in terms of research focus.11 Whilst some scholars have separated these two 
approaches to constructivism into different camps, based on epistemological differences 
(see Fierke, 2007), I view them on a continuum across a spectrum of constructivist 
understanding. This position is supported by scholars such as Thomas Risse (2008), and 
allows researchers to benefit from the broad range of insights into norms that 
constructivists have provided. Thus, whilst I consider both perspectives in turn for the 
sake of clarity, I must stress that I view them on a spectrum where there is a differing 
                                                 
11 Conventional constructivists have tended to concentrate on demonstrating the impact of relatively 
stable international norms on state behaviour, often with the aim of countering the realist reliance on 
material power in explaining the actions of states. Thick constructivists have, however, privileged the 
study of norm construction and identifying the norms generated in historical events to provide an 
enhanced understanding of how certain situations came into being. Weldes (1999), for example, provides 
a very illuminating account of the Cuban missile crisis. The focus is on meanings as opposed to the 
assessment of previously defined norms of behaviour. Hopf (1998) is one of the first of many 
constructivists to draw a distinction between varieties of constructivism.  
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emphasis as opposed to clearly defined lines of separation. I shall explore these 
variations by first focusing on the conventional constructivist approach to the study of 
international norms.   
 
2.1 Conventional Constructivism  
Conventional constructivists tend to view norms as standards of appropriate behaviour 
that guide interactions and influence the interests and thus behaviour of states. Norms 
are generally viewed as ‘single standards of behaviour’ with strong ‘evaluative 
dimensions’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). Due to their function as a means by 
which to judge behaviour, evidence of their existence is provided by the justificatory 
trail of discourse that accompanies the actions of states. Scholars working towards this 
end of the constructivist spectrum have focused on questions regarding the emergence 
of international norms as well as how they exert an influence on states, attempting to 
explain variations in state behaviour – for example why some international norms are 
influential for some states and not others and when this is likely to be the case.  
 
Emergence and Development 
A classic study regarding the emergence of international norms is provided by 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) who introduced the notion of a norm life-cycle to 
international politics. The model proposes three stages to the development and 
acceptance of a norm internationally. The initial stage, norm emergence, is 
demonstrated to be down to the work of norm entrepreneurs with organizational 
platforms (such as NGOs) from which to promote their conceptions of appropriate 
behaviour. Through the efforts of entrepreneurs, norms make the transition from these 
organisational platforms to the international realm. One of the examples given is the 
work of Henry Dunant in the promotion of norms protecting medical personnel in war-
time, leading to the establishment of what is now known as the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the various Geneva Conventions outlining humanitarian 
law. The motives for such action are thought to lie in the conviction of norm 
entrepreneurs that these ideas form the most appropriate guide to behaviour, based on 
their ideational commitment, empathy and altruism (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 
898). As such, the actions of norm entrepreneurs are aimed at convincing ‘a critical 
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mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms’ through a re-framing of the issues 
at hand (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895).12  
 
Once this ‘tipping point’ of persuasion has been reached, Finnemore and Sikkink 
suggest that the second stage of the norm lifecycle is led by these states, and/or 
international organizations with the aim of socializing norm compliance in other states 
and promoting ‘social norm following’ as opposed to ‘rational norm following’ (Farrell, 
2005b). This is with the objective of initiating a ‘norm cascade’ through the 
mechanisms of socialization, demonstration and institutionalisation. Various scholars 
have explored this notion of social learning, for example Checkel (2001), and it is 
generally seen as fundamental to the conventional constructivist understanding of norms 
– states learn the norms of international society and through this process they become 
part of identity and are influential. Motivation for states to respond emanates from the 
‘pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of 
state leaders to enhance their self-esteem’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895).  
 
A large amount of research in this area has focused on norm promotion by international 
institutions (e.g. Checkel, 2005), whether this is related to the first stage of the norm life 
cycle in terms of norm formation, for example the UN’s role in establishing 
international norms associated with decolonization, human rights, education, and norm 
development, or building on and regulating that which is already recognized and well-
known (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). In this process international institutions are 
given much more autonomy than in the previous perspectives of realism and neo-
liberalism. Indeed, in Rules for the World Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 7) demonstrate 
that international organisations such as UNHCR, the WTO and the IMF ‘use their 
knowledge and authority not only to regulate what currently exists but also to constitute 
the world, creating new interests, actors, and social activities’. The authors construct an 
argument that suggests that international organisations have often served to define what 
is considered as good governance, in both regulative and constitutive ways, due to the 
authority and autonomy that they hold. So in terms of norm setting, these institutions 
have both autonomy and influence.  
 
                                                 
12 The issue of framing and persuasion is explored in more detail by scholars such as Payne (2001), and is 
also seen as a crucial mechanism associated with norm change (e.g. Finnemore, 2003). 
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The final stage in the lifecycle is norm internalization, where these international norms 
achieve a taken-for-granted quality, as can be seen for example in norms against state 
sponsored slavery and piracy as well as those protecting medical personnel in war time. 
These are areas where the standards for appropriate behaviour have moved beyond 
debate and are so widely accepted that they take on qualities associated with habit.  
 
Constructivists have traced the development and evolution of many international norms. 
Studies have focused on, for example, the rise of a pro-NGO international norm 
(Reimann, 2006), the international norms for election-monitoring (Kelley, 2008), the 
nuclear taboo (Tannenwald, 2005), or the anti-mercenary international norm (Percy 
2007b). Scholars have also assessed potential international norms that have failed to 
come into being, for example in the domain of anti-whaling (Bailey, 2008). For those 
international norms that are established, changes to definitions over time are also 
monitored, for instance with regards to the international norms governing the use of 
force (Finnemore, 2003; Alkopher, 2007). The processes of treaty development have 
been identified as one very illuminating way to trace the development of an 
international norm. Hawkins (2004) suggests that the negotiations for the Convention 
against Torture are a revealing record of how the international norms prohibiting torture 
progressed. Although as both Tannenwald (2005) and Percy (2007a) demonstrate this 
does not mean that international norms are reducible to law, in fact strong international 
norms may be very weak in law as the authors show to be the case with regards to the 
nuclear taboo and anti-mercenary norms respectively (also see Scott and Ambler, 2007).   
 
Certainly the stage at which the international norms, or potential international norms, 
are in this lifecycle framework is important for how we view questions regarding 
defection and contestation. The expectations we hold regarding behaviour will be 
different depending on the stage in the norm life cycle. If actors defected in stage one of 
the model, we are unlikely to expect other international actors to regard their action as 
defection from the norm, as this norm would not yet be established internationally. In 
stage 2 however, a number of states (norm leaders) will have accepted the norm and be 
promoting it internationally, in doing so these norms become constitutive of what is 
meant by being a legitimate member of international society (e.g. human rights 
compliance; Donnelly, 2003). Defection at stage 2 as opposed to stage 1 is more 
challenging, as this becomes contrary to the identity of a legitimate member of 
international society. International normative regimes, such as those associated with 
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human rights and detention, are so closely associated with what it means to be a liberal 
democratic state (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999), challenge to these norms by states for 
whom this identity is important raises a number of questions. For example, what does 
this mean for our understanding of compliance in terms of the benefits to self-esteem 
and legitimation? Has the influence of international norms been vastly over stated by 
constructivists? Is material power really the overriding factor? Or, as Dunne (2007) 
asks, can international norms somehow unravel in new contexts? Defection at this point 
in the lifecycle by states considered to be norm leaders is particularly difficult to 
understand given the relationship between norms and identity and the progressivist basis 
to most constructivism research.13  
 
Research that examines the development and evolution of international norms is 
certainly very valuable as it provides a framework within which to understand changes 
in state behaviour over time. However, there are issues to address in relation to this 
body of work. Primarily, the norm life-cycle has often been taken to suggest a process 
towards the internalization of a particular norm at the international level. The ‘cycle’ 
privileges emergence over decline, and does not easily account for changes in the 
meaning of norms as they go through the various stages, and indeed continue to change 
even once internalized (Kersbergen and Verbeek, 2007; Sandholtz, 2008).14 There is 
often the assumption of ‘moral’ development and ‘progression’, yet as Keene (2007: 
335) points out, whilst there may be progress in one area (his example is that of anti-
slavery), this ‘can be counterbalanced by more questionable developments in another 
(the exclusion of African states from the family of nations)’.15  
 
The changing dynamics of international norms as well as the interactions between 
different normative regimes are certainly a fascinating feature of the international 
environment. With regards to the international norms prohibiting torture, Hawkins 
(2004) suggests that violations of such norms have become part of an enabling structure 
for intervention in the domestic affairs of a state, and in extreme circumstances military 
intervention. However, what happens when states such as the USA, who are generally 
                                                 
13 This would be unless these particular states (norm leaders) are considered to be somehow separate and 
exempt from the influence of norms. 
14 Research of such a nature, focusing on the constantly changing meaning of norms, has tended to fall 
towards the thicker end of the constructivist spectrum.  
15 There seems to be an underlying assumption that international society is moving ‘forward’, which may 
be the case, however, ‘blips’ or more substantial periods of regression need to be accounted for as they 
can be very significant in changing direction and shaping shared understandings. 
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considered to be norm leaders, also defect from these international norms? Can 
defection from the norms prohibiting torture still remain part of an enabling framework 
for intervention? The effect of such defections could further change the framework, and 
thus the nature of intervention. Whilst this is speculation, such scenarios demonstrate 
why changes in the dynamics of norms and interactions between regimes are a 
significant part of the life-cycle of international norms, which consequently have a 
bearing on the practices of international politics. International normative regimes 
certainly do not stay the same, as the in-depth historical studies of Finnemore (2003) 
and Percy (2007b) have highlighted, nor are they likely to do so. This thesis is based on 
the premise that, even once established, there will be a constant battle over meaning, 
and international normative regimes are by no means immune from decline. This does 
not however negate the significance of their influence on behaviour in the international 
sphere.       
 
Normative Influence 
Having established the presence of certain international norms and broader normative 
regimes in the international sphere, constructivist scholars have been tasked with 
demonstrating how they are important and how exactly they ‘shape actors and agency in 
world politics’ (Farrell, 2002: 56). Evidencing the existence of an international norm 
does not automatically equate to compliance behaviour. Indeed, a large amount of 
constructivist research has been based on the call for scholars to give greater 
specification to the mechanisms involved in the influence of international norms, 
explaining how and why they are ‘compelling to actors’ (Yee, 1996: 102). Conventional 
constructivist scholars have responded with research that problematizes state interests 
and identity. 
 
International norms can influence behaviour in the international sphere by shaping the 
terms of debate that underpin political decisions. As Dimitrakopoulos (2005) suggests, 
international norms have both problem-solving and legitimising dynamics. The author 
claims that international standards ‘affect political outcomes by providing a menu of 
legitimate forms of action from which actors choose those that are considered likely to 
solve a given political problem’ (Dimitrakopoulos, 2008: 330). Dimitrakopoulos, like 
various conventional constructivist scholars before, emphasises the way norms 
influence the interests of states, in this case by ‘link[ing] perceived interests to 
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appropriate strategy’ (2008: 320), which sometimes results in ‘normative lock-in’ 
(2008: 322) – actors are tied to a particular strategy.    
 
Such research follows earlier insights that have problematized the interests of states. 
Finnemore (1996), for example, suggested that in order to understand the interests of 
states we need to appreciate the wider social structure in which states are embedded. 
These ‘dense networks of transnational and international social relations’ then socialize 
states to want particular things (Finnemore, 1996: 2). In doing so, states mould their 
view of the world as well as their understanding of their particular role in it. State 
interests are therefore seen to be constructed through this process of social interaction 
and ‘in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good 
and appropriate’ (Finnemore, 1996: 2). Over time as the normative context changes 
there are corresponding alterations in state interests.16  
 
International norms in this sense can change the preferences of actors in the 
international realm and the policies they consider. Empirical examples can be taken 
from Klotz’s (1995) discussion of anti-racial discrimination norms and South African 
apartheid (as mentioned earlier) as well as Price’s (1997) analysis of norms prohibiting 
chemical weapons. These studies (among others) serve to demonstrate that the means by 
which norms are able to influence the preferences of states is through their guidance on 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity. In Price’s research, international 
norms are shown to provide a measure of identity by distinguishing ‘civilized’ states 
from ‘savages’ in associating advanced technology with the former and chemical 
weapons with the backward ideas of the latter. Any defection from these international 
norms has the potential to ‘painfully negate’ a state’s ‘own common and supposedly 
superior standard of civilized identity’ (Price, 1997: 43).17 This may render the 
‘threshold of violations of social practices … so high that certain actions exceed the 
realm of intelligibility’ (Price, 1997: 126).18  
 
                                                 
16 This influence is of course not only limited to states, scholars such as Farrell (2005a; 2005b) have 
explored the impact of international norms on military organisations, whilst Atkinson (2006) has focused 
on US military exchange programs as a mechanism of state socialisation.     
17 Parallels can be draw with Krebs and Jackson’s more recent claims that the ‘Bush administration was 
nearly as preoccupied with how the combat was portrayed as with the combat itself’ (2007: 35). 
18 There are of course very strong normative leanings to this finding in suggesting a correlation between 
civilization and compliance, particularly in this case due to benefits this representation of reality provides 
to those dominant in international society. However, such insights do serve to illustrate the conceived 
relationship between norms and perceived identity, regardless of who benefits (although a consideration 
of the latter is important). 
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Hawkins (2004) provides a further example with regards to the treaty negotiations over 
the universal jurisdiction of the UN Convention against Torture and Other, Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) (1984). Hawkins suggests that 
states worked very hard to avoid standing against other states particularly where they 
shared a similar identity. The author cites Kamminga’s (an Amnesty International 
lobbyist) recollection that ‘one of Amnesty’s major arguments was, ‘‘How can you be 
in the same camp as Uruguay and Argentina on this?’’ When some states began to 
switch to favor universal jurisdiction, a variety of other states quickly followed’ (2004: 
793).19 To stand against universal jurisdiction on torture would put states against those 
with whom there is a shared identity, as well as suggesting to others that the state in 
question is either in favour of torture or fears being found out pursuing such practices 
(Hawkins, 2004: 787).  
 
International norms are therefore influential for those who value the identity with which 
the norms are associated. For example, norms determining appropriate behaviour and 
what it means to be a liberal democratic state will be influential for actors who share 
this identity. As alluded to above, international human rights norms or those prescribing 
standards for detention are strongly associated with what it means to be a liberal 
democratic state, thus defection and contestation by those who share in this identity is 
puzzling. This is because these identities are thought to form the very ‘basis of interests’ 
(Wendt, 1992: 398), as what we want is perceived to depend to a large degree on ‘who’ 
we are. Identities define the range of interests actors consider both possible and 
appropriate as ‘identities constitute interests and actions’ (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 
266-267). Interests can only be determined by reference to ‘the ideas and norms that are 
the lens through which states interpret their interests and forge their identities’ (Sikkink, 
2005: 10). As highlighted in Fierke (2007: 171) conventional constructivist scholars 
tend to suggest that the ‘identity as a liberal democracy cannot be detached from an 
interest in complying with human rights norms’, and increasingly human rights are seen 
as a constitutive feature of what it means to be a legitimate state in international society.  
 
Thus, international norms influence state behaviour by shaping the terms of debate and 
constituting identity, for example – as in the above research, what it means to be a 
legitimate state in the international society, thus often informing state interests. This is 
                                                 
19 Such arguments in relation to recent US practices are unlikely to have received as much impact as 
coalitions have been built by close association with states that have less than favourable human rights 
records.  
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not to suggest that international norms always change behaviour or indeed influence the 
actions of states in singular fashion. The normative environment within which decisions 
are made is far too complex and crosses too many contexts to suggest that this could be 
the case. Scholars account for such complexity to a greater or lesser degree. An 
understanding that engages with this is fundamental to this thesis, as I will further 
outline towards the end of the Chapter. First however, I consider how conventional 
constructivists have approached this varying impact of international norms.  
 
Variation in Impact 
Demands for conventional constructivist scholars to explain variation in compliance 
with international norms has naturally followed from the enhanced influence with which 
international norms are accredited. How can we know when and for whom international 
norms will be influential? Questions such as this have often been translated into 
research attempting to demonstrate the causal impact of international norms on 
behaviour, and the mechanisms by which they are influential. The nature of the norm, 
the degree of internalisation into the domestic structures of the state, and a combination 
of rationalist and normative perspectives, are all areas that have been explored to 
approach such questions.  
 
Research focusing on variation due to the nature of the international norm has explored 
both the realms of norm strength and degree of legalization. Legro (1997) devised a 
measure of norm strength based on specificity (how well the norm is defined), 
durability (how long it has been in effect/whether violators have been penalised) and 
concordance (how widely it is accepted in diplomatic discussions and treaties).20 
However, whilst it would seem sensible to suggest that the robustness of international 
norms needs to be taken into account, this was not found to ‘directly relate to their [the 
international norm’s] impact on the thinking and actions of actors’ in WWII (Legro, 
1997: 57). Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, and Slaughter (2000) have generated similar 
measures in terms of legalisation. As Kahler (2000: 679) suggests at the end of the 
special issue of International Organization (focusing on legalisation), those norms that 
are characterised by ‘heightened precision, obligation, and delegation associated with 
legalization are more likely to be secured’ and are thought to provide a ‘backstop 
normative evolution against retrogression’.  
                                                 
20 This approach is based on the premise that even when norms have been established (following 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s lifecycle) they are likely to vary in ‘strength’. 
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This analysis of legalisation, however, does also recognise that such a factor needs to be 
considered in relation to identity, the importance of which has been demonstrated in the 
previous section.21 The legalisation of norms, for example, ‘serves to attach the identity 
of “law abiding” (more valued in some societies than others) to those who observe 
particular norms’ (Kahler, 2000: 679), creating reputational costs to defection. Thus 
international norms are considered to be influential for the reasons of identity given 
above, but variation in this is found in the norm itself in terms of the degree of 
legalization. This certainly seems like a logical argument, however, again there are 
problems for the international detention regime considered in this thesis. Prohibitions 
against torture, an aspect of this normative regime are, for example, highly legalized 
(Lutz and Sikkink, 2000) so we would expect that they are less likely to be challenged 
or defected from given that law is in place to prevent retrogression. Furthermore, both 
the USA and UK would seem to value the identity of law-abiding given the association 
of the rule of law with the principles of liberal democracy thought to be informing the 
actions of such states.  
 
Risse and Sikkink (1999) have, alternatively, focused on the variations in international 
norm influence in terms of the processes of norm internalisation,22 which is based on 
ideas of social learning in the domestic sphere.23 The authors present a 5-phase spiral 
model based on human rights development24 applied to initially norm-violating 
countries. In the model a state is thought to pass through the stages of repression, then 
denial, tactical concession, prescriptive status and rule-consistent behaviour.25 Once the 
international norms are internalised into the domestic practices of the state the authors 
                                                 
21 As also mentioned in the previous section, legalisation is not necessarily directly linked to the impact of 
international norms; Percy (2007a) and Tannenwald (2005) provide evidence of cases where norms are 
strong but the corresponding law is weak.  
22 Koh (1997) has also taken a similar stance with regards to international law. 
23 Whilst Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) model looked at norm diffusion internationally, Risse et al 
(1999) focus on diffusion domestically. Once ideas have become norms internationally, they approach the 
question of how these norms then influence the behaviour of states at a domestic level.  
24 In this they tend to focus on a ‘central core of rights – the right to life’ defined as ‘the right to be free 
from extrajudicial execution and disappearance’ and ‘freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest and 
detention’ (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 2).    
25 The variation in level of internalisation and hence domestic effect of international norms is thought to 
be based on three types of causal mechanism through an overall process of socialization: 
• Process of instrumental adaptation and strategic bargaining 
• Process of moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion 
• Process of institutionalisation and habitualization 
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argue that they form part of their ‘taken-for-granted’ behaviour, significantly reducing 
the impact of individual state leaders.26  
 
Certainly, this model provides interesting insights generated by case studies forming the 
chapters of the book. However, as they are aimed at demonstrating how human rights 
norms can have an influence in initially violating countries, compliance is almost 
assumed in ‘Western’ states.27 Yet if we consider the actions of those thought to be 
norm leaders, such as the USA and UK, there certainly appear to be significant 
anomalies the model does not account for. Questions are raised such as whether these 
states have regressed from ‘taken-for-granted’ rule-consistent behaviour, where the 
importance of the leader is minimal, or whether they were ever there in the first place. 
Certainly they now fall short on several aspects of Phase 4 (persistent behaviour), as this 
requires that actors normative ideas do not change with context and who they are 
interacting with. We only have to consider Tony Blair’s press conference of August 
2005 where the former Prime Minister (2005zb) emphasised that ‘the rules of the game 
are changing’, after the attacks of July 7th 2005; context clearly has a role here. Also 
there needs to be a strong consistency between words promoting human rights and 
actions – there are certainly exceptions to this for the USA and UK. Indeed, aspects of 
Phase 2 (denial) appear to be evident, for example, whilst there does largely seem to be 
agreement concerning the moral validity of the international detention regime which 
encompasses prohibitions on torture, there is at the same time disagreement as to 
applicability.  
 
We are then left with a contradiction between identity and practice leading to various 
questions regarding the influence of norms. Theories of compliance such as the above 
are certainly criticised for focusing too much on the role of structure and process at the 
expense of adequately accounting for agency (Flockhart, 2006). They are also limited 
by not providing sufficient means by which to study the changing nature of international 
norms; assumptions regarding their meaning, permanence and one-way progression are 
very apparent.  
 
                                                 
26 International norms are considered to have achieved a taken-for-granted status independent from 
individual belief systems. 
27 These states are referred to as having the ‘identity as promoters of human rights’ (Risse and Sikkink, 
1999: 23) and human rights norms are seen to ‘both prescribe rules for appropriate behavior, and help 
define identities of liberal states’ (1999: 8). 
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Various authors taking the conventional constructivist approach have proposed to 
overcome some of these problems by generating a synthesis between constructivism and 
more instrumental perspectives to explain defection or strategic action. The tendency 
has been to weaken the influence of international norms and suggest that there is room 
for state actors to create ‘rules of exception’28 or ‘exclusion’29 (Cardenas, 2004).30 
Authors seem to have moved towards a focus on state decision-making and room for 
manoeuvre within the parameters of the international norm (e.g. Shannon, 2000; Farrell, 
2005b). To do so scholars have often relied on a combination of appropriate and 
instrumental action and have concentrated on suggesting when each is likely to ‘win 
out’; for example, when the logic of consequences will take precedence over the logic 
of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1998). Yet, as Hurrell (2002) suggests, the divide 
between these logics of action is by no means clear. Indeed, surely we are in fact 
calculating what the LoC is based on broader normative frameworks? The constitutive 
side to norms, where they inform the interests of states, often appears to be very down-
played in such research. The focus is instead on actors deciding whether or not to follow 
international norms where their meaning is assumed. Much is left out of the picture with 
regards to defection and contestation, for example, the interactive processes of 
contestation. This reflects the top-down nature of much work in the 
constructivism/rationalism domain. 
 
Thus, whilst conventional constructivism provides many illuminating contributions with 
regards to international norms, such as the need to consider factors such as the nature of 
the norm, the stage at which it is located in the norm life-cycle, and how international 
norms are influential by means of socialisation and identity, there are several areas 
where significant limitations are apparent. First, the focus is often on international 
norms where, when they achieve a certain status, meaning is held constant.31 I find this 
problematic and prefer to consider international normative regimes as in a constant 
process of change with regards to interpretations of meaning and application, however 
fast or slow this may be at different times in history. Second, there appears to be a 
                                                 
28 These are rules that ‘specify the conditions under which a state can trade one set of norms for another, 
or when international norms can be violated’ (Cardenas, 2004: 222).  
29 These may occur ‘anywhere that powerful groups see others as less equal than themselves’ and can 
serve to justify the suspension of human rights to a certain group (Cardenas, 2004: 223) as has often been 
the case in the U.S. led ‘war on terror’. 
30 Certainly arguments concerning exceptionalism will have to be considered when working though the 
cases in this thesis. 
31 There are of course exceptions to this, as mentioned Finnemore (2003) traces changes to the norms 
governing the use of force. 
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degree of permanence suggested with regards to compliance behaviour. I begin from the 
premise, however, that there is always room change in interpretation, both as human 
agents change, as well as the different normative regimes that are interacting at any one 
time. Third, explanations that rely on perceived interests coming into conflict with 
international norms only provide part of the picture; understanding these interests and 
how they develop, rather than making fixed assumptions is generally more illuminating. 
And fourth, much of the above analysis rests on the importance of a liberal democratic 
identity in international society. The interplay of different social identities in the process 
of norm negotiation is not considered.     
 
Whilst these are general claims and as such they mask certain divergences within the 
conventional constructivist research programme (as mentioned previously I view 
constructivism more as a spectrum so scholars will come up against these criticism to 
differing degrees), they serve as a means to clarify the positioning of this thesis. I shall 
now refine this further with reference to scholarship that falls more towards the thick 
end of the constructivist spectrum.  
 
2.2 Thick Constructivism 
Whilst sharing many of the same principles as conventional constructivism, in terms of 
a concern with the construction of social reality and the mutual constitution of structure 
and agent, those constructivists towards the thicker end of the spectrum place more 
emphasis on the importance of language and the continuously changing nature of 
norms. This is within a framework that engages to a much greater extent, with the 
multiplicity of identity.  
 
Language 
Fundamental to this end of the spectrum of constructivism is the focus on language (see 
Fierke, 2003). The means to achieve an understanding of social reality rests on the 
discovery of the processes by which social facts are constituted by language and rules 
(Fierke, 2003; 2007). Scholars in this domain, such as Onuf (1989) and Kractochwil 
(2000) have located their arguments in a broader lineage (Fierke, 2007) drawing on the 
‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy and in particular the insights of Wittgenstein.32 The focus 
has been on areas such as the influence of different speech acts on interactions in the 
                                                 
32 The linguistic turn has influenced a range of scholars, for example, John Searle, Jurgen Habermas and 
Richard Rorty. 
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international sphere, where the limits of shared understandings are, how politicians set 
boundaries to what is possible in a given context, and the relationship between language 
and shared norms (Fierke, 2003: 81). Emphasis is placed on language both sustaining 
and enabling identities. 
   
Thick constructivism tends to be characterised by a rejection of ‘getting behind our 
words to compare them with that which they describe’. Instead language is viewed ‘as a 
form of action in itself’ (Fierke, 1996: 469, drawing from Wittgenstein, 1958). The act 
of naming a particular context, for example labelling the ‘war’ on terror and the 
historical analogies drawn upon, will create certain parameters for action – they create 
‘games’ within which actors are situated (Fierke, 1996).  
 
As opposed to generating predictive hypotheses to test in relation to norm defection, our 
focus is shifted to understanding the use of language by actors in their construction of 
the world and the identities and norms that are portrayed as important in the discourse. 
This creates a ‘game’ which then affects the parameters for action. Instead of a direct 
concern with intention, the emphasis towards this end of the spectrum of constructivism 
is on ‘the generation of meaning, norms and rules, as expressed in language, by the 
subjects of analysis’ (Fierke, 2007: 176). To determine an isolated or singular cause for 
something, such as the defection and contestation of the international norms concerning 
the detention and treatment of prisoners in the ‘war on terror’, drifts into the realm of 
interpretation; how can we really determine a singular cause for this action and is one 
really likely to exist? As such, we are better placed studying questions that focus on 
how the ‘social fact’ that detention abuses happened became possible, how normative 
constraint was negotiated to allow for this, and the variation in meaning attributed to 
these actions (Fierke, 2007). This approach is firmly grounded in a constitutive, as 
opposed to Humean, conception of cause (Kurki, 2008).  
 
Norms, Meaning and Interpretation 
Scholars writing from the thicker end of the constructivist spectrum certainly emphasise 
different elements with regards to international normative regimes. Norms, at any level 
(institutional, domestic society or international for example), tend not to be internalised 
by actors as has been the case in much conventional constructivist thought (Onuf, 
1998). Scholars are less deterministic with regards to the impact of international norms 
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on behaviour.33 This position is more consistent with my conclusions at the end of the 
consistent constructivism section, moving away from a sense of permanence and 
allowing room for interpretation. Judgement governs the chosen course of action, based 
on that which makes sense within the particular context of rules. Variability in the 
context, the array of rules available, and their changing nature is built into our 
understanding.   
 
As Kratochwil suggests, ‘(n)orms not only establish certain games and enable the 
players to pursue their goals within them, they also establish inter-subjective meanings 
that allow the actors to direct their actions towards each other, communicate with each 
other, appraise the quality of their actions, criticize claims and justify choices’ (1993: 
75-76). They serve to reduce complexity, render action meaningful, as well as forming 
the basis for justification and communication. Thus they are influential on actors but not 
in the same stable, isolated, and Humean causational manner that tends to be portrayed 
towards the conventional constructivist end of the spectrum.  
 
Wiener (2004) provides a useful account of the differences between these two 
approaches with regards to norms. The author suggests that scholars working in the 
conventional constructivist programme employ a largely behavioural34 interpretation of 
international norms as relatively stable causes for action, as has been explored earlier in 
this Chapter. This is in contrast to the more reflexive approach to norms now under 
consideration where norms are seen as contested and the focus is on the construction of 
norms in practice as opposed to influence. The concern is with contested meaning as 
located in practice. Attention is shifted ‘towards social practices to assess the meaning 
of a norm’ (2004: 199) as opposed to making assumptions as to how they are 
understood and testing for compliance or defection. This brings into focus questions 
surrounding the ‘impact of variation in the meaning’ of norms (Wiener, 2004: 200) as 
opposed to their direct influence where meaning is taken as stable even across context. 
This meaning is thought to be located in discourse such as ‘official documents, policy 
documents, political debates and media contributions’ (2004: 201) and can also be 
accounted for through interviews (Wiener, 2008).  
 
                                                 
33 This is not to suggest that constructivists towards the conventional end of the spectrum are completely 
deterministic in their approach, elements are however apparent. 
34 This is not in terms of ““Do X to get Y,” norms take a different form: “Good people do X”” (Risse and 
Sikkink, 1999: 8, citing from Fearon, 1997).  
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The functioning of international normative regimes (particularly those of a prescriptive 
nature) would certainly benefit from being located within this framework, as opposed to 
isolating singular international norms from the broader normative context. It then 
becomes an interesting question as to how far these meanings can be contested, and how 
fairly stable international normative regimes (whilst still contested to a degree) retain 
influence, restricting or enabling certain behaviours in the face of this contestation. 
International normative regimes certainly hold an influence related to that in 
conventional constructivism through informing the interests of states and setting the 
parameters of action by means of identity. Indeed, as Wiener (2004: 219) notes both 
approaches ‘are important strands of compliance research’, and ‘pursuing them in 
isolation unnecessarily obscures important theoretical advances in the field’.  
 
Thus, as opposed to focusing on a behavioural account of norms where there is an 
isolated and observable causal relationship between norms and behaviour, based on the 
assumption of stable international norms exerting an influence, scholars taking a more 
reflexive approach to norms tend to focus on their constitutive side; where meaning is 
interpreted in different contexts of interaction. Therefore, the application and perceived 
parameters of the international detention regime will be influenced by contextually 
based interpretations which are in a constant state of reproduction or challenge; social 
consensus internationally leading to the presentation of stability over a period of time.  
 
This approach presents a different perspective to the previous accounts generated from 
the conventional constructivist approach and allows for interpretation and contestation, 
revisionism and defection, from relatively stable international normative regimes. This 
is achieved by focusing on meaning and interpretation as situated in broader normative 
structures. However, how do we consider the arguments made previously concerning 
the influence of international norms through constituting what it means to be a 
legitimate state in the international society, in light of this more interactive and dynamic 
approach? To address this issue our focus is shifted to the various social identities 
influencing and informing decisions.  
 
Multiplicity of Identity 
Issues concerning the multiplicity of identity have been granted more attention towards 
the thick end of the constructivist spectrum. Indeed questions have been posed as to 
whether or not an account of multiple social identities can fit with more conventional 
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constructivism. Maja Zehfuss has been one particularly prominent critic of the type of 
constructivism put forward by Wendt. Although Wendt himself suggests that actors 
have several social identities, Zehfuss (among others) points out that this is still based 
on a relatively stable characterisation of identity. There is little room for multiplicity or 
contestation as change is portrayed as simply moving from ‘one relatively stable 
identity to another’ through interaction (Zehfuss, 2002: 90). Wendt’s position does not 
account for insights from scholars such as Jutta Weldes (1999) who have demonstrated 
that state identity is always precarious and in need of stabilisation or reproduction. 
Indeed, Zehfuss (2002: 89) notes that Wendt simply ‘reduces identity to something 
negotiable between states’. The author also suggests that ‘Wendt’s recognition that 
domestic politics influence state behaviour and state identity fails to address the 
complexity of the issue at hand’ (Zehfuss, 2001: 335).35 Steve Smith (2001: 53) further 
supports this point, arguing that the perspective presented by Wendt seems to be largely 
‘limited to examining how states construct identities and interests through interactions, 
and will not delve deeper into the identity of the state than that’.  
 
Zehfuss (2001; 2002) has investigated the consequences of Wendt’s characterisation of 
identity in relation to the redefinition of the Federal Republic of Germany’s identity to 
allow for military involvement abroad (such action was previously unacceptable). The 
author found that a number of exclusions were needed to sustain Wendt’s approach 
negating the complexity of identity and the contestations that are inherent, resulting in a 
loss of understanding. Clearly this is a theoretical problem that is always approached in 
the social sciences, the compromise of focusing on either explaining or understanding 
(Hollis and Smith, 1990) and how parsimonious we wish to be, however for the 
purposes of this study I would question how much we can really explain if we do not 
have the means by which to understand. Although Zehfuss’ (2001: 317) account is 
limited to Wendt’s conceptualisation of identity, the tensions demonstrated do not 
reflect well in general for those constructivists who do not account sufficiently for the 
multiplicity and complexity of identity in their analysis.  
 
Scholars towards the thicker end of the constructivist spectrum suggest that identities 
are contingent and changeable. This is not taken to mean that states simply switch 
identity through interaction but that we work with multiple identities. Certainly I agree 
                                                 
35 Indeed Zehfuss goes even further to state that, ‘[t]he contingency and even inherently contradictory 
character of …expressions of identity is…not only invisible through Wendt’s framework but in tension 
with his conceptualization of identity’ (Zehfuss, 2001: 335). 
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that we need to move away from a unitary account of identity to progress passed the 
problems presented in the previous sections. I also feel that more needs to be made of 
the interaction between the domestic and international as opposed to being seen as 
separate spheres. Questions are raised as to how we understand the influence of norms 
in terms of such a framework. This is where I look to psychology for guidance, in terms 
of how to approach the study of multiple social identities in conjunction with the 
influence of international normative regimes. In the next Chapter I provide the micro-
foundations for such an approach by drawing from the social identity approach in social 
psychology. By employing insights from the social identity approach, we can utilise 
both areas of constructivist research into norms. Before I go on to the next Chapter I 
will however sum up exactly where I stand within the above debates and outline how 
this position relates to the international detention regime that is of concern in this thesis.  
 
 
3. Approaching International Norms 
Drawing from the above literature review this section will outline the specific approach 
to the international detention regime taken in this thesis. The central points I highlight 
focus on relating this international normative regime to a liberal democratic social 
identity internationally, embracing the tensions and complexities in the international 
normative environment, and concentrating on the multiplicity of identity. 
 
As has been demonstrated, there are various ways in which international norms have 
been characterised and studied within the constructivist research programme. I begin 
from the premise that international norms exist and have a causal impact on behaviour 
in the international sphere in a constitutive, not isolated or singular, manner. They are 
experienced by individuals, and do not exist without them, but they are not solely 
reducible to individuals as by definition they are shared. There are many areas in which 
there is substantial consensus internationally for the existence of normative regimes 
influencing the actions of international actors. For example, researchers more towards 
the conventional end of constructivism have highlighted norms governing the use of 
force, mercenary use, human rights, and diplomatic arrangements as previously 
mentioned. Such norms are by definition shared internationally, although they are 
certainly not restricted to this sphere as somehow separate from the domestic. 
International normative regimes not only provide guidance as to appropriate behaviour 
internationally, but also domestically, for example in relation to human rights.  
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Predominantly, the international norms referred to by constructivists relate to those 
associated with being a liberal democracy, a dominant social identity internationally. 
Whilst the norms that constitute this social identity predate the concept of a liberal 
democratic state (for example the human rights regime), they are now taken to be a 
constitutive aspect of what this social identity means, which is also often seen as 
indicative of being a legitimate state in the broader international society. Whilst the 
liberal democratic social identity is dominant in the international society, taking this as 
representative of a singular international identity does not account for the multiplicity of 
social identities or indeed fit with the principles of the social identity approach as 
further articulated in Chapter 2, where I ground these insights in the micro-foundations 
provided by this perspective in social psychology. Thus, I relate the international 
detention regime to a liberal democratic international social identity. Given that the 
international detention regime constitutes, in part, what it means to be a liberal 
democratic state, I share the conventional constructivist assessment that they will then 
to some extent inform the perceived national interests of the political elites that 
represent individual states, where they value this social identity. As Wendt (1992: 398) 
suggests, identities form the ‘basis of interests’. 
 
Thus, international normative regimes are understood in general to relate to the 
predominant social identity in international society, that of being a liberal democratic 
state. As such these standards contribute to the construction of the national interest by 
political elites. However, where I diverge significantly from those who are firmly 
grounded towards the very conventional end of the spectrum of constructivism is in 
accounting for multiplicity, both in terms of identity and international norms. As 
mentioned, much conventional constructivist scholarship focuses on a singular state 
identity which encompasses international norms. As such there is often little room for 
divergence in terms of their impact, other than the explanations that I have addressed, 
such as variations in norm strength, variations in the degree of internalisation into the 
domestic structures of the state, or indeed a separation of the logic of consequences 
from the logic of appropriateness. These arguments, whilst insightful, do little to 
address the issue of multiplicity, which is fundamental internationally, particularly in 
relation to the question posed in this thesis.  
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I disagree with the concept of a singular identity in which different norms compete. As 
Zehfuss has pointed out, multiplicity also applies to identity. Political representatives 
are not simply faced with a singular identity of being a liberal democratic state in the 
international society; they have many social identities, some based on historical ties, 
others on international and trans-national groupings with which they are associated. 
Whilst these may not appear to contradict each other, the varying normative content can 
be accentuated in certain circumstances, for example the norms of a country’s military 
can become out of tune with those of human rights groupings.   
 
International norms, as associated with being a liberal democratic state, interact with 
those from other social identities, to inform and give meaning to the actions of states. 
Thus, an approach that isolates international norms from the broader social identities 
context in which they are situated is highly restrictive in terms of the analysis of 
behaviour.36 Whilst identities form the basis of interests, there is always room for 
judgement and negotiation in this broader social identities context without having to 
rely on exogenous interests or a separation between the Logic of Consequences and the 
Logic of Appropriateness (see Muller, 2004: 396). Actors are calculating what is in their 
interests in certain contexts based on broad normative regimes relating to different 
social identities; interests are always embedded in such frames of reference.  
 
The environment within which political elites are located is certainly exceptionally 
complex, with many social identities and normative regimes influencing behaviour.37 
Defection, contestation and revisionism, can reveal changes and modifications to 
international normative regimes, their application, and what is meant by the social 
identity of being part of a group of liberal democratic states, which then sets the 
framework for subsequent debates. To say that a particular act violates an international 
norm tells us very little unless we embed this in the broader normative and social 
identities context encompassing public arguments with opponents on particular policies. 
Analysis must capture these public negotiations (Hasian, 2007). Thus, focusing on 
singular isolated norms with permanent meaning leaves much out of the picture that is 
essential to our understanding of the negotiation of normative constraints and processes 
of influence.    
 
                                                 
36 I will give greater specificity to account for such factors in Chapter 2. 
37 Kowert and Legro (1996) raise this point with regards to competing and contradictory norms. 
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In this thesis, singular international norms are not considered to be internalized to the 
extent that there is no room for individual decision-making; a degree of contestation is 
always possible but this relies on an interaction between the individual or group of 
individuals (embedded in the social context), and the various audiences judging 
behaviour. Such actions may or may not result in changes to international normative 
regimes, depending on broader acceptance. The meanings and interpretations at the 
agent level (whether individual or collective) are therefore a vital consideration in 
understanding the processes of defection and contestation by members of the social 
identity to which these regimes relate.  
 
Such an approach also enables us to capture the co-constitutive processes central to 
constructivist understandings. The significance of this is often lost in research that 
focuses purely on the impact of normative regimes on behaviour in the international 
sphere. The approach taken in this thesis engages with norm influence in terms of an 
interactive process, addressing concerns raised about previous research where norm 
entrepreneurs and norm leaders often appear to be separate from the normative context, 
(see Kornprobst, 2007 for further criticism along these lines). Norm leaders and norm 
entrepreneurs are instead firmly embedded in the broad normative and social identities 
context.38 The framework outlined in Chapter 2, based on the micro-foundations of 
social psychology, will provide the means by which to capture such processes in 
relation to the political elites that represent the state.  
   
In relation to epistemological issues that are generally seen to separate the different ends 
of the spectrum of constructivist research, I must also clarify my position. Whilst 
constructivists share a commitment to social subject matter, the means by which enquiry 
is sought has often been framed very differently. This thesis goes some way to 
acknowledging the ‘multiple norms [that] can influence actors – with competing or even 
contradictory prescriptions for behavior and identity’ (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 486). 
As a consequence, I avoid focusing on the prediction of behaviour in relation to singular 
and isolated variables, and instead favour a constitutive approach to causation over a 
Humean one. I consider the unity of state identity, and the conventional constructivist 
characterisation of norms as single standards of appropriate behaviour exerting an 
influence on states, too restrictive. As I have demonstrated in this Chapter there appear 
to be too many contingent and contested factors for this type of research. Indeed, I feel 
                                                 
38 The content of the social identities context considered in this thesis is outlined in Chapter 3. 
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we are better placed to aim for a framework that will enhance our understanding of the 
processes involved in the negotiation of normative constraint, thus highlighting 
influential factors that we may not have previously seen, as opposed to aiming for 
prediction. What exactly this framework will show us then, in terms of the negotiation 
of normative constraint becomes an empirical question.   
 
Research towards the conventional end of the constructivist spectrum also rests on ‘a 
strong specification of the subjective motivations of individuals’ yet to achieve this 
would require ‘unmediated access to people’s minds’ that researchers would not be able 
to obtain even through the private statements of state leaders (Krebs and Jackson, 2007: 
40). In terms of the positioning of this thesis, I agree with the standpoint of scholars 
such as Krebs and Jackson (2007), that we cannot get behind language to compare it to 
reality, language has a hugely significant role in constructing reality. To miss this point 
loses much of the value of the constructivist approach to enquiry in international 
relations. Thus, the focus of analysis in this thesis is on the language used to negotiate 
international normative constraints and manage social identities, as contextually 
situated. Karin Fierke (2007) has been direct in stating that this is likely to lead to a 
separation into two distinct sectors of constructivism. However, again I have to stress 
that I view these differences on a spectrum as opposed to clear camps with distinct 
boundaries. Before providing the specific framework for such an approach, which is the 
subject of Chapter 2, I must also demonstrate what this means for the international 
detention regime.     
 
3.1 The International Detention Regime 
In this section, the Chapter moves from a general discussion of the different theoretical 
interpretations of international norms, and the approach adopted in this thesis, to a 
specific focus on the normative regime of concern in this study. Standards governing 
the use of detention and appropriate treatment of prisoners, particularly in warfare, have 
a long history. However we do not have to look far back to see reasons for the 
construction and continued development of an international normative regime to protect 
the rights of detainees; the horrors of the two world wars in this regard will suffice. This 
means that there are strong images and clear memories providing impetus for the 
international detention regime to develop even further. It has indeed become more 
prominent as a sub-field of human rights in the last 20-30years.  
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The foundations for the normative regime concerning the detention and treatment of 
prisoners can be traced as far back as the crusades with regards to the ideas of 
reciprocity and ransom. Whilst not hugely prevalent at that time, Megret (2007) 
suggests that reciprocity preserved a small amount of humanity in this area. This was 
applicable to certain ‘like-minded’ groups – a theme certainly apparent today in debates 
over applicability in the war on terror with non-state entities. The idea that prisoners 
might mean profit in terms of ransom also provided incentives to treat captives well, at 
least those with money. In the 19th Century detention practices shifted away from 
ransom to the more long-term holding of prisoners (Neff, 2007). Such moves were 
accompanied by a change in attitude regarding responsibility, prisoners were no longer 
the responsibility of the individual (hence ransom was prevalent), but were prisoners of 
the state. Furthermore, the focus was no-longer solely on military necessity with regards 
to detention, but began to encompass ideas about the rights of captives. Neff suggests 
that this shift to humanitarianism from military necessity was based in broader 
intellectual trends, such as the Romantic Movement which stressed the rights and 
dignity of individuals, the anti-slavery movement, the American Declaration of 
Independence, and the development of rights and duties in the French republic. Whilst 
debates ensued on applicability, reciprocity and humanitarianism are taken to form the 
sources of the international detention regime. There is also a historical basis to 
arguments concerning the lack of utility to torture in such contexts, dating back to 
Aristotle, further strengthening these normative developments (Ross, 2005).      
 
These foundations have been reinforced by the construction of legal treaties with which 
we are familiar with today as documented in human rights and humanitarian law, with a 
brief mention in refugee law. Humanitarian law seems to have the longest history in this 
regard as many of the roots for institutionalised norms have their origins in the 
principles of religion and ancient practices which have then been reflected in 
humanitarian law, otherwise referred to as the laws of war or jus in bello.39  
 
Before the twentieth century the legal basis for the international detention regime is 
largely restricted to customary international law, however mention is made in the Lieber 
Code of 1863. Article 56 states that: 
                                                 
39 For example suggestions were raised in the sixth century BCE by the Chinese warrior Sun Tzu that 
limitations should be placed on the conduct of war. War crimes were also referred to in around 200 BCE 
in the Hindu code of Manu. Later in 1625 Hugo Grotius wrote on the humanitarian treatment of civilians 
in On the Law of War and Peace (2004). This is to name but a few of the texts or codes of conduct that 
have been constructed to regulate the conduct of hostilities (see Trombly, 2003).  
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A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon 
him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by 
mutilation, death, or any other barbarity. 
 
The first Geneva Convention, adopted in 1864, laid further foundations for international 
humanitarian law in that it set rules for the protection of victims of conflict and the 
provision of medical care in conflict with the introduction of the red-cross symbol. The 
Hague Conventions of 1899 however refer specifically to the humane treatment of 
prisoners of war. Chapter 2 of the annex to Hague II is devoted to prisoners of war and 
Article 4 refers specifically to humane treatment. This is again echoed in 1907. These 
conventions do not specifically refer to torture but by banning action that is inhumane it 
would seem reasonable to deduce that torture is of concern in this provision. Article 2 of 
the Geneva Conventions in 1929 again refers to humane treatment but this is expanded 
to include protection ‘particularly against acts of violence, insults and public curiosity’. 
The Convention gives extensive guidance to the treatment of prisoners of war including 
provisions for the conditions of detention.  
 
Despite this durability it is largely the Geneva Conventions of 1949 that we look to for 
clarification of international detention standards in times of conflict. The conventions 
were aimed at providing greater regulation to the conduct of hostilities and protection to 
those involved than was experienced before and during WWII. The two additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Convention of 1977 again refer to prisoners of war, and 
Protocol II specifically concerns humane treatment. With respect to the treatment of 
prisoners of war, the laws developed still in some aspects go ‘far beyond that of rules of 
human rights law relating to the treatment of prisoners in peacetime’ (Rodley, 2002: 3).  
 
In terms of human rights, documentation of detention standards can be found in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which clearly states that: 
 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person (Article 3.) 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 
5.) 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Article 9.) 
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The protection of detainees has been further documented in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), Article 7 referring to prohibitions on 
torture and Article 9, arbitrary arrest or detention. The topic of detention has however 
grown much more significantly as a field of human rights law in the last 20 years with 
various changes to the legal norms and institutions set to deal with the area. Major 
advances include the General Assembly Resolution 3452 (XXX) of 1975 containing the 
Declaration against Torture, alongside General Assembly Resolution 3453 (XXX) 
referring specifically to ‘Torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment’. This was followed by the 
development of enforcement mechanisms with the power to investigate, such as the 
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (1980), and the 
appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions. In 1984 the 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment was adopted by the General Assembly. Later in 1985 a Special Rapporteur 
on Torture was appointed. With regards to disappearances the International Convention 
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, was adopted in 2006. 
 
Regional developments have also been hugely prevalent with references to international 
standards for detention being found in treaties such as the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), the American 
Convention on Human Rights (1969), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (1981), the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985), 
and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (1987). The latter has also set up procedures for visiting 
places of detention. Examples of other instruments relating to detention are:     
• Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1977) 
• Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (1990) 
• Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment (1988) 
• Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2000) 
• Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, 
particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against 
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Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(1982) 
• Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979) 
• Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials (1990) 
• United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of the Liberty 
(1990) 
• United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice (1985) 
References to detention can also be found in the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951) albeit limited to Article 31 concerning penalties (Art 31(1)) and 
restriction of movement (Art 31(2)). However, these basic principles were developed as 
part of a UN Expert Roundtable in 2001 on Article 31. The roundtable decided that 
there was a need for greater elaboration particularly in terms of national legislation to 
ensure compliance with the basic principles above.40 The concerns generated by 
detention practices have increased to present the need for a greater clarification of 
Article 31 and the protections afforded to refugees and asylum seekers.  
 
We can see from the brief consideration above that issues concerning detention are 
heavily prevalent in international law. Many conventions, codes of conduct and 
standards have been put in place internationally. Together these represent the 
international normative regime prescribing standards for detention and prohibiting 
torture. In the interests of concision, this thesis will refer to the aforementioned as the 
international detention regime. As stated in the introduction, I use the term ‘regime’ to 
refer to the above as a collection of normative and constitutive standards. This differs 
from the purely regulative and institutional approach employed by neo-liberals.  
 
Given that there are a variety of legal standards and mechanisms in place, what can we 
deduce to be the main themes that emerge regarding the international detention regime? 
Clearly norms concerning torture and inhuman treatment occupy a central role in this 
                                                 
40 The Expert Roundtable identified that detention must be considered an exceptional response in terms of 
individual cases, and needed to be undertaken in line with both human rights and refugee law - not 
introduced arbitrarily. Justification for the detention of those covered by the Refugee Convention was 
found in the protection of national security and public order, not to be used for the purposes of deterrence. 
The conclusions suggested that overall usage should be minimized and the authors point out that there are 
in fact many other means of restrictions on the freedom of movement that do not amount to detention. 
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area; we only have to look at the amount of literature written on this specific aspect of 
detention and human rights standards to establish this. Whilst there are many other 
themes which I will consider below, a number of these do in fact relate back to torture 
in terms of avoiding conditions that may lead to torture and abuse.  
 
The standard definition of torture employed can be found in Article 1 of the United 
Nations Convention against Torture (CAT) as: 
 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing 
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 
One point to draw from this is that States will be in breach of this Article if they provide 
consent or acquiescence to actions that defect from the agreed international normative 
standards in this area.  
 
Article 2 (2) is quite clear in stating: 
 
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat or war, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture. 
 
Thus the prohibitive standards are not deemed to be context specific in any way. A 
further theme concerning detention, and related to torture, is the principle of non-
refoulement. Article 3 (1) of the CAT states that: 
 
No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 
 
This position is given further support in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, although 
under this legal document exceptions are granted on national security grounds – there 
are however no exceptions under part 3 of ECHR, which also refers to non-refoulement.  
 
The CAT also includes provisions on the prevention of torture in providing education 
and information ‘in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical 
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personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, 
interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or 
imprisonment’ (Article 10 (1)).  
 
Whilst Article 31 (1) does allow for the denouncement of the Convention ‘by written 
notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nation’ this can only come into 
effect one year later. Indeed, the absoluteness of the prohibition is backed up in the 
ICCPR where no derogation is permitted from Article 7 concerning torture and ‘cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment’. Article 4 makes clear that this applies even in times of 
emergency. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions also prohibits ‘cruel 
treatment and torture’ as well as ‘outrages upon personal dignity’. Additionally support 
for prohibitions on torture can also be found in the various legal instruments listed 
earlier in this section. Prohibitions on torture are therefore robust, absolute and highly 
specified across times of peace, armed conflict and states of emergency. The right has 
achieved the status of jus cogens and as such cannot be changed by a later rule of 
customary law or treaty, but can only be altered through an opposing new norm of jus 
cogens status. Such a status is reflected in the Judges’ opinion on Filártiga v. Peña-
Irala (Kaufman, 1980), that ‘the torturer has become, like the pirate and the slave trader 
before him, hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind’.   
 
Whilst clear definitions are provided for torture (giving us a substantial basis from 
which to consider defection and contestation), this is less than precise for inhumane and 
degrading treatment. Reference is made to the inherent dignity of the human person in 
the preamble of the ICCPR which suggests this forms a fundamental part of the 
detention regime, yet there is no specific definition for this. There has indeed been much 
debate in terms of practice. The ICRC interprets the provision to involve a degree of 
suffering, either physical or mental (Aeschlimann, 2005). However Aeschlimann also 
notes that ‘it is practically impossible to establish precisely, whether technically or 
legally, the threshold of suffering or degree of pain “required” for each category has 
been met, given that each individual will feel and react differently when subjected to the 
same methods’ (Aeschlimann, 2005: 111). The variation in cultural connotations to 
different forms of suffering, are impossible to control for. There is therefore scope for 
interpretation on what constitutes inhumane and degrading treatment. However, this is 
dependent on acceptance by other members of the social group to which this pertains – 
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in the context of this thesis, an international social group of liberal democratic states is 
prominent.  
 
Prohibitions on indefinite imprisonment are another area that is covered by the current 
detention regime. Indefinite detention is incompatible with Article 9 of the UDHR as 
given earlier in this section; this is again supported by Article 9 of the ICCPR:   
 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
detention. No one shall be deprived of liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law. 
 
Similar sentiments can be seen regionally, under Article 5 of the ECHR, Article 7 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 6 of the African Charter of Human 
and People’s Rights. Further to this we also find in the ICCPR that: 
 
Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a 
court, in order that such a court may decide on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the 
detention is not lawful (Article 9 (4)). 
 
The broad application of these rights is documented in ‘General Comment 15’ (Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1986) where, ‘the 
enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizen’s of States Parties but must also 
be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum-
seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find themselves in the 
territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party’.41  
 
In addition to the above, the right of a detainee to challenge the legality of his/her 
detention is held in the writ of habeas corpus in common-law countries. Habeus corpus 
dates back to the Magna Carta of 1215, where Article 39 states that ‘No free man shall 
be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, 
or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against 
him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law 
                                                 
41 Temporary derogation can be permitted from Article 9 under Article 4 of the ICCPR however this is 
restricted to a ‘time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation’ and ‘to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation’. Derogations have to be limited in terms of duration and must 
follow the principle of proportionality. Detention which may begin as legal must also be subject to review 
to avoid it becoming arbitrary (Zayas, 2005).   
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of the land.’ Inherited from the English legal system the right to habeus corpus features, 
for example, in Article 1 (9) of the United States Constitution.  
 
Also, related to protections against indefinite detention are the right to a fair trial and 
essential judicial guarantees. Article 14 of the ICCPR sets out ‘minimum’ guidelines for 
this and refers to the entitlement to ‘a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established in law’. Amongst other rights the 
detainee is to be ‘informed promptly’ of the charges against him. This right falls under 
the same rules for derogation as included in footnote 41. 
 
Norms prohibiting disappearances also feature in the international detention regime. 
Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (1992) suggests that action in this regard is considered to be an ‘offence 
to human dignity’. In his writings on the matter Rodley (2002: 267) goes as far to 
determine that disappearances can be seen as ‘constituting a crime against humanity’. 
Disappearances may amount to torture or even the arbitrary deprivation of life. The 
importance of such prohibitions can be seen in the adoption, in December 2006, of the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance. Article 1 (2) of the Convention states that: 
 
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for enforced disappearance. 
 
Article 2 defines disappearance as: 
 
the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by 
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed 
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the 
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.   
 
International norms against such behaviour are very strong given the horrendous nature 
and ‘unthinkability of the behaviour’ (Rodley, 2002: 243). Prohibitions on 
disappearances certainly seem to play a strong part in the international detention regime.  
 
Alongside the aspects already covered, the international detention regime also makes 
provisions for prohibiting extra-legal executions and the death penalty, as well as 
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inadequate or degrading conditions of detention. If we consider this normative regime in 
terms of robustness or legalization we can see that prohibitions on torture and 
disappearances in particular should be fairly robust and they are highly legalized, the 
other areas vary on this dimension. However, as mentioned I do not wish to view these 
as single standards. Instead I view them as a collection of norms, a normative regime 
internationally, which prescribes standards for detention. The above demonstrates what 
is entailed by this; prohibitions on torture and inhuman treatment, disappearances, and 
indefinite detention, the right to habeas corpus, a fair trial, and non-refoulment, as well 
as prohibitions on extra-legal executions, the death penalty and degrading conditions of 
detention. 
 
There is one further point of clarification that I must add regarding the terms ‘prisoner’ 
and ‘detainee’ that will be used in this thesis. I draw on the conclusions of Rodley 
(2002: 5-6) where: 
 
the terms ‘prisoner’ and ‘detainee’ (used separately or together) should be taken as referring to any 
persons who are so positioned as to be unable to remove themselves from the ambit of official action and 
abuse. 
 
The terms are not limited to ‘a person confined, after due legal process, to a formal 
institution of detention, as a result of conviction for a criminal offence, or on remand 
pending trial’ (Rodley, 2002: 6). Although such prisoners are obviously also as entitled 
as any others to have their basic human rights respected. The rights discussed above are 
given regardless of the reasons for or legitimacy of detention. This broad definition will 
inform the analysis in this thesis.  
 
The above outline has drawn very heavily from the legal sphere to establish what factors 
constitute the international detention regime. There are several reasons for this which 
require further clarification. First, I do not view normative regimes solely in terms of 
international law. I agree with scholars such as Percy (2007a; 2007b) and Tannenwald 
(2005) that international normative regimes can be strong even if weak in international 
law. International law does however provide very useful documentary evidence of 
normative change and establishment in the international sphere, as I have drawn upon 
above, however international norms and normative regimes are not reducible to this. 
International law regarding detention documents the shared understandings governing 
such behaviour, and indeed contributes to the furtherance of the international detention 
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regime, yet these legal agreements are not the regime in themselves – the shared 
understandings as experienced by individuals are.  
 
The rule of law and the normative standards documented in international law are 
furthermore taken to be largely associated with the liberal democratic social identity in 
the international society, even though the development of the latter social identity has 
followed the establishment of such standards. For the purposes of this thesis, it is 
sufficient to draw from international law as an indication of shared understandings. 
From this basis I focus on the processes of negotiation in terms of defection and 
contestation. International normative regimes are not, after all, static in their nature, 
interpretation and contestation are indeed the focus of this thesis. International legal 
sources provide us with the language and foundations from which to undertake such an 
analysis, generating expectations for behaviour on these lines. With a clear definition of 
norms and the international normative regime governing detention in place, we can 
engage with overarching question of this thesis; how have the normative constraints 
regarding detention practices been negotiated by the USA and UK in the war on 
terror so as to enable contestation of the international detention regime? For 
example, were the political elites in the USA and UK successful in creating an enabling 
framework to allow for sustainable action counter to the regime? How was constraint 
manifest in this period given that it looks like the regime failed? And, how can we 
account for the processes that allow for contestation at a micro-foundational level? 
These questions are crucial if we are to understand the nature of normative constraint in 
these cases and the processes of contestation involved, thus enabling us to address the 
puzzle of counter-normative behaviour raised in this thesis.  
 
Conclusion 
My objective in this Chapter has been to provide the foundations for understanding the 
international detention regime, as assessed in this thesis. I have considered the various 
ways in which international norms have been conceptualised in IR, in terms of power 
for realists and interests for neo-liberals. I then demonstrated why a constructivist 
characterisation of international norms captures many more dynamics of their 
functioning, which are crucial to understanding international behaviour. This is in terms 
of their social dimension, constitutive nature and importance attributed to identity in 
understanding the influence of international norms. I situated this thesis’ conception of 
the international detention regime in the current debates within the constructivist 
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approach and highlighted exactly where this study falls in the broad spectrum of 
‘constructivisms’. The multiplicity of identity and broader normative environment are 
central to analysis in this thesis, allowing for a greater degree of contestation and 
defection, with the influence of international normative regimes characterised more as 
an interactive process. International law was then utilised to provide the foundations for 
an assessment of the international detention regime and the language through which 
such analysis can be sought. Chapter 2 will give greater specification to the framework 
generated in this thesis by drawing from social psychology, in particular the social 
identity approach to provide a micro-foundational basis for this contribution to 
constructivist research, focusing on the contestation of international detention regime.  
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Chapter 2 – The Contribution of Psychology  
 
Over the past decade psychology has been granted an increasingly significant role in 
constructivist research (e.g. Shannon, 2000; Shannon and Keller, 2007). The demand 
for scholars to give greater specification to the functioning of normative regimes, 
particularly regarding their influence on the behaviour of states, has provided a 
considerable catalyst for such moves. Psychology has proven to be of great assistance in 
this area. In this Chapter I will demonstrate why an engagement with the discipline of 
psychology, particularly social psychology, is crucial to understanding the issues of 
concern in this thesis; that is the processes of defection and contestation of the 
international detention regime. In particular, I will establish why some of the insights 
generated in social psychology are essential to approach the overarching question of this 
thesis; how have the normative constraints regarding detention practices been 
negotiated by the USA and UK in the war on terror so as to enable contestation of 
the international detention regime?  
 
Psychology, like other social sciences contains different ways in which to view the 
world and the nature of its employment in constructivism certainly reflects this. This 
Chapter will consider these variations, demonstrating why social psychology 
(particularly insights from the social identity approach) provides the most beneficial 
framework from which to engage with the questions of this thesis. I argue that the social 
identity approach, provides a framework for understanding the processes of contestation 
in relation to international normative regimes (more specifically, that associated with 
detention practices as outlined in Chapter 1). Whereas research into the varying impact 
of normative regimes in the international sphere has tended to focus on disparities in 
norm strength (Legro, 1995; 1997), variations in internalisation and diffusion at the 
state level (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Flockhart, 2006), and a separation of the 
logic of consequences from the logic of appropriateness as assessed in Chapter 1, these 
insights generally rely on a dichotomy between compliance and defection and lack a 
persuasive account of both influence and contestation. The social identity approach, 
however, provides a micro-foundational assessment which highlights the interactive 
processes with the broader social context that have a significant impact on normative 
influence and contestation internationally. Thus, these contributions enable a much 
more comprehensive analysis regarding the processes of norm influence and 
contestation. 
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In order to support this position I begin by firstly considering the historical engagement 
of psychology with international relations, largely in terms of leadership studies and 
diplomatic style. I demonstrate how this became much more analytical in orientation in 
the 1970s/80s reflecting changes in psychology itself. The growth in literature focusing 
on foreign policy analysis, leadership and decision-making, particularly in times of 
crisis, is reflective of this period. From this basis I evaluate the different ways in which 
psychology has been utilised in the constructivist research program, considering both 
the reasons for engagement as well as the implications. This will form the second 
section of the Chapter.  
 
In the third section I demonstrate the potential value of further engagement with the 
social identity approach, establishing a framework for assessing the negotiation of 
normative constraints to allow for contestation and defection from the international 
detention regime. I outline the ways in which the social identity approach (1) provides a 
micro-foundational assessment of the influence of normative regimes, (2) demonstrates 
how the processes of group membership are crucial to understanding variations in the 
influence of normative regimes, and (3) draws our attention to the management of social 
identities in the negotiation of normative constraint. These factors provide us with a 
framework from which to assess the main question of this thesis; how is normative 
constraint negotiated so as to allow for the contestation of international detention 
standards by the UK and USA? Furthermore, they inform the central argument of this 
thesis; that contestation of the international detention regime is an interactive and 
dynamic process embedded in a broad social identities context. 
 
Thus, engagement with psychology in this thesis is not in terms of assessing the beliefs 
and values of state leaders to explain defection (the motivational dynamic that has been 
popular with much engagement with psychology in international relations), but instead 
focuses on the multiplicity of social identity and processes of contestation to generate 
further understanding with regards to the influence of normative regimes. This approach 
serves to highlight the interactive practices of leadership, as opposed to focusing solely 
on the personal qualities that particular leaders possess. The latter is certainly an 
important factor in international relations scholarship, but to address the processes of 
defection and contestation of the international detention regime in the cases of the UK 
and USA, this thesis needs a framework that brings together the elements of both 
leadership and the broader context of social identities.    
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1. Psychology’s Relevance to International Relations 
Psychologists are concerned with understanding the minds and behaviours of humans 
and other organisms. There has been a long founded role for such a discipline in 
international politics, particularly in the study of leadership and decision-making. This 
section aims to re-situate the use of psychology within this historical framework, 
serving as a basis from which to consider the more recent employment in constructivist 
research and generate informed accompanying debate. 
     
The historical use of psychology in the study of international affairs has been 
predominantly based on research into the dynamics of leadership, in particular, the 
values held by leaders and their means for conducting diplomacy. Overall the early 
insights were not aimed at generalisation; instead they provided specific observations of 
particular leaders to understand certain circumstances. Accounts of this kind are based 
on the strong assumption that leaders can be the ‘agents of change’ (Elock, 2001: 5) and 
that leadership stems from the personal qualities leaders possess.  
 
The study of personality has since become increasingly analytical, accompanied by a 
drive to establish leadership as a separate field of inquiry (Paige, 1972; Hermann, 
1977). Through this process a significant body of literature has emerged focusing on the 
profiling of leaders and the development of research methods to enable investigators to 
assess personality types and leadership style from a distance (e.g. Feldman and Valenty, 
2001). The importance of this type of examination is based on the assumption that the 
beliefs held by individual leaders are fundamental in determining the course of 
international affairs. Indeed Jervis (1994) has suggested that this has become ever more 
apparent in the increasingly complex post-Cold War era.  
 
In addition to moves to make the study of personality and leadership style more 
analytical, the 1970s and 1980s also saw a growth in literature on crisis decision-
making. This research programme aimed to generate general propositions about the 
ways in which leaders deal with crisis situations. Studies were conducted to develop 
guidance concerning the general mistakes that state leaders make as well as proposing 
means by which to avoid such mistakes. Significant illustrations can be found, for 
example, in Irving Janis’ development of Group Think (1982), and the study of 
Perception and Misperception in World Politics by Robert Jervis (1976). Various areas 
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of psychology were granted a major role in identifying factors that are likely to have an 
impact on the ways that decision-makers process information in international politics. 
 
Yet whilst the transfer of psychological insights to the study of international decision-
making and leadership may seem like a natural and logical move to make, scholars have 
advanced a variety of objections. Jervis himself points to a problem that is often raised 
in the use of psychology in international relations, that of transferring results obtained in 
an experimental (often laboratory based) or interpersonal setting to international 
phenomena. A particularly interesting point that Jervis (1976: 4) suggests in relation to 
his own research is that, ‘very few [psychology] experiments give subjects incentives to 
perceive accurately’ whereas this tends to be a fundamental concern to policy makers.  
 
In more general terms, relating to the use of psychology in international relations (or for 
that matter any other discipline), a consideration of the initial aims of the psychological 
research and the conditions in which the original studies were conducted are certainly 
crucial elements to take into account. These will often highlight conditions where 
specific factors, such as types of identity, were created experimentally and then tested 
with controls placed on other potentially influential elements.1 This process of creation 
is markedly different to the discipline of IR that attempts to explain or understand past 
events or environments, often with the aim of predicting future actions.  
 
We cannot, therefore, take for granted that the insights generated in psychology will 
transfer easily to the complex world of international affairs where isolating influence 
becomes a much more daunting and perhaps undesirable task. The latter is particularly 
apparent when the aim of research is to assess the multiplicity of influences, as opposed 
to testing the impact of singular isolated variables. Whilst both approaches are 
important for constructivist scholars, depending on their orientation, multiplicity is of 
significant concern in this thesis.  
 
This brief discussion highlights the presence of reservations in drawing from 
psychology even when there is a shared methodological basis such as a focus on 
individuals and a positivist understanding of the world in terms of the ‘search for 
explanation, description, and prediction’ through the isolation of variables (McDermott, 
2004: 3). Ultimately though, these common foundations and the evidently crucial role 
                                                 
1 For a consideration of the experimental method and social psychology see Haslam and McGarty (2001). 
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of psychology in this area of foreign policy analysis and decision-making, in addition to 
the value of such an engagement, have enabled scholars to overcome the misgivings that 
are raised. This is certainly reflected in the significant growth of the field, for example 
in the expansion of undergraduate modules focusing on both political psychology and 
psychology and international relations, particularly in the USA (e.g. Rose McDermott at 
the University of California, Santa Barbara and Paul Kowert at Florida International 
University; also see the International Society of Political Psychology’s website for 
course listings). 
 
This shared basis is not necessarily true however of constructivism. Caution is therefore 
required in terms of the manner of engagement with psychology. The discussion in this 
section, whilst only providing a cursory glance at the material, serves to provide a basis 
from which to consider the expanded use of psychology in constructivist research.   
 
 
2. Psychology in Constructivism 
Having briefly highlighted various benefits to the employment of psychology in the 
study of issues such as leadership, diplomatic style, and decision-making, as well as 
some of the reservations that have accompanied such moves, I will now assess the 
different contributions that psychological insights have made within the constructivist 
research program. The factors discussed above will be very important to consider in the 
course of evaluating the different ways in which constructivist scholars have engaged 
with psychology to date. First I will briefly outline why constructivist scholars have 
drawn on insights from psychology, as despite initial reservations as referred to above, 
the use of insights from psychology to enhance aspects of constructivism has been on 
the increase over the past 10 years. This has been particularly apparent in research into 
international norms and normative regimes. This section will briefly examine some of 
the reasons for this increased engagement with psychology.   
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, constructivist scholars have provided a diverse range of 
literature revealing the important role of normative regimes in international affairs. 
Those towards the conventional constructivist end of the spectrum have focused on 
questions surrounding their varying impact on state behaviour. In allocating substantial 
influence to international normative regimes, defection and contestation become more 
difficult to understand especially in cases where these standards are thought to be 
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embedded domestically within the state. As suggested in the previous Chapter, the ways 
in which scholars have accounted for defection in the cases assessed in this thesis would 
benefit significantly from analysis informed at the micro-foundational level, particularly 
where there is more engagement with processes of contestation. The issues advanced in 
Chapter 1 certainly raise the question of how deep we need to research within the state 
to understand the variation in normative influence.2 If we are to bring the individual 
decision-maker into analysis then it would seem that psychology has a substantial role 
to play, this position certainly fits with research highlighted in the previous sections 
concerning the importance of individual leaders in the study of international affairs. The 
question of how normative regimes actually connect to individual actors is one raised by 
several scholars (e.g. Yee, 1996; Checkel 1998) and is a challenge that is taken up by 
Vaughn Shannon whose work I shall consider in more detail below. There certainly is a 
need to assess how political elites interpret their situations, particularly regarding 
international normative regimes, and as such the move to psychology seems an 
appropriate one to make.  
 
Psychology can provide the means to account for the variation in normative influence 
by focusing our attention on constructivism’s micro-foundations, how constructivist 
concepts are influential at the individual level (Checkel, 1998; Goldgeier and Tetlock, 
2001; McDermott, 2004). Shannon (2000: 298) is a strong advocate of such a position 
suggesting that we can draw on the ‘psychological needs underlying constructivist 
logic’ to further illuminate the factors involved in normative influence.3 Utilising 
research from psychology certainly provides a basis from which to study the influence 
of normative regimes at a level beyond the state. Psychology can provide insights in a 
way that other disciplines cannot primarily due to their focus on individuals.  
 
Constructivist scholars such as Alexander Wendt have capitalised on psychological 
contributions by directly transferring them to the state, personifying the state by 
suggesting that such entities function just like people do. Whilst such an approach 
provides for very interesting analysis this is not the position taken in this thesis. Indeed, 
I disagree with Wendt’s statement that the state-as-person has become ‘so deeply 
embedded in our common sense that it is difficult to imagine how international politics 
might be conceptualized or conducted with out it’ (Wendt, 1999: 196). Such a position 
                                                 
2 This was also a point advanced by Checkel (1998).  
3 This point will be further developed when I consider Shannon’s work in more detail below.  
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is certainly tempting particularly as state leaders themselves often ‘engage in the 
practice of perceiving states as people’ thus effectively creating such a social reality 
(Greenhill, 2008: 346). However, the state only has the capacity to ‘act’ based on 
human agents. Human political action takes place within the structure of the state and 
pertaining to the state, but the state-as-person cannot replace the actions of individuals 
in our assessment of international affairs. Indeed, to do so would miss much variation in 
behaviour, particularly in terms of contestation relating to international normative 
regimes. As Flockhart (2006) suggests, individuals are socialized and act; this 
represents the position taken in this thesis. Thus, I agree with scholars such as Wight 
(2004) that the state is not a person and as such cannot be ascribed personal qualities.4 
Instead the focus in this thesis is on the political elites in the state and their interactions 
with representatives of the different social identities associated with the state. The state 
provides a framework and structure – as such it very much exists as an entity, but this is 
not separate from the subjects of analysis which are the individual’s that represent the 
state.  
 
On this basis, psychology enables us to explore the normative and regime based insights 
of constructivism at the level of the individual. Such an approach provides significant 
micro-foundational understanding to key concepts, supplying greater specificity and 
capacity to account for variations as well as mechanisms for change that are generally 
obscured from analysis.  
 
As highlighted at the end of Chapter 1, there is a great deal of multiplicity to normative 
regimes and international social identities. Constructivist research towards the thicker 
end of the spectrum certainly gives us the means by which to acknowledge this 
multiplicity and accompanying contestation. However we are left without a micro-
foundational account by which to assess normative influence in this framework. 
Certainly, scholars demonstrate how the construction of norms set the rules of the game 
and the parameters within which action can take place, developing by means of 
contestation and co-constitutive processes. However, greater specificity could be 
provided to assist scholars in understanding these processes and the negotiation of 
normative constraint, in a framework that incorporates both contestation and influence. 
This provides the motivation for engagement with psychology in this thesis.      
                                                 
4 As Wight further argues, this does not mean the state cannot have agency, as agency ‘also resides in 
structural contexts’ (2006: 293). 
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2.1 Psychology’s Added Value 
Given the reasons above for looking to psychology, how exactly have the insights 
generated in this discipline been used to benefit constructivism to date? Certainly this 
has varied hugely in terms of scope and amount of psychology used. Whilst some 
scholars have engaged with psychology fairly minimally to illustrate small 
modifications or clarifications of constructivist concepts others have gone much further 
and privileged psychological components.  
 
We can see references to psychology in the work of Wendt (as mentioned above) 
particularly in terms of his ‘“sociological social psychological” form of systemic 
theory’ (1992: 394) in contrast to the economic basis of neo-realism. Wendt certainly 
cites several sources from psychology or at least political psychology and this provides 
the basis for the cognitive-constructivism that he presents. Ted Hopf (2002) also follows 
this cognitivist line to develop an understanding of how identity works. By drawing on 
literature from experimental psychology, identity is demonstrated to function in a 
similar way to heuristics, schemas and scripts providing us with the means by which to 
classify and make sense of the world. Identity allows us to interpret the world, and in 
turn dictates what about the world is considered relevant. Partly as a consequence of this 
‘individuals routinely choose only a small fraction of the actions, verbal and otherwise, 
that are objectively available to them at any given time’ they are in this sense ‘bounded 
by the social cognitive structure, its discourses, and their identities’ (Hopf, 2002: 5). 
The author proceeds from this basis to provide an inductive account of Russian identity, 
by also drawing on sociology and social theory.   
 
The value of psychology in the above research is very much limited to providing a basis 
for understanding the functioning of identity as a cognitive shortcut. Hopf gives clear 
reasons for this limitation in terms of the theoretical pre-loading associated with other 
insights from psychology regarding identity. The author refers in particular to the 
assumptions that are generally made concerning issues such as the drive for group 
membership that underpins a great deal of research in social psychology. With the 
inductive emphasis in Hopf’s work it is clear that engaging with psychology any further 
would lead to a compromise of the research objectives. Psychology thus helps by 
contributing to an understanding of the functioning of the key concept of identity and 
providing a basis for such research. However beyond this the role of psychology is 
minimal.  
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Psychology has also been drawn upon in the domain of social learning and persuasion 
(Finnemore, 1996; Checkel, 2001; Finnemore, 2003). Finnemore (2003) for example 
has employed concepts from social psychology to assist in highlighting certain factors 
involved in explaining normative change with regards to the changing purpose of the 
use of force. Social psychology is used to identify the means by which social 
movements ‘change law and institutions, as well as social norms and understandings’ 
(2003: 151). Finnemore specifically applies insights from social psychology to illustrate 
individual-level mechanisms of change such as ‘persuasion and communicative action’, 
as well as the ‘affective mechanisms’ of liking and empathy.  
 
With regards to the latter, Finnemore suggests that affect and emotion have been largely 
neglected in the IR literature however they are considered by the author to be ‘essential 
to creating purposes for social action’ and initiating change (2003: 154). This is a point 
also raised by Ross (2006), who, also engaging with psychology, suggests that 
constructivists have neglected the important role of emotions in identity formation. 
Finnemore draws on research from psychology that has demonstrated our tendency to 
be more easily persuaded by people we like, as well as insights suggesting that 
increased interaction with others increases our liking. Finnemore also focuses on the 
issue of empathy. In terms of policy this area is particularly interesting as changes in 
empathy are considered to ‘create changes in identification with others, ergo changes in 
political priorities for intervention’ (2003: 157).  
 
Farrell (2005b) alternatively, draws more specifically on social identity theory from 
social psychology. The author highlights the concepts of ‘norm bolstering’ and ‘norm 
stretching’ as alternative strategies that may be sought in rising threat conditions. This is 
in relation to situations where militaries are faced with strategic circumstances where 
they come into conflict with the normative regimes as set in humanitarian law and those 
of conventional warfare. Which alternative is advanced is suggested to depend on the 
nature of the norm; whether it is well or poorly established. Where norms are poorly 
established it is thought that there is much potential for norm stretching, although a 
desire for legitimacy will prevent violation. If a norm is well established actors are 
thought to put more resources into bolstering a norm even if that course of action is not 
the most satisfactory in terms of strategic imperatives. Psychology is therefore used to 
illuminate the means by which actors can behave strategically whilst at the same time 
being norm-followers.  
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From this brief consideration of some of the ways in which psychology has been used in 
constructivist research we can see that this has been for a variety of purposes, but has 
largely centred on the need for greater agency and understandings at a micro-
foundational level. The studies above have all tended to use psychology in a fairly 
minimal but significant way. This has certainly suited the nature of their research. 
However, Hopf (2002) highlights further reasons for this restricted usage. One 
particularly significant point that Hopf raises is that psychology often goes too far in 
focusing on the individual, sacrificing the importance of social structures. This is an 
issue that I will consider in more detail below in relation to the work of scholars such as 
Vaughn Shannon where individual state leaders are privileged. I demonstrate why I 
agree with Hopf’s claims in this respect. However this does not prevent further 
engagement with psychology and utilisation of the micro-foundations that this 
discipline provides. To overcome this issue I engage to a much greater extent with the 
social identity approach in social psychology, where individuals are firmly embedded in 
the broad and complex normative and social identities context.  
 
2.2 Decision-Making in a Normative Environment 
One distinct approach to the question of defection from international normative regimes 
has been put forward by Vaughn Shannon. The author claims that the sociological focus 
of constructivism has created an obstacle to the study of norm violation (as he terms it). 
Instead his research centres on the individual decision-maker operating within the 
international normative environment. International norms, in this sense, function to 
constrain policy makers as they pursue their interests, process information, and make 
decisions. To explain this Shannon draws on psychological insights concerning 
decision-making and argues that norms operate as shortcuts, based on actors’ needs to 
organize and comprehend difficult situations. They also indicate to actors the means by 
which to satisfy their need for social approval5 and the need to maintain a positive self-
image to enhance self-esteem. As such they ‘indicate pathways likely to bring positive 
feedback to actors, and provide a reasonable heuristic for successful action’ (Shannon, 
2000: 300). Psychological needs are used to underpin the constructivist logic of norm 
compliance, whilst recognising instrumental imperatives as well.  
 
                                                 
5 Actors are considered to be both socially aware, as well as conscious of their own interests and 
instrumental needs. 
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For the violation of international norms to occur, Shannon suggests that leaders must be 
motivated to violate due to a conflict between their ‘perceived “national interests” and a 
given norm’ (2000: 294). This conflict then drives actors to interpret the situation in 
such a way as to mitigate the restraints of the norm so they are able to justify the 
violation as ‘socially acceptable’. This is particularly important if international social 
standing is of great value to the actor, and as a consequence violation will only be 
possible if there is sufficient room for interpreting the norm or situation in such a 
fashion as it is justified. In this sense the ‘parameters of a norm indicate under what 
situations the norm’s prescriptions will apply’ (Shannon, 2000: 295). To resolve the 
dilemma posed by a conflict between actor interests and social structure, Shannon 
suggests that policy makers employ the use of accounts. Account-giving is a concept 
studied in psychology and involves individuals using several methods to justify action 
that is in violation of a norm, to both themselves and others (Fritsche, 2002, provides a 
good review of the typologies used). In Shannon’s assessment accounts take the form of 
apologies, denials, excuses and justifications6 which are used to ‘avoid negative social 
judgments, and maintain a positive self-image’ (Shannon, 2000: 299). If actors have 
both the will and the ability to violate in terms of the above, violation is considered to 
be a more likely course of action.  
 
Shannon does recognise some of the failings of this approach in his later work (Shannon 
and Keller, 2007), for example that the simple existence of the above circumstances is 
not enough to guarantee violation, and that comparatively unambiguous norms can be 
violated. Nonetheless, there is another issue that I would like to raise here. That is the 
usefulness of framing arguments in terms of compliance/violation seemingly as 
opposites, which I also considered briefly in Chapter 1. By doing so we appear to be 
creating a value judgement, associating compliance with ‘good’ behaviour and violation 
with ‘bad’. Norms surely can be either; this is a matter of judgement as appropriate does 
not necessarily mean good or bad, although it is often portrayed as such in constructivist 
research (e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Bad norms can spread too, for example 
Fujii (2002) explores the diffusion of a genocidal norm in Rwanda. Indeed, the 
normative environment is very complex where regimes often clash, compliance in one 
area may lead to violation in another – a point missing from assessment that focuses on 
singular norms. Whilst Shannon does acknowledge that norms have many sources, our 
understanding would surely benefit from a framework that embraces this as opposed to 
                                                 
6 Each has a different purpose and effect on the norm in question.  
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focusing on one isolated source and comparing this to behaviour. In addition to this, by 
concentrating on violation versus compliance, it also becomes much more difficult to 
consider issues such as the changes to the shared meaning of norms that can result from 
contestation. 
 
We can therefore identify some potential difficulties with this approach for the type of 
analysis sought in this thesis that is heavily grounded in multiplicity. This largely results 
from the strict concepts used by Shannon. Whilst I have further reservations about this 
manner of engaging with psychology, before moving on to these I shall reflect on how 
Shannon has developed this approach. He has done so partly in collaboration with Jon 
Keller, also based in the USA. Keller’s work largely falls in the domain of foreign 
policy decision-making and political psychology so has a similar focus to that 
considered in the first section of this Chapter, considering the relevance of psychology 
to the issues of IR.   
 
Keller’s (2005a; 2005b) research concerns the impact of democratic norms of restraint 
on decision-makers. Keller focuses on domestic constraint, and differentiates between 
direct constraints and potential constraints. Most constraints are not considered to be 
direct, they are instead potential in nature, and as such they must be interpreted by 
leaders before they can exert an influence on policy. The core of the argument is that 
potential constraint cannot be deduced from the apparent nature of the constraint instead 
this can only be understood in relation to the personality informing interpretation.  
 
The author proposes two approaches to constraint, constraint respecters and constraint 
challengers. The former involves leaders who tend to internalise the constraints of their 
environment, where as the latter focuses on constraints as obstacles. These concepts are 
then used to analyse decision-making processes in times of crisis. Four factors were 
considered to be particularly relevant in determining whether a leader was to be 
characterised as a constraint respecter or challenger. These included a continuum on the 
following aspects; task or interpersonal emphasis, the need for power, distrust, and 
nationalism. The first two shape sensitivity to constraints in general and the second, the 
tendency to pursue violent policy.  
 
Keller explores the impact of these factors in times of crisis as it is in these 
circumstances that ‘the connection between leaders’ characteristics and their states’ 
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foreign policy behavior is likely to be particularly strong’ (2005b: 214). The author tests 
a range of hypotheses relating to expectations of the techniques that constraint 
respecters or challengers will employ to manage crises and domestic constraint. This is 
regarding the crises of Vietnam (1961) and Laos (1961) in relation to President 
Kennedy (rated as a constraint respecter), and Grenada (1983) and Libya (1986) in 
relation to President Reagan (rated as a constraint challenger) (Keller, 2005a).  
 
Whilst there are some situational differences, Keller (2005a: 862) argues that the ‘very 
different perceptions and responses to potential pacifying constraints exhibited by 
Kennedy and Reagan’ cannot be attributed to these factors alone, but instead 
demonstrate the importance of leadership style in relation to domestic constraint. 
Leadership style is considered to be a highly significant source of variation in how 
leaders perceive and respond to domestic constraints, yet Keller certainly does not 
suggest that this factor works alone.7  
 
In a later paper authored by Shannon and Keller (2007) these issues of personality and 
leadership style are related directly to the violation of international norms. The authors 
build on their respective analysis and propose that violation is in fact heavily influenced 
by the beliefs and decision-making styles of leaders. Two areas are considered in 
determining leadership style – how sensitive the actor is to the ‘political context’ and 
how they ‘view the international environment’. If actors are deemed to be low in 
sensitivity to political context, and view the world in terms resembling a Hobbesian 
state of nature, then they are considered to have motivation to violate. Those leaders 
considered to be more sensitive to their political context and with a more favourable 
world outlook are deemed to be less likely to violate international norms.  
 
The authors provide an illustration of these arguments with reference to the 2003 
military intervention in Iraq. Through a consideration of U.S. officials involved in the 
decision to go to war in Iraq,8 Shannon and Keller suggest that ‘distrust’ and ‘ingroup 
bias’ are the most important factors in predicting actors’ orientation towards violation.9 
                                                 
7 Keller suggests that there is a need for a more complete model that also accounts for the influence of 
situational factors and the ‘precise character of the constraints themselves’ (2005a: 860).   
8 President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Senator John Kerry is 
also included to increase variation on the dependant variable. (Positions as at time of intervention).  
9 Task/interpersonal emphasis, need for power, belief in ability to control events, self-confidence, 
conceptual complexity were the other factors tested. 
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This moves beyond Shannon’s (2000) previous work concerning the belief that states 
wish to avoid ‘anti-social’ norm violation to enhance a positive self-image, and instead 
focus’ on variation in this due to personality factors.  
 
Shannon and Keller cite Hermann’s (1999) previous consideration of these issues for 
clarification on the differences between the concepts. Hermann suggests that for those 
high in distrust and ingroup bias: 
 
International politics is centered around a set of adversaries that are viewed as “evil” and intent on 
spreading their ideology or extending their power at the expense of others; leaders perceive that they have 
a moral imperative to confront these adversaries; as a result, they are likely to take risks and to engage in 
highly aggressive and assertive behaviour (1999: 29). 
 
For those who are low in these traits: 
 
[The] world is not a threatening place; conflicts are perceived as context-specific and are reacted to on a 
case-by-case basis; leaders recognize that their country, like many others, has to deal with certain 
constraints that limit what one can do and call for flexibility of response; moreover, there are certain 
international arenas where cooperation with others is both possible and feasible. [Their] focus is on taking 
advantage of opportunities and building relationships (1999: 28) 
 
It seems from this then that those who are high in the traits of distrust and in-group bias 
are likely to disregard international norms as ineffectual. Shannon and Keller suggest 
that all members of the Bush Administration studied, except Colin Powell, were rated 
high on distrust and in-group bias. Whilst the authors do acknowledge that this 
approach does not diminish the importance of structure (instead it is to supplement this) 
the importance they place on individual factors such as personality is clear to see.  
 
This approach to constructivism is based on international norms as environmental 
constraints to which decision-makers vary in their sensitivity.10 Psychology plays a 
major role in analysis of this kind and is incorporated in a fairly direct manner. 
Psychology is used to provide the means by which to assess the micro-foundations of 
constructivist ideas concerning the influence of specific international norms and their 
effect on individuals. Shannon and Keller suggest that whilst we have seen a move to 
‘second-wave constructivism’ where agents (individuals, collectives or states) are 
                                                 
10 This is also true of other authors that have considered the role of psychology in constructivism, for 
example Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001), in terms of trade-off reasoning and bounded decision-making. 
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deemed to internalise norms to differing degrees we should in fact move beyond this 
understanding to focus more on how norms are perceived or understood by individuals 
and how they function within the policy-making process. This also reflects moves in 
political psychology to engage more with constructivism to provide a more mainstream 
basis for their insights (Houghton, 2007).  
 
Such an approach does indeed fit with the direction that many have asked of 
constructivism in terms of bridging the gap between international norms and 
individuals, giving greater specification of how they function and are influential at this 
level (for example Yee, 1996). Whilst the authors do clarify that they do not ‘dismiss 
norms out of hand as do realists’ (Shannon and Keller, 2007: 82), as their purpose is to 
approach questions of why violation occurs, it is questionable how much is left of the 
constructivist understanding of international norms particularly in terms of their 
constitutive effects. The individual is quite isolated from the broader normative 
environment, interactive processes are negated, and constraints simply seem to boil 
down to a matter of choice with little regard for the role of audiences in this process.  
 
By isolating the individual and a specific singular international norm to such an extent 
we seem to be moving away from the core of constructivism, perhaps more towards the 
domain of neo-liberalism. To be fair, some aspects of the above research suggest that 
international norms are constitutive for some leaders and not for others. However, we 
must then ask where do the interests come from for those leaders that are not influenced 
by international norms, are they singularly held interests, interests that are dominant in 
the decision-making group, reflective of the wider domestic population, or are they 
some how ‘natural’? I would tend to follow Meyer’s (2006: 527) statement that, actors 
‘cannot extract themselves and their potential utilitarian considerations from the cultural 
and social context in which they are embedded and their actions will always reflect this 
context.’ The approach taken by Shannon suffers from too much top-down emphasis in 
terms of the influence of international norms as opposed to an interactive process; also 
the meaning of the international norm in question is simply assumed. This again reflects 
the issues raised in the previous Chapter. 
 
So is it really the individual identity of the elite policy makers that we should be 
concerned with in assessing the influence and contestation of international normative 
regimes? What about the social aspects of identity? What are the implications of this 
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individual analysis for constructivist research? Certainly, by presenting international 
norms in the way that Shannon does, the link between norms and identity, and therefore 
their influence, appears to be markedly reduced. Yet, given the social and collective 
nature of international normative regimes can our understanding of these issues really 
come down to a few key players and their personality to understand the negotiation of 
international normative constraints? Although Shannon and Keller are justified in 
pointing to the previously broad claims made by constructivist theorists concerning the 
power of structural variables to constrain state action, and hence their inability to 
account for violation, I question whether they give slightly too much agency to the 
individual as opposed to embedding them in broader structures. Indeed I disagree that 
the individual can truly be isolated to such an extent as is required in research of this 
nature. 
 
2.3 Norms, Identity and the Social Identity Approach 
The research outlined above is by no means the only way we can engage with 
psychology in order to provide a micro-foundational assessment of normative influence 
and contestation in international affairs. The area I shall now explore is the potential 
contribution of the social identity approach from social psychology.11 Whilst Shannon’s 
account does not really consider identity (this was only in terms of individual 
personality), social psychologists, particularly those working from the social identity 
approach have incorporated the ‘multifaceted and situationally contingent’ nature of 
identity into their analysis (Huddy, 2001: 127-128), and as such would seem to have 
much to offer constructivism on the basis outlined in Chapter 1, where multiplicity and 
changing interpretations were drawn out as key factors from the literature.   
 
Insights from this approach to psychology have been applied to issues in international 
relations such as inter-group conflict (for example Gibson, 2006; Mercer, 1995), to 
assess potential threat (Gries, 2005), societal security (Thelier, 2003), norm diffusion 
(Flockhart, 2005, 2006), and the role of recognition in identity formation (Greenhill, 
2008). Whilst these contributions span different theoretical approaches to IR, in this 
section I shall concentrate specifically on usage in constructivism. In many respects the 
social identity approach is highly complementary to constructivist research. This is 
partly due to a shared concern with the impact of norms, social influence, and the 
                                                 
11 This approach was briefly mentioned with regards to the work of Farrell (2005b) earlier in this Chapter, 
which specifically engaged with SIT.   
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functioning of identities. As the social identity approach is centred on the relationship 
between the individual and social groups this perspective is a particularly appropriate 
area of psychology with which to engage.  
 
It is perhaps surprising then, that constructivist scholars have not granted more attention 
to this developing research program.12 Logical connections are certainly ripe to be made 
given the similarities in research focus. In fact, constructivist scholars have in the past 
been critical of the value any enhanced engagement may bring (Checkel, 1998: 345). 
This position is understandable given some of the difficulties with early insights in 
terms of their applicability to real world situations beyond the laboratory. The position 
advanced in this thesis, however, reflects the growing body of research within the social 
identity approach that addresses these and other concerns.   
 
This approach to social psychology is based on a growing body of literature that 
originated in the 1970s. Unlike the forms of psychology drawn upon in the previous 
section, the social identity approach concentrates on social groups; social identity is 
defined in terms of group membership or association with a group.13 The key tenets of 
this perspective are found in both Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorization 
Theory (SCT), which, taken together, present an account of the psychological processes 
of group membership related to the comparative context and based on assumptions of 
motivation for membership.  
 
SIT was introduced by Tajfel and Turner in 1979 to explain findings generated in a 
series of ‘minimal group experiments’14 (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament. 1971); how 
it was that individuals came to express preferences for an in-group defined on the basis 
of minimal shared characteristics such as being labelled as having a preference for the 
paintings of Kandinsky or Klee.15 The ‘simple designation of group boundaries’ was 
                                                 
12 Notable exceptions include Flockhart (2005; 2006), Greenhill (2008).  
13 The concept of social identity has various meanings across the social sciences. For a review of the 
different types of social identity conceptions see Brewer (2001).   
14 This involves volunteers that have not previously met. After being asked to estimate the number of dots 
on a screen participants are divided into groups, which they are led to believe is based on their having 
over or under-estimated in their approximation. The allocation is actually completely random. Having 
been assigned, the groups are asked to distribute money between their group and the other; this is done on 
the basis of pre-defined matrices. Whilst we would expect participants to have no preference on 
distribution, they actually show strong in-group favouritism in both absolute and relative terms. 
15 Three variables are considered to influence in-group favouritism. Firstly, the extent to which 
individuals identify with the group and internalize the group membership and it becomes part of their 
self-concept. Secondly, how much the context in which we are in makes comparison with a relevant out-
group meaningful, and thirdly the relevance that this comparison has (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). I shall not 
 78 
enough to lead to the basic construction of a social identity, which consequently had an 
impact on the decision-making behaviour of individuals in the group (Huddy, 2001: 
133). Hogg and Abrams (1988: 16) suggest that this reflects a process by which the 
group ‘installs itself in the mind of the individual’; the individual not only becomes a 
member of the group, but the group also becomes constitutive of the individual. As 
individuals are members of many groups they have multiple social identities with the 
potential to influence behaviour. This influence is dependent on social identity salience; 
that which is salient forms the basis of our self-conception in terms of ‘our sense of self 
and associated perceptions, feelings, attitudes and behaviour’ (Hogg and Vaughan, 
2005: 127). This has a significant bearing for constructivists when assessing the impact 
of international normative regimes on the behaviour of states or political elites as there 
are multiple normative influences to consider that may or may not be complementary – 
for example those associated with membership of a human rights social grouping, the 
UN, or indeed the military profession. Our attention is directed to social group 
memberships, with their varying content, to understand disparities in international 
normative influence, this is in contrast to other areas of psychology mentioned 
previously that concentrate investigation on the attributes of the individual.  
 
SCT builds on the insights of SIT by highlighting the importance of categorisation in 
the process of social identity salience. Categorisation into social groups serves to satisfy 
the basic human need to reduce cognitive complexity and create a degree of parsimony, 
with regards to the complex social world. We need look no further than the discourse of 
state leaders in the USA and UK to see evidence of such factors, for example the very 
broad categorisation of the world into civilized and non-civilized groupings. Through 
the process of self-categorisation social identity salience is reached. This involves a 
series of stages where the social identity is ‘situationally accessible, and chronically 
accessible’, it has a good ‘structural fit’, ‘normative fit’, and can ‘satisfy uncertainty 
reduction’ and ‘self-enhancement’ to become psychologically salient (Hogg and 
Vaughan, 2005: 128 (see also Table 2, page 78)). Self-categorisation as a group member 
enacts the associated social identity (the normative content is thought to be largely 
derived from prototypical members), which, when salient forms the basis of our 
interests; if we identify highly with a particular group a benefit to the group is 
                                                                                                                                               
be focusing on the areas concerning inter-group conflict. This is still an area very much under debate in 
the literature, whether or not motivation towards an in-group will lead to conflict (see Gibson, 2006).     
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considered to be a benefit to the self. A favourable representation of the social group is 
therefore taken as a positive reflection on the self.  
 
We can take an example here from constructivist research, where being a liberal 
democratic state is generally understood to influence the human rights behaviour of 
states with this social identity.16 If we follow the micro-foundational insights generated 
in the social identity approach, being a liberal democratic state forms the basis of an 
international grouping of states with like minded political elites. If political elites 
identify highly with this social group and it is salient in the context then the norms that 
constitute the group will be influential and favourable representations will be seen to 
reflect positively on members. However, as this will always be only one of many group 
memberships (even if it generally dominates) the micro-foundational insights provided 
by the social identity approach allow significant room for variation in influence 
depending on shifts in both context and identification with the social groups. These 
factors, including the salience of representations of the social group are essential to any 
assessment of normative impact. In the case of this thesis, the salience of membership 
of a group of liberal democratic states is essential to understand contestation of the 
international normative regime prescribing minimum standards for detention and 
prohibiting torture.  
 
Whilst this makes it appear that context dictates precisely which isolated social identity 
is most salient for us we must note that, ‘social identities are emergent higher order 
products that are transformed by context, rather than merely aggregated from it’ 
(Haslam and Ellemers, 2005: 72). We do not completely switch identity dependent on 
our situation, yet there is a degree of re-organisation where certain aspects obtain 
greater significance due to their contextual relevance. For example, our social identities 
such as gender or age will vary in salience across situations yet they do not disappear. 
The emphasis is on context to explain salience and this will in turn influence 
comparisons that are made to the out-group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See Fierke’s (2007) review of constructivism for this point.  
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Table 2. Social Identity Salience 
  
  
 
 
  
Has categorisation ‘X’ got good structural fit? 
Does it account for relevant similarities and 
differences between people in the context? 
 If no – try a new 
Categorisation 
 
  
 
 
 
 
If yes – does categorisation ‘X’ satisfy  
uncertainty reduction in that context? 
 If no – try a new 
Categorisation 
 
 
If yes – does categorisation ‘X’ satisfy  
self-enhancement motives in that context? 
 If no – try a new 
Categorisation 
 
 
If yes – categorisation ‘X’ is the 
psychologically salient basis for self-
conception in that context. 
 
(Taken from Hogg and Vaughan, 2005: 128) 
 
 
If individuals come to define themselves in terms of a particular group membership then 
the norms of that social identity are seen as crucial to identity maintenance (Postmes, 
Haslam and Swaab, 2005). Our ‘beliefs about appropriate behavior’ are deemed to be a 
direct consequence of our ‘self-perception as a group member’ (Christensen, 
Rothgerber, Wood and Matz, 2004: 1296).  
 
There is of course much more to this approach, further elements will be highlighted 
throughout the remainder of this Chapter as I outline the framework for analysis in this 
thesis. There is indeed a wealth of literature in psychology exploring and debating the 
different factors in this approach. For now though we have a sufficient basis from which 
to evaluate the use of the social identity approach in constructivism.  
 
One prominent example is that of Flockhart (2005; 2006) who undertakes a substantial 
engagement with SIT in order to understand variation concerning the diffusion of 
international norms domestically. The author poses the question of why ‘the same 
norms matter so differently to apparently similar agents’ (2006: 90). As opposed to just 
focusing on the elite level (as in Shannon’s work), a re-conceptualisation of the state is 
proposed in terms of two distinct social groups, the ‘mass’ and the ‘elite’, varying in 
social construction and ‘categorization processes’, thus leading to ‘very different 
conceptions of interests and political preferences’ (2005: 252). This will then affect the 
Social categorisation ‘X’ is situationally 
accessible, and chronically accessible 
If no – try a new 
Categorisation 
If yes – has categorisation ‘X’ got good 
normative fit? Does it make sense of people’s 
behaviour in the context? 
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perception of the norm set (Flockhart’s term) in question and whether or not it will be 
influential; the relations between these two groups (the mass and elite), whether they are 
in agreement or not, is thought to depend on the norm set in question.   
 
Flockhart (2006) uses the example of Denmark to illustrate that even where ‘the 
traditional domestic structure concept would be characterized by homogenous relations 
between elite and mass, a social democratic ethos and a particular set of political 
structures and coalition processes, one will find that the constellation around state/elite-
nation/people is completely different in the cases of Europeanization and Human 
Rights’ (2006: 99-100). By viewing the state in terms of two different social groups we 
appear to be better placed to understand variations in normative influence.  
  
To approach the question of norm diffusion however, Flockhart also needs to be able to 
account for shifting norm sets. After ‘a critical juncture’ or some form of ‘commonly 
destabilizing shock’ (the example of the end of the Cold War is given) Flockhart 
suggests that agents experience ‘an ideational vacuum, where previously held stable 
ideas no longer provide a base for problem solving and policy-making’ (2005: 259).17 
As in Hogg and Vaughan’s model of social identity salience, if a social identity is 
unable to satisfy those factors identified, a new categorisation of the self will be sought 
in terms of a different social group membership becoming salient or indeed a new one 
being developed. In this period different idea sets compete, those of the preferred social 
group then win out. These ideas are then gradually internalised into the domestic 
structures of the state, successful diffusion depending on acceptance by both the mass 
and elite.   
 
The framework that Flockhart presents is quite complex and I do not wish to re-
articulate the whole argument here. Instead I shall draw out the main points that the 
social identity approach adds. These build on the insights of Marcussen, Risse, 
Englemann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher (1999) suggesting that change in the norm sets 
of elites is the result of a critical juncture. Research in the social identity approach 
proposes that if the social group is no longer satisfactory in terms of the criteria in the 
model, then there will be a need for new social membership. If there is a desire for 
membership,18 the social identity of the group will be accepted and hence the associated 
                                                 
17 In this Flockhart is drawing on Martin Marcussen’s (2000) ideational life-cycle.  
18 It is not thought to be possible to socialise agents that don’t wish to belong. 
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norms or normative regimes become influential.19 The social identity approach leads us 
to the conclusion that the salient normative regimes will be those associated with the 
social group attributed with the ‘most positive value’ (Flockhart, 2006: 96). This refers 
predominantly to the state level and international group membership. However, within 
the state there is variation in terms of social groups. Flockhart refers to the elite and the 
mass, although as I propose in the following section I intend to extend this to consider 
other sectors such as the military, legal, human rights and humanitarian, UN, and liberal 
democratic social groups. If membership of the new international group is not 
considered important for the social group of the mass or elite (it can work both ways) 
then the chances of acceptance of new norm sets are heavily reduced. 
 
These contributions provide significant advantages, and serve to demonstrate potential 
benefits for constructivists in drawing on insights from the social identity approach. 
However, again there are limitations. Given Flockhart’s concern with norm diffusion 
emphasis is understandably placed on this, internalisation involving ‘successful norms 
transfer, achieved once the behavioural attributes of the norm set no longer require 
active enforcement and norm consistent behaviour has achieved a status of ‘taken-for-
grantedness’’ (2006: 98). This, however, favours a focus on the progression from 
previously held norm sets to those in line with the Euro-Atlantic community, desire for 
membership of this group determining norm acceptance and leading to processes of 
diffusion and internalisation depending on the nation’s people and political elite. Such 
an approach seems to suggest a positive one-way process towards the norms of the 
Euro-Atlantic community and as such a degree of finality is implied in the norms 
achieving ‘taken-for-grantedness’. Does this then leave us with the same problems that 
were discussed in Chapter 1, in that we are puzzled by the emergence of behaviour that 
appears to be contrary to these norms or suggests a degree of contestation or defection 
after they seem to be embedded in terms of the two groups?   
 
Certainly, Flockhart’s analysis does refer to the possibility of ‘de-socialization’ of an 
‘unacceptable norm set’ either ‘gradually through long-term persuasive argument’ or 
‘following an event that is perceived as a critical juncture within the society/social 
group in question’ (2006: 107). This is to explain norm change through either top-down 
or bottom-up processes, change may occur through either the elite or mass first. 
                                                 
19 Although this is thought to vary in terms of degree of identification with the social group (e.g. Jetten, J., 
Postmes, T., Mcauliffe, B. J., 2002). 
 83 
However, there seems to be a degree of tension between the stability implied in 
internalisation and the fluidity required for the changes in social identity salience of the 
social identity approach that needs to be further addressed. Conventional constructivism 
is based on a relatively stable understanding of norms and identity, whereas much less is 
taken to be enduring in the social identity approach, as emphasis is placed on the 
context-specific nature of social identity (Huddy, 2001; 2002). Indeed, the degree to 
which identity is context dependent or enduring is contested in the social identity 
literature and is generally taken to be an empirical question. Such disagreements should 
not be ignored as they generate further avenues for enquiry as opposed to assumptions 
to make.  
 
Furthermore, the insights provided by Flockhart do not take into account the 
multiplicity of social identities (the Euro-Atlantic community and the sub-groups of the 
mass and elite form the focus of analysis) or the complexity of the international 
normative environment that are essential to understanding the questions of concern in 
this thesis. Indeed, the above analysis does not engage with more recent advancements 
in the social identity approach that move away from the previously mechanistic 
causational flow from context, to the salience of a particular social identity, to actions in 
line with that social identity. The dynamic and interactive nature of normative influence, 
contestation and multiplicity are not brought to the fore. The remainder of this Chapter 
engages with these and other more recent advancements in the social identity approach, 
and in doing so builds the framework for analysis taken in this thesis.  
 
2.4 Developments in the Social Identity Approach 
There are several areas where there has been significant progress in the social identity 
approach, that are beneficial to constructivist research. These revolve around questions 
concerning identity formation (Postmes, Haslam and Swaab, 2005), causational flows 
and the role and characterisation of context (Klein, Spears and Reicher, 2007), as well 
as issues of leadership (Haslam and Reicher, 2007) and the management strategies 
employed to cope with often competing social identities (Roccas and Brewer, 2002; 
Haslam and Reicher, 2007). Of primary concern for the questions of this thesis are 
causational flows, leadership and the management of social identities. These key areas 
will provide the basis for the framework of understanding employed in this study.  
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Traditionally the social identity approach has been associated with a highly mechanistic 
and one-way causational flow from context to social identity salience to action. 
However, Klein et al (2007) have expanded this framework to include reciprocal flows 
and engage with the strategic side to identity performance. Klein et al (2007: 41) 
provide empirical research to suggest a bidirectional approach where ‘causality can flow 
back from performance to identity and to context.’ They outline various ways in which 
these dynamic relationships may occur. Such an approach shares greater similarities 
with the key tenets of constructivism relating to the importance of practices which are 
both a consequence of context and identity, but also a means by which identity and 
context are shaped.20 This is developed and supported at a level of analysis that draws 
individual actors into the picture. The interactive element is certainly an essential 
component of the position taken in this thesis, to assess the contestation and negotiation 
of normative constraint regarding detention practices in the international sphere. This 
allows for greater integration of structure and agency, crucial when our objective is to 
understand processes of defection and contestation, without negating the importance of 
the broader normative and social identities context.  
 
Another interesting facet of the research presented by Klein et al reflects a growing 
trend in the social identity approach focusing on the influence of leaders in constructing 
particular social identities. This approach differs considerably from other ways in which 
constructivists have engaged with leadership, often either by negating the importance of 
leadership once norms are internalized (Risse et al, 1999) or by focusing on the 
attributes leaders possess (Shannon and Keller, 2007). Research in the social identity 
approach privileges social category membership, as opposed to individual 
characteristics. Leadership is demonstrated to be fundamentally dependent on the 
development of a shared identity and in contrast to a prioritisation of the specific 
personality traits, beliefs, and attitudes held by individuals, leadership is seen as ‘a 
much more dynamic, active and practical process of social identity management’ 
(Haslam and Reicher, 2007: 141).  
 
Research in this expanding area of the social identity approach has tended to focus on 
the capacity for leaders to receive support,21 based on analysis of followers (Duck and 
                                                 
20 Although the degree of separation between performance, identity, and context suggested in Klein et al’s 
characterisation will not suit all scholars working within the constructivist research programme.  
21 Noting factors such as leaders’ proto-typicality, distributiveness, fairness, or identity-affirming 
behaviour.  
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Fielding, 2003). Haslam and Reicher (2007: 125), however, argue for a more dynamic 
approach to the ‘relationship between leadership, social identity, and social reality.’ 
Through studying the interactive processes between leaders, on the one hand as sharing 
identities with followers, and as on the other creating and managing these social 
identities, we can appreciate the ‘balance between existing constraints and future 
possibilities,’ dependent on the way in which actors harness social identities and 
construct social reality (Haslam and Reicher, 2007: 128). Often in constructivist 
research norm entrepreneurs and norm leaders appear to be some how isolated from the 
broader normative context, as mentioned in Chapter 1. The social identity approach 
addresses this issue by highlighting the interactive processes that function at the micro-
level, in terms of this thesis, in relation to political elites.  
 
This approach to leadership differs from that which is often taken in psychology and 
political psychology in that it directs research toward the processes of social identity 
management. As Haslam and Reicher suggest, leadership ‘is more about doing than 
having’ (2007: 141). In contrast to the more traditional interpretations of the social 
identity approach, these developments also allow a greater role for state leaders and 
political elites in terms of manipulating social identities with regards to their fit to 
context as well as salience. This process is restricted, however, by audiences and 
context. These factors are considered to be central in influencing and organizing 
constructions of social reality.  
 
The above insights share much in common with constructivism broadly conceived, but 
focus predominantly on the cognitive and social micro-foundations as well as questions 
of leadership processes, areas that are highly relevant to the questions of concern in this 
thesis. In the remainder of this Chapter, I demonstrate how a framework focusing 
specifically on the management of social identities by political elites, in terms of the 
social groups associated with the state, can provide significant insight into the processes 
of contestation and defection from the international detention regime.   
 
 
3. A Framework for Understanding 
As outlined above, the social identity approach has developed into a more interactive 
and dynamic perspective, much more beneficial for understanding contestation and 
defection. Insights point to the centrality of the processes of social identity management 
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in understanding the interactions between context, the social identities associated with 
the state, normative influence, and behaviour. I propose that in order to appreciate the 
processes of contestation regarding the international detention regime we have much to 
gain from assessing the management strategies employed by political elites. They 
provide a framework from which to understand the interactive nature of normative 
constraint in specific cases.  
 
Research into the management of social identities is another area where there has been 
significant development in the social identity approach. Whilst previous laboratory 
based social identity studies have tended to focus on clearly defined groups, with a 
singular salient in-group and out-group, the political context is clearly much more 
complicated than this.22 Leaders in particular, are limited in how far they can operate on 
a straightforward in-group/out-group dynamic since the social environment involves 
many memberships and audiences. The social identity approach, furthermore, has 
traditionally been based on a hierarchical understanding of social groups, where one is 
more highly valued than the rest. Yet this does not really capture the complexities of the 
political environment and the necessity to maintain different memberships and thus 
social identities simultaneously. In the political sphere we must also note that 
boundaries are less likely to be clearly defined.23  
 
In light of these concerns social identity scholars have increasingly engaged with 
questions of management strategies as opposed to relying on that of hierarchy across all 
circumstances.24 Scholars are recognising, more and more, that competing frames of 
reference (based on social group membership) can be simultaneously salient or overlap 
(e.g. Reicher, Haslam and Hopkins, 2005). Thus how these memberships are negotiated, 
how we understand social influence in light of overlapping and interconnected 
categories and how we deal with competing normative pressures becomes a matter of 
significant interest. Indeed, this is an area that has also often been neglected in certain 
strands of constructivism, where the emphasis has been on the impact and defection 
                                                 
22 One example of a real world study highlighting this is provided by Gibson (2006). In his assessment of 
in-group attachment the findings suggest that ‘the influences on people are not purified; instead, they are 
often highly cross-cutting and contextual’ (2006: 697).  
23 For an interesting study that considers the construction of boundaries between in-group and out-group, 
where they are drawn, and their implications for cooperation and conflict see Rousseau (2006).  
24 The hierarchical ranking of social groups in terms of salience and importance.  
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from singular international norms or shifts from one identity to another to explain 
change.25   
 
An increasing number of social identity studies have demonstrated that we do not 
simply switch between different social identities as simplistic interpretations of the 
social identity approach have suggested (e.g. Klein et al, 2007).26 Instead we attempt to 
render compatible our various different social identities. One complicating or 
constraining factor in this process is that of the various audiences to which there is 
potential accountability. Audiences can both judge and contest an actor’s claim to be 
part of, or indeed representative of, a particular social identity, as well their 
interpretation of that which constitutes the social identity (Klein et al, 2007). The 
‘multiplicity of accountability pressures’, as characterised by Klein et al (2007: 41), is 
certainly evident for leaders in the political sphere. Indeed, as social identities are by 
definition shared ‘the individual cannot easily redefine or adjust one social identity to 
better fit with other identities’ (Brewer, 2001: 122); this is dependent on persuasion and 
acceptance by the various audiences. In the context of international politics it is 
certainly fair to say that there are significant pressures and strategic considerations 
regarding both the selection and presentation of social identities. The management 
strategies employed will undoubtedly be based on such deliberations. 
 
One typology of such strategies is provided by Roccas and Brewer (2002). The authors 
focus on ways to reduce inconsistencies in memberships, based on the need for 
cognitive consistency and compatibility between different beliefs and attitudes. In doing 
so they suggest four different ways in which multiple memberships may be organised. 
The first strategy, dominance, involves the subordination of the relevant social identities 
to one super-ordinate group identification. This could be used to mask or to reconcile 
divergence between subgroups or as a vehicle for social change, in terms of identity 
formation at a super-ordinate level and associated emergent norms.27 The dominant 
                                                 
25 Of course the multiplicity of identity has been more apparent in areas of constructivism associated with 
scholars such as Maja Zehfuss (2001). However, this has tended to be in terms of social roles and has not 
been based on the micro-foundations for multiplicity and the capacity for management.  
26 The traditional approach is largely a consequence of laboratory based study as mentioned earlier in the 
Chapter.  
27 However, this form of social identity could lead to intolerance especially when the super-ordinate 
group is represented in a non-complex way, not representing the ‘diversity of dimensions’ but focusing 
instead on ‘one set of prototypical dimensions’ (Amiot et al, 2007: 368). Studies are cited that also 
suggest the more we see our own in-group as prototypical of the super-ordinate category, the more our 
attitudes to out-group are will be negative. 
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subgroup within the super-ordinate category is seen as most likely to impose its own 
characteristics on the group (Amiot, Sablonniere, Terry and Smith, 2007). 
 
The second strategy involves the process of compartmentalisation, where the various 
social identities are differentiated and seen as applicable in different circumstances or in 
relation to different issues. The diverse social identities are kept separate, reconciliation 
is not attempted and context plays an important role in determining their relevance, as is 
traditionally associated with the social identity approach.  
 
The third strategy identified by Roccas and Brewer involves intersection representation 
where the overlapping attributes of the diverse social identities are acknowledged and 
they are viewed on this exclusive basis. Only the attributes common to all the social 
identities form the area of focus as the basis for a new and very narrow category. The 
authors give the example of ‘women’ and ‘researcher’ as categories to form the 
exclusive category of ‘woman researcher’. Whilst this process draws from the existing 
social identities to constitute the exclusive category, Hutter and Crisp (2005) have also 
demonstrated that when we cannot rely on the attributes of the categories themselves to 
explain the conjunction, we generate new emergent attributes. The example is given of a 
‘Harvard educated carpenter’ where the conjunction demands new attributes not based 
in either category.  
 
The final strategy Roccas and Brewer highlight is that of merging social identities. All 
divergent social identities are held despite their lack of convergence, as they all share at 
least some common features. They are all seen on the most inclusive terms.  
Which of these four strategies is chosen is highly dependent on the degree of conflict 
between the different social groups and corresponding social identities. An additive 
strategy (such as Roccas and Brewer’s final category) is highly unlikely in times of 
contestation when differences are accentuated. However, merging is likely to be fairly 
easy when conflict is not apparent. Where there are conflicting normative demands 
management is crucial to increase tolerance and efforts will tend to be made at 
achieving compromise and reconciliation. Compartmentalisation as a strategy could 
alternatively either exacerbate or reduce conflict, but in certain circumstances may be 
the only strategy available.    
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Expression of these strategies can vary and may be explicit in the language actors 
employ. Alternatively actors may make use of more subtle implicit suggestions. Overall 
these strategies aim to draw together or differentiate between multiple social identities, 
at times through the generation of new categories of membership, for example 
international coalitions fighting terrorism, or changes to existing categories, for example 
constructions of the international community as super-ordinate. The strategies serve 
various functions. First, to assist individuals in their ability to cope with their own 
multiple memberships and competing demands, second, as a mechanism by which to 
perceive the multiple memberships of others, and third, for strategic purposes such as 
mobilization or social change, particularly for those in leadership positions.28  
 
Whilst the categories identified by Roccas and Brewer above are quite neat and appear 
to be isolated, I must note that this is not how I expect them to translate into the 
complex political sphere. Indeed, as will be apparent in the empirical Chapters to this 
thesis, they often appear in conjunction with each other in the same passage and in 
relation to the same social identity. Intersection representation in particular, does not 
feature purely in terms of forming an exclusive category exactly as Roccas and Brewer 
suggest. However, areas of overlap are bolstered, alongside other arguments, generally 
to support dominance. I use this interpretation of intersection representation in my 
analysis. The management strategies outlined above serve as a framework for analysis 
but it is important to stress that I do not attempt to impose strict and false boundaries 
around them.  
 
Conclusion 
In relation to constructivism there is much value to a consideration of how political 
elites as representatives of states manage different social identities and what this tells us 
about the interactive nature of normative influence as contextually situated. Such a 
framework provides us with insights into contestation processes which internalisation 
and personality based arguments miss out. The changing and contestable nature of 
norms is often marginalised as are the interactive processes of leadership that social 
identity scholars emphasise. This can however be brought to the fore in analysis by 
considering how the negotiations between context, social identities and international 
normative regimes are constructed. This is crucial to our understanding of how 
                                                 
28 The latter usage need not be direct in construction, but instead, as Klein et al (2007) point out, the use 
of ambiguity in discourse relating to multiple audiences is a potentially very significant strategy. 
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contestations and defections became viable policy options. We are indeed led to 
stimulating questions such as, what social identities are at play, how do they seem to 
interact, and how are they managed by political elites in order to allow for the 
contestation of international normative regimes? These questions will be explored in the 
empirical Chapters of this thesis in order to assess the interactive processes of 
contestation in relation to the international detention regime by the USA and UK 2001-
2006. The value of the framework provided by the social identity approach, particularly 
in relation to the management of social identities, will be evaluated in responding to the 
overall question posed by this thesis; how are normative constraints negotiated so as to 
allow for the contestation of the international detention regime, by the USA and UK in 
the war on terror? I argue that such an approach is highly beneficial to the development 
of understandings in this area.  
 
In order to show the value of the social identity approach it has been necessary to 
engage with the relevance of psychology to IR, how insights from the discipline have 
been used, particularly in constructivism, where there has been an increase in 
engagement over the past decade. I have provided justification for the type of 
psychology employed in this thesis, the social identity approach, by evaluating the 
different ways in which insights from psychology have been used by constructivist 
scholars and the implications these have for the study of normative influence and 
contestation. I have outlined the manner of employment adopted in this thesis, building 
a framework for subsequent analysis based on advancements in the social identity 
approach, in particular the management of social identities by political elites.   
 
In the remainder of this thesis I evaluate how far these arguments are beneficial in 
enabling us to access the processes of contestation in relation to normative constraints, 
essential to answering the overall question of this thesis. This is based on the micro-
foundational understanding of the influence of norms and normative regimes provided 
by the social identity approach in relation to the multiplicity of social identities. In order 
to provide such an assessment, Chapter 3 proceeds by identifying the social identities to 
be considered, providing justification for their inclusion, before Chapters 4 and 5 assess 
the management strategies apparent in 2001-2006.  
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Chapter 3 – The Social Identities Contexts of the USA/UK 
 
The last Chapter established the framework from which I will assess the interactive 
processes of contestation and defection from the international detention regime, by the 
USA and UK in the context of the war on terror.1 By drawing from the micro-
foundational insights provided by the social identity approach in social psychology, our 
attention is directed toward social group memberships (or association with different 
social groups), and their importance for understanding the negotiation of normative 
constraint. The purpose of this Chapter is to highlight the social groups of significance 
with regards to the international detention regime, building a picture of the social 
identities context within which political elites make decisions and set policies.  
 
The normative context which IR scholars usually evaluate tends to be very limited, 
often focusing on one identity or one international norm, as evidenced in Chapter 1. 
This thesis moves away from such an approach by identifying and assessing the 
multiple social groups associated with the state, where these are relevant to the 
detention regime. This Chapter, unlike the others in this thesis, does not make 
substantive claims in itself with regards to the contestation of the international detention 
regime. The limited discussion presented is, nonetheless, very important to 
contextualise and provide clarity for the Chapters that follow.  
 
Chapter 3 has three main objectives: (1) to identify the social identities to be examined 
in remainder of this thesis; (2) to define, albeit in a limited and generalised manner, 
these social identities; and (3) to argue why they are relevant to examine contestation of 
the international detention regime by the USA and UK. Practical restrictions prevent a 
more weighty analysis than that which I provide below. For example, the material used 
for this Chapter has been limited to that which is publicly available. These sources do 
not provide in-depth insights into the issues of concern. Whilst interviews with key 
personnel from these social groups may have overcome some of these constraints, there 
are still problems in terms of how much we can generalise from a very small sample of 
individuals. Indeed, there are further constraints in terms of access to officials, as well 
as the feasibility of such an approach within the confines of this thesis, given that 
describing these social identities is not the primary focus of analysis. To define each of 
these social identities in substantial depth would be a thesis topic in itself, and beyond 
                                                 
1 The basis for the international detention regime was outlined at the end of Chapter 1.  
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the requirement of this Chapter, which is to contextualise the analysis that follows in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Thus, I provide a very general and limited discussion of the complex 
social identities of concern in this thesis in order to provide the reader with a sufficient 
contextual basis for the analysis in the remainder of this thesis.   
 
This Chapter considers the social groups of the UK and US militaries, the human rights 
and humanitarian social grouping, the UN, the UK and US legal professions, and 
membership of a group of liberal democratic states internationally, in this order. The 
optimal way to provide a valuable frame of reference for Chapters 4 and 5 is to consider 
these different social identities in relation to a set of three consistent questions. (1) What 
constitutes the social identity of this group? (2) How is this social group important to 
the UK and/or the USA? (3) How is this social group relevant to the international 
detention regime (and vice versa)? This Chapter builds on the framework established in 
Chapters 1 and 2, and generates a basis from which to assess the management of these 
social identities in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Method 
The social identities assessed in this thesis have been pre-selected for analysis. This is a 
significant point that requires further justification. This thesis does not attempt to 
recover, inductively, the social identities that are most significant in the discourse of 
political elites in the USA and UK 2001-2006. There are several reasons for rejecting 
such an approach. First, focusing only on the social identities evident in the discourse 
would not capture exclusions or significant issues that political elites refuse to address. 
Second, this would restrict our ability to assess interactive processes, as the basis for 
analysis would rest on the discourse of political elites. Third, political elites are unlikely 
to always directly refer to specific groups (they are more likely to refer to issues 
pertaining to that group), therefore, we need an understanding of the social identities in 
order to access the management strategies employed in the discourse.  
 
The social groups included in this thesis have been selected on the basis of their overall 
importance to the state, thus the need for political elites to consider them in the 
formulation of policy, as well as their relevance to the international detention regime 
(and vice versa). I have not included membership or association with the EU because it 
is only the UK that is actually a member. I have also not included religion as a social 
group. Religion is of course highly significant to both Bush and Blair, however, the 
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inclusion of religion would go beyond what is feasible in a thesis. The different sections 
of this Chapter, which focus on the social groups identified, will provide further 
justification for those selected.  
 
There are several other areas that I must also clarify before embarking upon the 
discussion in this Chapter. First, I do not in any way suggest that these social identities, 
understood in terms of social groups (see Chapter 2), are static. I do not engage with 
changes to them in this Chapter, as to track these changes would be a thesis topic in 
itself and is therefore beyond the scope of this research project. Some attempts to 
redefine these social groups will be considered in the course of Chapters 4 and 5, where 
relevant to the questions posed. Second, I realise that there are variations within the 
social groups presented – they generally do not form a coherent whole on all 
dimensions, there is of course room for variation as there is in any organisation or 
grouping. The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a general overview of the basis of 
these social groups, where variations within are highly significant, these will be 
acknowledged. Third, in order to achieve this assessment I will draw on key documents 
and discourse pertaining to these social groups. Fourth, as mentioned above, this 
Chapter does not claim to provide an in-depth assessment of these social groups. 
Various scholars have focused on each of these groups individually and where 
appropriate I will draw on their insights. I do not hope to replicate in any way studies 
such as those into military culture, or into the organisational culture of the UN. Whilst 
there is the risk of over-simplification, the modest objective in this Chapter is to 
establish the basic principles of the social identities context within which decisions and 
policies pertaining to the international detention regime are made. 
 
 
1. The UK Armed Forces 
What constitutes the social identity of this group? The social identity of the UK 
armed forces is based on the shared ethos and values of the three services, the Army, the 
Navy and the Air Force. Whilst there are clearly differences between these services, and 
even between the regiments and brigades within services, this Chapter aims to identify 
the general and fundamental principles that underlie this social group.   
 
In terms of the ethos, values and standards that define the three services there is much 
similarity. The British Army (2008a) for example, emphasises the core values of, self-
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less commitment, courage, discipline, integrity, loyalty, and respect for others, 
alongside standards of lawful and appropriate behaviour, underpinned by 
professionalism and excellence. The RAF (2008) and Navy’s (2008) approach also 
reflects these core values and standards. The guiding principles of ‘humanity and 
victory’ (emphasis added, Ministry of Defence, 2003a), alongside duty (British Army, 
2008c) permeate the discourse of this social group.  
 
The overall objective of the UK armed forces however is to serve the aims of foreign 
and security policy as determined by the British government. These priorities feature in 
both the Strategic Defence Review (1998) and the New Chapter (2002), and are 
reiterated in the Defence White Paper (2003b): 
 
To deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories by defending them, 
including against terrorism; and to act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and 
stability (Ministry of Defence, 2003b: 4).  
  
Certainly, many factors that contribute to the social identity of the UK armed forces, 
particularly regarding their purpose and future direction, are the result of government 
policy. However, this policy is also influenced by the character and existing doctrine 
and culture built up by the UK’s Armed Forces. This is quite logical as policy must be 
militarily possible in terms of culture, training and capacity. Indeed the complex 
relationship between government policy and military doctrine is identified in the 
publication, British Defence Doctrine (Ministry of Defence, 2001a). The values and 
standards identified above are therefore crucial in the construction of government 
objectives and will also be central in establishing how these objectives should be 
achieved. Normative constraints are therefore evident, however, the manner in which 
they will be manifest is not clear. This is due to the complexity of competing factors, 
such as ‘humanity and victory’ as mentioned above.  
 
How is this social group important to the UK? The UK armed forces form a central 
component of the British government’s foreign and security policy (e.g. the Strategic 
Defence Review, 1998; Blair, 1999). Blair’s ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ 
speech in 1999 granted a central role to the use of military force, with particular 
emphasis on fighting for values, should circumstances require such action. This built on 
UK involvement in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), and set the tone for the use of 
force in Sierra Leone (2001), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). The armed forces are 
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also a significant part of UK society based on strong historical roots, and 
responsibilities between the nation and the armed forces as codified in the military 
covenant (British Army, 2008c). Thus, they are a highly significant social group in 
relation to the UK.  
 
How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? The UK 
armed forces have been involved in the detention of prisoners in the war on terror, both 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their actions directly relate to the international detention 
regime. They are practitioners in this context and are responsive to the interpretations of 
the British government regarding appropriate detention standards.  
 
The basis for an assessment of perceptions of the international detention regime rests on 
this social group’s approach to the rule of law and human rights more generally. The 
rule of law is mentioned in the discourse, largely in terms of International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) and guidance for soldiers in field operations as we would expect. The New 
Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review stresses that actions must only be taken ‘when 
legally justified’ (Ministry of Defence, 2002: 9) and conduct must be in accordance 
with ‘international legal obligations’ (2002: 12). However, the restrictive nature of 
international law is also highlighted, in terms of the enemy knowing the range of 
options available and the potential for permitted actions to be less severe than those 
outside the law. The ‘increasing demands of legislation, including international law’ 
(Ministry of Defence, 2001b: 10) and growing ‘judicial scrutiny by international courts’ 
(Ministry of Defence, 2001c: 16) are identified by the Ministry of Defence.  
 
The need to address this intensifying international legal climate is acknowledged in 
terms of the training of servicemen and women, as well as ‘the development and 
procurement of weapon systems’ that are more suitable to this emerging environment 
(Ministry of Defence, 2001c: 16). The government’s publication, The Future Strategic 
Context for Defence (Ministry of Defence, 2001c: 31) suggests that:  
 
Weapon systems and tactics will need to evolve to cope with limitations on rules of engagement caused 
by public, international and allied opinion, and by developments in international law. 
 
Thus there is much emphasis on the future requirements of international law, and public 
opinion in response to such a climate. Meeting these objectives is constructed as 
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something to strive for whilst at the same time being cautious about the ‘possibility that 
these pressures will affect our ability to fulfil military objectives’, and may be seen as a 
weakness by the enemy (Ministry of Defence, 2001c: 16). 
 
In terms of human rights, there is a humanitarian focus in much of the discourse, 
indicated by the motto for the UK Armed Forces ‘a force for good’ as mentioned 
previously. The ‘[p]ressure to mount military operations for "moral" reasons’ is 
identified as an area that will continue to increase (Ministry of Defence, 2001c: 14). 
There will be a greater need to tackle issues of human security and support human 
rights. Thus, human rights have become part of the armed force’s objectives, yet 
concerns are also raised about the potential for ‘unreasonable operational restrictions’ 
that may be generated by such an emphasis (Ministry of Defence, 2001c: 17). There is 
an expressed desire for dialogue with ‘other Government Departments and NGOs’ on 
these issues and for public debate to be properly informed on the need to balance human 
rights with operational requirements (Ministry of Defence, 2001c: 17). The need for a 
positive international legal framework to encompass these competing demands is called 
for.   
 
Thus, there is much complexity to this social identity. International normative regimes 
are highly valued and very important in the standards and values of this social group. 
However, these are often juxtaposed with operational requirements. Although this does 
begin to change with The Aitken Report (British Army, 2008) where defection with 
regards to detention is seen as damaging to operations. To set government policies 
contrary to the international detention regime or that place strain on the Armed Forces 
in terms of compliance with these standards would undermine the Armed Force’s 
reputation internationally, sometimes compromise effectiveness, as well as be counter 
to their values and ethos.2 The strong emphasis on duty in the armed forces means the 
government has a responsibility to ensure that these circumstances are not created. 
Thus, this social group generates normative constraints on the development of policy 
relating to detention in the context of war but these are counterbalanced by the emphasis 
on trade-offs as above.    
 
 
                                                 
2 This is in terms of the institutional reputation, values and standards of this group, based on the inductive 
and deductive interactions of the collection of individuals that are members of this social group (Postmes, 
Haslam and Swaab, 2005).  
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2. The US Military 
What constitutes the social identity of this group? As with the UK Armed Forces, the 
US Military is run on a joint service basis, each with a particular history. There is 
indeed much justification in the US Military documents as to the merits of each service, 
perhaps reflective of the nature of funding for defence in the USA in comparison to the 
UK. As stated previously, where there are specifics to individual components these will 
be mentioned. However, again the objective of this section is to build an overall picture 
of the fundamental aspects of social identity for this social group. 
 
Whilst some differences are apparent in each service’s creed, espousing the values of 
what it means to be a US soldier, airman or sailor, the overall ethos is very similar. Each 
emphasises service to the United States as we would expect. The US Navy however 
places particular stress on ‘Honor, Courage and Commitment’, ‘excellence and the fair 
treatment of all’, as well as obedience to those in higher authority (US Navy, 2007). The 
US Air Force and Army both underline the primary place of the mission, that they ‘will 
never accept defeat’, ‘never leave a fallen comrade’ (US Army, 2007) or ‘an Airman 
behind’ and that they ‘will never falter’ (US Air Force, 2007). Answering a call to duty 
is also stressed in the Air Force creed, as it is throughout much of the more general 
Army discourse. In the current climate ‘the attacks of September 11th’ serve ‘as the Call 
to Duty for today's generation’ (US Army, 2006a), where duty to one’s country is seen 
as ‘a noble calling and…among life's greatest work’ (US Army, 2006a). There is also 
much mention of a ‘warrior ethos’, which involves the elements stressed in the creeds of 
the Army and Air Force mentioned above. In terms of the Army this warrior ethos 
‘defines who Soldiers are and what Soldiers do’ (US Army, 2004: 5). Army values and 
the warrior ethos are a ‘non-negotiable element of…Army Culture’ serving to influence 
decisions, particularly ‘where expediency may compete with morality’ and helping 
soldiers to ‘understand what “doing the right thing” means’ (US Army, 2005a: 4). As 
indicated above: 
 
Soldiers who live the Warrior Ethos always put the mission first, refuse to accept defeat, never quit and 
never leave a fallen comrade behind.  They are trained and equipped to engage and destroy the enemies of 
the United States in close combat (US Army, 2005a: 4). 
 
Other values revolve around issues of ‘sacrifices, courage, and heroism’ (US Army, 
2006b), professionalism and preserving freedom.  
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In terms of purpose across the Military this is expressed as supporting the goals and 
objectives set out in the National Security Strategy (NSS) (The White House, 2002; 
2006), the National Defense Strategy (NDS) (Department of Defense, 2005; 2008) and 
the National Military Strategy (NMS) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004). There is an 
emphasis on making a difference in the world and having a positive effect, ‘shaping the 
world to be a safer place’ (US Army, 2000: 10) as well as a better place. The strategic 
objectives identified in the NDS involve, securing the nation from direct attack; 
‘secur[ing] strategic access and maintain[ing] global freedom of action; establish[ing] 
security conditions conducive to a favorable international order; and strengthen[ing] 
alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges’ (Department of 
Defense, 2005: Executive Summary). Additionally the NMS defines Military objectives 
as ‘to protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent conflict 
and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: viii). 
Again, these factors are the product of an interaction between military culture and the 
government’s political aims.  
 
Thus, as with the UK armed forces, normative constraints are apparent in terms of 
military culture, however, the way in which this will take shape is highly context 
dependent due to the complexity of competing factors – as is evident in the warrior 
ethos itself.  
 
How is this social group important to the USA? The US Military is heavily engrained 
in US culture and political objectives. The US Army stresses their ‘vital role in the 
growth and development of our nation’ (US Army, 2006b) as well as their contribution 
to enabling ‘America to survive and flourish throughout the 21st Century’ (US Army, 
2004: 21). Their ‘central role in US engagement around the world’ and ‘in shaping the 
international environment’ (US Army, 2000: 3) is given great importance both by the 
Military themselves, as well as in political rhetoric (the latter will be addressed in the 
course of Chapter 5). This role is thought to come with the ‘responsibilities pre-
eminence requires’ (US Army, 2005b: 1). The US Army highlights their frequent 
position ‘at the top of opinion polls as the most respected institution in the country’ with 
soldiers serving as ‘the face of America’ (US Army, 2006a). The importance of support 
from the Nation to fulfil their objectives is regularly highlighted. Thus, this social group 
and their normative content are highly significant to US policy-makers and political 
elites.  
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How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? The US 
Military, like the UK, have been involved in the detention of prisoners in the war on 
terror, both in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their actions therefore are also directly related to 
the international detention regime and the interpretations given by the government. The 
US Military have been implicated in much more controversy than the UK with regards 
to detention practices, for example at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay.   
 
The basis for an assessment of perceptions of detention standards again rests on this 
social group’s approach to the rule of law and human rights more generally. The 
Geneva Conventions are generally considered to be firmly embedded in US Military 
culture. For example, Woodward (2006: 86), highlights General Myers’ and Colin 
Powell’s arguments against the Bush administration’s denial of Geneva provisions (also 
see Goldsmith, 2007: 113-114). Specific details regarding detention are however limited 
to the field manuals that deal with procedures relating to prisoners. A new manual was 
released in 2006 (2-22.3) following the Detainee Treatment Act (2005) and the various 
controversies surrounding detainee abuse. This replaced the Army’s field manual (34-
52) from 1992. In the more general documents, the ethos informing such situations is 
that there will be ‘morally uncertain situations’ (US Army, 2005a: 4) within which 
servicemen and women will have to make decisions as to how to balance the factors 
involved.  
 
Thus, as with the UK Armed Forces, there are normative constraints in relation to this 
social group on the subject of detention, based on the centrality of Geneva and the core 
ethos of doing the right thing. However, again there is much complexity to this due to 
perceived operational requirements and instances of moral ambiguity. More recently, 
detention practices and the treatment of civilians have been increasingly linked to 
operational success; however this appears to be a relatively new idea that is beginning to 
emerge in relation to the US Military (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005).  
 
 
3. The Humanitarian and Human Rights Social Group 
As with the UK Armed Forces and the US Military considered above, there are certain 
difficulties in placing all human rights and humanitarian organisations under one 
umbrella when determining an overall identity for this social grouping, however there is 
also much common ground to be found. This will be established through a consideration 
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of Amnesty International (AI) – with headquarters in London, Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) – with headquarters in New York, and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) – with headquarters in Geneva. Where appropriate, the differences 
between these organisations will be highlighted, when they shed light on varying 
aspects of the framework of social identities with which state leaders and political elites 
interact and generate policy.   
 
What constitutes the social identity of this group? The ICRC has the longest history 
of the three organisations, founded in 1863 as the International Committee for Relief to 
the Wounded, and later becoming the ICRC. Based on the vision of Henry Dunant and 
his experience of the casualties of the Battle of Solferino in Italy, the organisation was 
established with the objective to, ‘preserve a measure of humanity in the midst of war’ 
(ICRC, 2005: 3). In addition to direct assistance in the form of establishing 
communication and reunification with families separated by conflicts, providing food 
and medical assistance, as well as visiting prisoners of war, the ICRC also aims to 
increase knowledge and awareness of IHL, promote and monitor compliance with IHL, 
contribute to the development of IHL, and where appropriate draw attention to 
violations of this area of international law. One significant feature of the ICRC is that its 
role is assigned by states. However, at the same time the organisation retains 
independence in order to fulfil the functions of its mandate.  
 
The organisation is based on principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, 
independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. These principles are seen as 
central to the identity of the ICRC, where perception by others along these lines is of 
essential importance in the work they carry out. This is particularly true of impartiality 
and neutrality; access into many areas where their work is undertaken is dependent on 
these characteristics. This is a matter where there is a difference in weighting between 
the ICRC and HRW/AI. Greater value is placed on dialogue between the ICRC and 
governments as opposed to systematic public denunciation; this allows for access to 
facilities or areas where it may otherwise have been denied. There is an emphasis on the 
‘fostering of a culture of responsibility’ (ICRC, 2007) as opposed to direct shaming, in 
order to increase compliance with IHL.  
 
AI was founded much later than the ICRC in 1961, with the specific purpose of 
campaigning on behalf of political prisoners across the world. The organisation’s 
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mandate since then has developed to encompass human rights issues across a much 
broader spectrum. Influence takes the form of letters to government, increasing public 
awareness and putting a face on those suffering from human rights violations. The 
organisation provides a vast range of reports on violations in all areas of the world. AI’s 
‘vision’ is based on ‘a world in which every person enjoys all of the human rights 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human 
rights standards’ (AI, 2005a). There is an absolute nature to this claim, applicable to all 
individuals across the globe.  
 
As with the ICRC, AI’s values are based on a belief in the rule of law and compliance 
with international standards. This is certainly a common theme across this sector as we 
would expect. AI defines itself as forming ‘a global community of human rights 
defenders with the principles of international solidarity, effective action for the 
individual victim, global coverage, the universality and indivisibility of human rights, 
impartiality and independence, and democracy and mutual respect’ (AI, 2005a). As we 
would anticipate these cover hugely similar if not the same principles as those set out by 
the ICRC. There is again a belief in the universality of the issues of concern, in this case 
human rights values though as opposed to the ICRC’s focus on IHL. The global reach 
of the issues, the features of impartiality and independence and international solidarity 
are echoed in the ethos of the ICRC as well as AI.   
 
HRW has the shortest history of the three organisations. Founded in 1978, the 
organisation was set up with the purpose of monitoring compliance with the human 
rights elements of the Helsinki Accords in the Soviet bloc countries. Subsequent to this 
initial focus, America’s Watch developed in the 1980s concentrating on human rights 
abuses in the war in Central America. The aim of the organisation was to counter the 
one-sided application of human rights norms. In 1988 HRW brought all their concerns 
in different areas of the world together to form one organisation with the objective of 
‘protecting the human rights of people around the world’ (HRW, 2005a: 1). The 
organisation’s stated purpose, as with AI, is to reduce the amount of human rights 
abuses through publicising them and as a consequence shaming those who are 
responsible for their occurrence. As such there is a strong reliance on international 
normative regimes prescribing human rights standards in order to achieve this objective.  
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Whilst evident in the other organisations, the discourse of HRW really highlights the 
social nature of power and how this enables certain actions. There is the belief that ‘our 
strength lies in our principle, our credibility, and the many supporters who stand with 
us’ (HRW, 2005a: 3). Through being legitimate, effectiveness can be achieved. HRW 
refers to this principle in terms of their own actions however such a belief would also 
seem to inform their understandings of the behaviours of other actors, such as the 
political elites that represent states.  
 
HRW also emphasize the links between human rights and ‘civilized society’ – a point 
frequently raised in constructivist research. This is expressed as a belief in the ‘basic 
values of dignity and justice that are, and should be, markers of a civilized society’ 
(HRW, 2005a: 19). These principles form the basis from which to judge the behaviour 
of actors, suggest appropriate ways to behave, and is reflective of the organisation’s 
understanding of the international environment.  
 
Whilst there are differences in emphasis and focus we can see common themes running 
through these organisations, for example, in the belief in the value of standards set in 
international law, the need to address human wrongs (whether this is in terms of public 
or private contestation), the need for all to be judged by the same standards, the belief in 
the universality of HR/IHL, and the belief that this social group can urge changes in 
policy. In addition to the values, beliefs and norms expressed above, other themes that 
emerged in the discourse of these organisations related to issues such as the importance 
of history, the enduring quality of IHL/HR, the need for morality in state leaders, as 
well as responsibility and accountability. However, there is a slight difference in 
expectations, how absolute we can be in terms of expected compliance with these 
standards; the ICRC being less absolutist and not placing as much emphasis on public 
protest and shaming.  
 
How is this social group important to the USA and UK? The human rights and 
humanitarian social group is highly visible in western society, particularly in the USA 
and UK. They also have a significant role in supporting and influencing the 
international normative environment. This is probably most visible in the work of the 
ICRC and their role in the development of IHL. Reimann (2006) however has also 
demonstrated how NGOs, generally speaking, have experienced substantial growth in 
the international sphere. They have broad support from inter-governmental 
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organisations such as the UN and EU as well as Western democracies. Reimann 
identifies the liberal democratic and neo-liberal economic ideology that dominates in 
the international sphere, as symbiotic with the rise of a pro-NGO norm internationally. 
Whilst previous constructivist research has focused on NGOs as promoters of world 
culture, Reimann highlights NGO dependence on the normative environment. The 
importance of NGOs to states such as the USA and UK is emphasised in the following 
statement, that ‘in order to be a properly functioning free market and democratic nation 
in the 1990s and 2000s, it was now necessary to have a flourishing “civil society” sector 
that included NGOs and other citizen-organized groups’ (Reimann, 2006: 59). Whilst 
this is a broad statement, it relates to the human rights and humanitarian social group 
under consideration in this section. They have political access and participate 
internationally, are important for the maintenance of international normative regimes, 
and Western states generally promote the spread of NGOs to non-Western part of the 
world. This social group is highly interlinked with what it means to be a member of an 
international group of liberal democratic states, and uses an international discourse, 
particularly for judging behaviour. Thus, this group is extremely important for states 
such as the USA and UK. 
 
How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? The human 
rights and humanitarian social group are very involved in international detention 
practices, albeit from a different angle than the US and UK militaries. Their interest is 
in monitoring the implementation of these detention standards, often visiting sites to 
assess conditions and treatment, and then highlighting practices that fall short to the 
relevant authorities and sometimes publicising in the public realm. The ICRC has a long 
history of visiting sites of detention, however as mentioned previously the reports are 
often not made public. HRW and AI are involved in some site visits and indeed 
campaign to be granted access, yet their emphasis is more on bringing abuses into the 
public sphere.  
 
The international detention regime is highly important to this social group, threats to 
this and other normative regimes are frequently cited. For example, AI states that the 
current context is experiencing a ‘threat to perhaps the most universally accepted human 
right – the right not to be tortured’ (2006a: 4). The implications and consequences of 
these challenges are emphasised. AI suggests that  ‘[b]y flouting fundamental principles 
of international law, the US administration’s detention policies in the so-called “war on 
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terror” risk making the world a less secure place’ (AI, 2004a: 1). Instead of IL placing 
an obstacle to measures designed to prevent terrorism, defecting from this framework is 
considered to make us more vulnerable to terrorism. Furthermore, there is also the threat 
that defection from IHL poses to soldiers in the field. If there is no strong example of 
compliance, others who are less inclined to comply, may in turn reject these principles. 
Defection becomes an excuse for others to follow suit.  
 
Unlike the UK Armed Forces and the US Military, the demands of IHL are not balanced 
against operational requirements. Indeed, as the ICRC state, in terms of IHL, a balance 
was struck between state security and individual rights in war in the drafting stages; the 
treaties were crafted with this in mind. IHL recognises that harmful actions do happen 
in times of war due to security imperatives but places limits on these. The ICRC is not 
unrealistic in this respect. They acknowledge that in war-time there is an emphasis on 
factors that run counter to certain principles of IHL and that war is a continuum of 
violence where there will be a risk of breaking humanitarian rules. Yet, this is not the 
same as them being undermined by political elites. International normative regimes are 
a vital symbolic resource even if they are not always adhered to; they provide important 
references for behaviour in times of war. Thus, whilst the ICRC recognises that there 
will be defections from the international normative regimes prescribing minimum 
standards in warfare, and it is impressive that they are so frequently adhered to in war, 
degradation of the actual regimes is very dangerous.  
 
There is a strong emphasis on the importance of international normative regimes as we 
would expect, and this is certainly the case with regards to detention. The utility in 
compliance with these standards in terms of the credibility and legitimacy that they 
grant to actions is a salient feature of the discourse of these organisations. The 
importance of rules in the conduct of international affairs is clearly recognised. Their 
application generally goes across all situations and for all actors, particularly with 
regards to normative prohibitions on torture – defection from which is considered to be 
illegitimate for anyone in spite of claims they may make to the contrary.  
 
 
4. The United Nations 
What constitutes the social identity of this group? Established in 1945 and now 
inclusive of 192 member states the UN has been mandated internationally to assist in 
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preventing the ‘scourge of war’, establish lasting peace and further social progress for 
all. The purpose and aims of the organisation are clearly set out in the preamble to the 
Charter of 1945 and are further articulated through more recent reports and statements 
by the Secretary-General (for the period considered – Kofi Annan).  
 
The UN has many roles and functions across a range of issue areas,3 however, the main 
goals of the organisation are clearly identified in the Charter as aspiring for peace, 
development, human rights and the promotion of international law, all founded on an 
ethos of cooperation. The route to achieving the first three of these goals is underpinned 
by the strengthening the rule of law. Whilst these objectives relate back to the context of 
1945, it is thought that they still remain humanity’s goals in the new millennium 
(Annan, 2000a), with human rights being central to ‘peoples’ expectations about the 
future role of the United Nations’ (Annan, 2000b: 15). The emphasis is on the 
attainment of better standards of life through the promotion of social progress and the 
achievement of a ‘larger freedom’, including ‘freedom from want and freedom from 
fear’ (Annan, 2000c: 55). The organisation aspires to assist in creating a ‘more peaceful 
and just world’ (Report of the Secretary-General, 2001: 13) and to ‘reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small’ (UN, 1945: Preamble). The 
UN is characterised as ‘serving as the place where the cause of common humanity is 
articulated and advanced’ (Annan, 2000b: 13).  
 
The influence of this social group in achieving these goals is thought to rest on its work 
‘in creating and sustaining the global rules without which modern societies simply 
could not function’ (Annan, 2000d: 68). This role is evident in the Charter and other UN 
mechanisms, ‘to introduce new principles into international relations’ that have a 
positive impact on ‘day-to-day conduct’ (Annan, 2000e: 6). We can see this clearly in 
the UDHR, articulating common aspirations for a more equitable and just world. 
  
This normative role is seen as essential to ‘formal governance structures’ such as the 
UN, in ‘defining objectives, setting standards and monitoring compliance’ (Annan, 
2000b: 14) internationally. Essential to this function is the social group’s ‘capacity to 
                                                 
3 Those set out in the Millennium Development Goals include targeting: climate change, organised crime, 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, poverty, corruption, protecting the vulnerable especially in emergencies, WMD, 
arms reduction education, conflict prevention, freedom of the media, racism, gender discrimination, and 
problems caused by increases in the world population.   
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inspire’ (Annan, 2000f: 77) and the need for and belief in legitimacy, which appear as 
fundamental aspects of the social identity constructed in the discourse, indeed this is 
where it is thought its strength and capacity to influence lies. This is evidenced in the 
two following passages:  
 
The great strength of the United Nations remains its legitimacy, founded on the bedrock principles of 
international law accepted by all States and expressed in the decisions of an Organization which 
represents the entire international community. In the international arena there is no substitute for such 
legitimacy (Report of the Secretary-General, 2003: 3).  
  
We are an organization without independent military capability, and we dispose of relatively modest 
resources in the economic realm. Yet our influence and impact on the world is far greater than many 
believe to be the case—and often more than we ourselves realize. This influence derives not from any 
exercise of power, but from the force of the values we represent; our role in helping to establish and 
sustain global norms; our ability to stimulate global concern and action; and the trust we enjoy for the 
practical work we do on the ground to improve people’s lives (Annan, 2000d: 68).  
 
Both of these passages demonstrate the importance of legitimacy to the purpose of the 
UN and to its capacity to influence and fulfil its goals. The values that characterise the 
UN and provide aspirations for the member states are given as follows: freedom, equity, 
solidarity, tolerance, non-violence, respect for nature, shared responsibility, pluralism, 
peace, and respect for every human life. Stress is placed on good governance based on 
the principles of ‘the rule of law, effective state institutions, transparency and 
accountability in the management of public affairs, respect for human rights, and the 
participation of all citizens in the decisions that affect their lives’ (Annan, 2000g: 22). 
The UN is constructed as a ‘guardian of the Charter and the core values enshrined 
therein’ as well as the principles above (Report of the Secretary-General, 2002: 4).  
 
Formal membership of the UN is articulated in the Charter in Article 4 (1): 
 
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations 
contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry 
out these obligations. 
 
The threat of expulsion is stated in Article 6, should a member state persistently violate 
the principles of the Charter. Thus there is a clear sense that identity as a group member 
is compromised if states do not live up to the standards as found in the Charter and 
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discourse of the social group, and as set by those considered to be prototypical 
members. This is despite the fact that the chances of expulsion are extremely slim. 
 
How is this social group important to the USA and UK? Membership of the UN is 
extremely important in international society, particularly in terms of contributing to 
what it means to be a legitimate state. The UN is the home to many institutionalised 
rules and laws governing behaviour internationally. High hopes were held of the UN at 
the end of the Cold War, in terms of new possibilities for action without the threat of 
paralysing vetoes. Indeed, the then US President George H. W. Bush (1990) stated that, 
‘the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle’. The UN provides a basis for 
multilateralism and is very important for the USA and UK in terms of providing 
legitimacy for actions and giving such states social standing internationally.4  
 
How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? The UN is 
very relevant to the international detention regime for similar reasons to the human 
rights and humanitarian social group. For example, they are involved in monitoring 
state practices and setting standards internationally. The main activities of the Special 
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
include, ‘transmitting urgent appeals to States with regard to individuals reported to be 
at risk of torture, as well as communications on past alleged cases of torture; 
undertaking fact-finding country visits; and submitting annual reports on activities’ 
(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008). The UN 
Human Rights Commission has, furthermore, increased awareness and drawn attention 
to cases of torture, disappearance, and arbitrary detention in the world, generating 
international pressure on governments to improve their record in these areas (Stewart, 
2008).  
 
In terms of the recent arguments concerning the need to balance human rights and 
security in the war on terror (particularly with regards to detention), Kofi Annan has 
been very clear that, ‘[r]espect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of 
law are essential tools in the effort to combat terrorism – not privileges to be sacrificed 
at a time of tension’ (Annan, 2003a).  The former Secretary-General rejected claims of a 
                                                 
4 The value that the Blair government and Bush administration place on such membership is clearly 
different in 2001-2006 however, with the latter viewing the organisation as an obstacle to avoid with 
regards to the invasion of Iraq. This will feature in the following Chapters, but is beyond the scope of 
assessment here.  
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trade-off (Annan, 2003b), instead ‘the moral vision of human rights – the deep respect 
for the dignity of each person’ is seen as ‘among our most powerful weapons against it 
[terrorism]’ (Annan, 2003c). The arguments for a balance are rejected in favour of a 
belief in the potential of human rights and the rule of law. Thus, the direction of 
normative constraint from membership of this social group is clear to see.  
 
 
5. The UK Legal Grouping 
The legal profession, perhaps more so than the other social identities discussed above, 
contains too many differences to go beyond the fundamentals of a culture in this 
particular area. The legal profession involves, for example, those who form part of the 
human rights and humanitarian social group, work as military lawyers, are lawyers at 
the UN or are involved in the judiciary. Thus, the following discussion is very general. 
 
What constitutes the social identity of this group? The legal social group has a very 
long history in the UK. The characteristics that I draw on are, however, gleaned from 
the legal system as it stands today. Hunt (1999: 91) provides a very useful account of 
the legal culture in the UK based on the ‘habits of mind and patterns of thought on the 
part of judges and practitioners’. Two particularly salient features that Hunt identifies 
are the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty which demands absolute ‘unquestioning 
loyalty’ to Parliament, and an objective, value-neutral approach (Hunt, 1999: 92).  
 
There is a very practical basis to both of these elements, where value-based choices are 
left to Parliament. In order to retain the authority of this social group, an objective 
approach is taken to the law, to ‘protect the courts against the loss of their legitimacy’ 
(Hunt, 1999: 94). Moving away from value-based choices has the effect of 
‘depoliticising the rule of law’ (Hunt, 1999: 93). This notion is grounded in a 
positivistic understanding of the law, where the emphasis is on finding the ‘real 
meaning’ of legal texts as opposed to assessing their ‘contingency of meaning’ (Hunt, 
1999: 93). The positivistic emphasis is thought to have a strong bearing on the culture 
of this social group, restricting the range of arguments that are deemed to be legitimate 
in legal terms. As Hunt states, such an approach, ‘dictate[s] a very particular mindset 
which subscribes wholeheartedly to the view that the courts are merely neutral arbiters 
applying ‘legal’ rules and principles which never embroils them in controversial value 
choices which might threaten their legitimacy’ (Hunt, 1999: 92). The individualistic 
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weighting in the court room is also thought to contribute to this mindset, often creating 
a barrier to consideration of some of the broader issues that might be at hand (Hunt, 
1999; Clements and Young, 1999). 
 
Another fundamental component which tends to be emphasised in relation to the UK 
legal social group is the duality of international and national law. Whilst advances have 
been made in this area, Dickson (2006a) suggests that it is still uncommon for the Law 
Lords to draw on human rights standards that are not yet part of British Law. They may 
exist internationally, and the government may have indicated a desire to comply with 
these standards, but until they actually form part of British Law, the Law Lords are 
unlikely to utilise these standards. The basis to this principle is that ‘an international 
treaty creates no rights or obligations at the national level unless and until it has been 
incorporated through domestic legislation’ (Dickson, 2006a: 336). Lord Steyn is cited as 
an advocate of a move away from this principle.  
 
These factors, Parliamentary sovereignty, a distancing from value based choices, and 
the perception of duality are fundamental principles that inform the social identity of the 
legal social group in the UK. Yet, as with the other social groups, this does not form a 
‘monolithic’ identity where change is impossible. Indeed, in the period assessed in this 
thesis (2001-2006) there is evidence of increased flexibility and assertion of the power 
of the judiciary. This is partly down to the obligations that result from membership of 
the European Community as well as the entry into force in 2000 of the Human Rights 
Act (1998). An illustration of some of these changes is provided by Dickson (2006b) in 
relation to rulings concerning the IRA in the period 1969-1993 and 1994-2005. The 
analysis suggests that there has been a subtle move towards the Lords ‘deciding cases in 
accordance with the rule of law, rather than with government preferences’ (2006b: 415).  
 
How is this social group important to the UK? Like the Armed Forces, the legal 
social group is very much part of the state apparatus, and as such expected on the whole 
to support the government. This group has an important task in the implementation of 
government legislation and advising the government on the legal context for proposed 
actions. Presenting a legal basis for action is extremely important in the UK in order to 
establish legitimacy. This social identity is very much part of the language and fabric of 
society in the UK.  
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Whilst not always framed in a positive manner, the significance of the UK legal social 
group in the broader social identities context is illustrated in the following statement by 
David Blunkett for BBC News, ‘I’m personally fed up with having to deal with a 
situation where Parliament debates issues and the judges then overturn them’ (BBC, 
2003a). Thus, the concerns of this group are highly significant to the UK government in 
terms of possibilities for action.  
 
How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? The 
international detention regime is highly legalised. The standards involved form part of 
domestic law in the UK. The Human Rights Act (HRA) (1998) has granted more power 
to this social group in terms of judging the government’s behaviour including that 
regarding the international detention regime. The Act stipulates that the judiciary pass 
judgement on the compatibility of legislation with the HRA, a subtle move away from 
an absolute principle of Parliamentary sovereignty (Clements and Young, 1999).    
  
The human rights based approach that has developed with regards to this social group is 
something that is noted in the literature. This challenges the ‘traditional view … that 
judges could not be trusted with human rights at all’, such matters were not seen to be 
part of their remit, yet now ‘the Lords are fast obtaining a global reputation for their 
pro-human rights approach in legal disputes’ (Dickson, 2006a: 330). This has indeed 
been supported in the discourse of members of the House of Lords, such as the now 
retired Lord Steryn and Lord Falconer. Speaking on human rights at Bangor University 
in March 2007, Lord Falconer stated that ‘human rights considerations are at the heart 
now of how laws are made’, they are mainstream and apply to everyone including our 
enemies. This human rights emphasis is not however consistent across this social group.  
 
The principles of duality and Parliamentary sovereignty may generally apply, however, 
the HRA has created a different role for this social group, one that is still emerging and 
is based on a tension between these, at times, competing demands. There are, therefore, 
normative constraints from this social identity that are highly relevant to detention 
standards. As we shall see in Chapter 4, this social group has been very important in this 
regard, challenging the government on various counts.  
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6. The US Legal Grouping 
What constitutes the social identity of this group? The legal system in the USA has a 
number of differences to the UK, however, overall the key principles and norms that 
underpin this social group are very similar. These include a value-neutral interpretation 
of the law with emphasis on the legitimacy this provides, equality before the law, and 
duality in terms of domestic and international law.  
 
The judiciary forms one part of the US governance system, alongside the executive and 
congress, each as independent and separated powers. Each branch contributes to the 
legal system however the judiciary is most closely aligned with the conception of a US 
legal social group. The Supreme Court is one fundamental aspect of this system. The 
purpose of the court is to ‘preserve and protect’ the US constitution. To do so the Court 
is charged with the task of interpreting the constitution, and has the power to quash 
legislation that is deemed to be unconstitutional. Doing so would render the proposed 
law invalid. As Madison wrote, ‘constitutional interpretation must be left to the 
reasoned judgement of independent judges, rather than to the tumult and conflict of the 
political process’ (US Supreme Court, 2008). As such, there is an emphasis on the 
authority, independence and legitimacy of the court’s opinion in providing a final 
interpretation as to the meaning of the legal texts in question.  
 
This is very similar to the UK legal social identity in terms of an emphasis on being 
value-neutral and separate from the realm of politics. These factors contribute to both 
legitimacy and authority which are fundamental to this social group. Goldsmith (2007) 
claims such cultural dynamics also permeate the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) where 
neutrality, detachment and personal integrity are privileged. The OLC has, Goldsmith 
states, ‘powerful cultural norms about the importance of providing the President with 
detached, apolitical legal advice, as if OLC were an independent court inside the 
executive branch’ (2007: 33). These ideals are therefore, part of a broad legal culture, 
however, as Goldsmith goes on to suggest, they were highly compromised in the war on 
terror in relation to the OLC.   
 
The US Supreme Court also places great emphasis on ‘Equal Justice under Law’, these 
words being written above the Supreme Court Building’s main entrance, and taken to 
‘express the ultimate responsibility’ of the Court (US Supreme Court, 2008). Equal 
protection and a right to due process are part of the 14th Amendment (1868), and again 
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are fundamental to this social group; this is alongside an emphasis on proving guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt (US Department of State, 2004). The values of the US legal 
social group are further articulated by the American Bar Association (2008) as 
‘promoting justice, professional excellence and respect for the law’ as well as striving 
for the defence of liberty.  
 
As with the UK there is a separation between domestic and international law. Various 
voices associated with this social group have expressed scepticism about the ‘creeping 
influence of international law on American law’ (Goldsmith, 2007: 21).5 This certainly 
is a contested issue, as in the UK. However, overall, the system is still one that reflects 
duality where ‘international law becomes part of and is applied by the US legal system 
only to the extent that it is incorporated into the US legal system’ (Murphy, 2004: 6). 
Thus, a value-neutral approach, equality and duality form the fundamental components 
of this social group. 
 
How is this social group important to the USA? The historical importance of the rule 
of law to the USA is a strong feature of American culture, where a central role is 
granted to this social group. This is largely based on interpreting the law (as mentioned 
above), and setting parameters for action. 
 
However, as was the case with the UK legal social group, there are limitations to this. 
For example, the US Courts generally refuse ‘to examine the legality of US actions in 
foreign affairs’ in terms of ‘international or general federal law’ as well as ‘their 
constitutionality’ (Murphy, 2004: 86). As Murphy further states, ‘US courts are 
especially unlikely to uphold a challenge to an act authorized by the president that 
allegedly violates a treaty, because the president has independent constitutional 
authority in foreign affairs that allows him to denounce or otherwise terminate a treaty 
even if this puts the United States in violation of international law’ (2004: 87). The 
courts do have the power to declare executive orders unconstitutional, however, as Bell 
suggests, this tends to be rare in occurrence ‘largely because of the perception that the 
president is entitled to direct his staff to act in whatever way he believes is most 
appropriate’ (Bell, 2004: 203). Thus, whilst this social group is extremely important to 
the USA, and the discourse of law enters into most aspects of social life, the executive 
                                                 
5 Scepticism regarding the binding nature of international law is certainly rife among political elites in the 
USA (Murphy, 2004: 12).  
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retains a large amount of authority with regards to interpretation and applicability of 
international law in foreign affairs. Whilst there have been shifts in power between the 
different branches of government in history, the period of the Bush administration is 
generally considered to be one characterised by decreased judicial oversight. As we will 
see in Chapter 5 however, the Courts began to present significant challenges to the 
administration’s interpretations, in 2004 and after. 
 
In addition to potential constraints through challenges in the Courts, the salience of 
legalism in the USA has created a highly restrictive environment due to the fear held by 
political elites of ending up before a Court or grand jury (Goldsmith, 2007). The 
President has a constitutional duty to faithfully execute the law, and the executive is 
heavily bound by law. Thus, this social group is clearly important for the USA and 
significant constraints are apparent, yet their remit is complex.  
 
How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? As 
mentioned with regards to the UK legal identity and highlighted in Chapter 1, the 
international detention regime is highly legalised. Many aspects are part of US domestic 
law. Thus this social group is very relevant in terms of interpreting and setting standards 
for US practices in this area. The normative constraints of this social group in terms of 
equality of justice, the right to due process, and value-neutral interpretation are very 
important in this context. This is however, complicated by the duality approach and 
assertions of presidential power in areas of foreign affairs. 
 
 
7. The International Social Group of Liberal Democratic States 
What constitutes the social identity of this group? Unlike the previous social groups 
assessed in this Chapter, the liberal democratic state social identity has more abstract 
foundations. It does not have an organisational basis in comparison to most of the 
previous social groups. Whilst the legal social identities also have less of an 
organisational basis there are still elements of a clear structure that are not so apparent 
with regards to the liberal democratic social group. However, there are clear 
components that constitute the social identity of this group, and it certainly exists as an 
influential social identity internationally.   
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Various studies have identified the key attributes of this social identity, often with the 
aim of assessing how countries score on these measures (e.g. Foweraker and Roman, 
2000). Liberal democratic political values are based on both liberty and equality as 
defined by Foweraker and Roman (2000). These two constitutive dynamics are thought 
to be achieved by means of various legal and institutional factors. The legal values 
include civil, property, political, and minority rights whereas the institutional attributes 
focus on accountability, representation, constraint and participation. A belief in the rule 
of law and in particular human and democratic rights, as well as liberal toleration and 
equality, are key elements for this social group.   
 
The collective identity that is dominant in the international society is based on these 
shared characteristics. Constructivist scholars have investigated various elements, most 
frequently human rights (e.g. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999), as well as more 
specifically the emergence of a pro-NGO norm (Reimann, 2006), norms governing 
election monitoring (Kelley, 2008), humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2003) and the 
development of the ‘Responsibility to Protect Doctrine’ based on the notion of 
expansive rights (Banda, 2007; Welsh, 2007).  
 
The liberal democratic social grouping was identified in Chapter 1 as a basis for the 
international detention regime that is of concern in this thesis. As we can see from the 
assessment in this Chapter though, this normative regime, like many others, is by no 
means limited to this social group. There is indeed much general overlap between the 
liberal democratic social group and the others assessed in this Chapter. This is not really 
surprising as the different groups all relate in some way to the constitutive components 
of the liberal democratic social identity. As mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, 
by separating these social groups in the way I have done, I do not intend to draw distinct 
boundaries between groups. They do indeed overlap significantly and are highly 
interlinked. However, they are not reducible to one overarching identity, to take such an 
approach would obscure the complexities and dynamism of the social identities 
environment and, as I have argued in the previous two Chapters, this would reduce our 
ability to understand the processes of contestation regarding the international detention 
regime.  
 
A further point to mention again, is that this social identity, as with the others assessed 
in this Chapter, is not considered to be static in terms of that which constitutes the social 
 115 
identity, how these factors are interpreted by members, the predominant normative 
regimes of the social group, and indeed, what it means to be a prototypical member of 
such a group. These features, whilst slow to change, are open to contestation by 
members based on the interplay between different memberships and emerging social 
identities. As there is no definite organisational structure to underpin this social group, 
arguably it is more open to contestation than the others. However, again any changes are 
dependent on acceptance across a variety of audiences, including the social groups 
identified in this Chapter. This social group does provide another basis from which to 
judge behaviour, both of the self and of others, and provides shared guidelines as to how 
to validate membership of and association with this group. The liberal democratic social 
group provides an international social unit beyond formal institutions and contains 
shared understandings about what it means to be a legitimate or prototypical state in the 
international society. It exists through the practices of political elites but what 
constitutes the social identity of this group is not reducible to members individually, as 
by definition the social identity is shared. 
  
How is this social group important to the USA and UK? The importance of 
membership of this social group was highlighted in Chapter 1 in relation to 
constructivist research that has investigated the constitutive components of this social 
group. Factors such as reputation, self-identification and social standing that relate to 
membership of this social group are all important, to varying degrees, to political elites 
in the USA and UK. The liberal democratic social group is dominant internationally so 
in order to be a prototypical member and influence other members socially, validating 
this identity through practices is essential. Sometimes being a prototypical member of 
this group will be more desirable to the USA and UK than others. Indeed, what it 
actually means to be prototypical is of course not static and is open to contestation by 
members. 
  
How is this social group relevant to the international detention regime? The basis 
for this was outlined in Chapter 1 in relation to how the international detention regime is 
understood. This normative regime is a component of what the liberal democratic state 
social identity means. Whilst these shared standards have roots beyond the concept of 
liberal democracy, they are nonetheless, partly constitutive of this group today. Thus 
this social group is very relevant to action regarding the international detention regime 
in terms of providing a basis for judgement and normative constraint.   
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Conclusion 
In the discussion above I have addressed the three questions set out in the introduction 
to this Chapter regarding each of the different social groups. First, I have identified and 
defined, in very general terms, each of these social identities (bearing in mind the 
restrictions set out in the introduction to this Chapter). Second, I have demonstrated 
how these social identities are important to both the USA and UK. Third, I have argued 
how these particular social identities are relevant the international detention regime. All 
these factors serve to justify the inclusion of these social groups in this study. The 
limited discussion above goes some way to demonstrating how each varies with regards 
to these questions, for example, the military social identity associated with the state is 
very different in how it is valued by political elites in both the USA and UK than the 
human rights and humanitarian social identity. Whilst this is only to be expected, it is 
important to be clear on these points prior to the subsequent analysis in Chapters 4 and 
5. Doing so enables a more informed examination of the interactions between these 
social groups and the Blair government and Bush administration, giving us an 
appreciation of the potential for public contestation from these groups. As will become 
more evident in Chapters 4 and 5, the social groups of the UK and US Militaries, the 
human rights and humanitarian social grouping, the UN, the UK and US legal 
professions, and membership of a group of liberal democratic states internationally, are 
all part of the complex context in which interpretations of the international detention 
regime are contested by political elites.  
 
Unlike the other Chapters in this thesis there are no main findings to be drawn from the 
above discussion. The aim has been to contextualise the subsequent analysis. An 
examination of the processes involved in the contestation of the international detention 
regime requires prior understanding of this broad social identities context. This not only 
determines the social groups that are relevant to the analysis, but by also providing an 
informed basis for subsequent investigation into the interactions between these social 
groups and the Blair government and Bush administration, this Chapter enables greater 
depth of analysis into the contestation of the international detention regime. Without 
this contextual basis some of the richness and nuances of the subsequent Chapters 
would be lost. To contest the international normative regime prescribing minimum 
standards for detention and prohibiting torture, political elites must interact with these 
social identities; how this is manifest will be examined in the following Chapters.  
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Chapter 4 – The Management of Social Identities: The Case of 
the UK 
 
‘[T]he right not to be subjected to torture or other ill-treatment, which includes the 
right not to be removed to a country or territory where one would be at risk of such 
treatment - the protection against refoulement - applies to all individuals, irrespective 
of whatever offence they may have committed or are suspected of having committed, 
and is a rule of customary international law binding on all states. It has also been 
codified in treaty law’ (Amnesty International, 2005b) 
 
‘[W]e hear an immense amount about their human rights and their civil liberties, but 
there are also the human rights of the rest of us to live in safety, and when people say to 
me, unless I can give absolutely cast iron guarantees, and they have all sorts of 
monitoring arrangements, we have got to keep people here who maybe engage actively 
in inciting terrorism in this country, I have to say I think we have got the world the 
wrong way round’ (Blair, 2006i). 
 
 
The previous Chapter identified and explored the various social identities associated 
with the state that have the potential to be salient concerning the international detention 
regime. The content of these social identities was established, in order to form the basis 
for analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. This Chapter will build on these insights to assess the 
management of these social identities by political elites in the UK, in this case the Blair 
government 2001-2006. As opposed to focusing on state leaders in relation to specific 
international norms, this thesis argues that a broader understanding of the normative and 
social identities context in which political elites make decisions and formulate policy is 
required to comprehend both the influence of and defection from international 
normative regimes. I demonstrate that by examining the management strategies of 
political elites, we are better placed to understand the interactive processes of defection 
and contestation of the international detention regime, thus how these normative 
constraints are negotiated.  
 
The international detention regime has been significantly compromised by several 
policies of the Blair government between 2001 and 2006; this is in addition to the 
challenging and revisionist rhetoric that has accompanied these changes. The main areas 
of concern relate to domestic anti-terror legislation, the deportation of terror suspects, 
and responses to US policies such as those pertaining to Guantánamo Bay and rendition. 
Contestation is highly apparent in both policy and rhetoric, particularly with regards to 
the right to a fair trial and the right not to be returned to countries where there is a risk 
that the individual will be subjected to torture and inhumane treatment. This thesis aims 
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to understand how such practices, contrary to the international detention regime, 
became possible by focusing on the interactive processes involved in negotiating 
normative constraint; this is in relation to the broader social identities context. The 
management strategies employed by political elites, will provide an insight into these 
interactions.  
 
The UK is a particularly interesting site of analysis, as our expectations, as established 
in Chapter 1, suggest that the Blair government will not defect from the international 
normative regime prescribing detention standards and prohibiting torture. These 
expectations are based on the emphasis political elites in the UK have previously placed 
on the promotion of human rights internationally, for example the ‘ethical dimension’ to 
the UK’s foreign policy as outlined by Robin Cook (The Guardian, 1997), as well as the 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law 
in the form of the Human Rights Act (1998). Furthermore, the Blair government have 
argued that values must provide a guide for action, based on ‘[e]qual worth, 
responsibility, community’ (2001i), ‘humanity and compassion’ (2001b), as well as 
inclusivity.1 As the former Prime Minister states:  
 
Politics without values is sheer pragmatism. Values without politics can be ineffective. The two must go 
together (Blair, 2001i).  
 
How the Blair government manage the interactive process of contestation and defection 
will be extremely illuminating in terms of furthering our understanding of normative 
influence, defection and contestation in this case.     
 
This Chapter is based on the framework established in Chapters 1 and 2, and draws 
from the insights of Chapter 3 regarding the specific social identities assessed in this 
thesis. As such, the analysis will demonstrate the utility of employing the social identity 
approach in a constructivist framework. The main argument advanced is that   
normative influence is negotiated through interaction with the social identities context. 
We cannot simply rely on the nature of the international norm, the degree of 
internalisation, or the personality of the state leaders to understand the processes of 
                                                 
1 This is not to ignore the UK’s recent history of internment and the use of stress positions in the Northern 
Ireland conflict. However the Blair government have emphasised a new direction banishing such 
measures to history. Whilst they can certainly be criticised for their inconsistency with regards to human 
rights (e.g. see Kampfner, 2004: 76), I am interested in the factors that the Blair government argue are 
fundamental, which influences social identity associations and expectations.  
 
 119 
defection and influence. By drawing on the micro-foundational insights of the social 
identity approach we can increase our comprehension of the relationship between 
international normative regimes and the behaviour of political elites, thus enabling us to 
avoid inaccurate expectations. 
 
Analysis in this Chapter is based on three time periods, 2001-2002, 2003-2004, and 
2005-2006. This is in order to track the interactive processes. Within these time-bound 
sections interactions with the human rights and humanitarian, legal, Armed Forces, 
United Nations (UN), and international liberal democratic social groups will be 
assessed, for example how these social identities are managed by the Blair government. 
As a point of clarification, when referring to the Blair government I do not mean the 
whole of the Labour Party, members certainly hold a variety of viewpoints on the issues 
discussed in this Chapter. Instead, I am mainly referring to the former Prime Minister 
Tony Blair, his close allies and inner circle of advisers in government. I do not attribute 
the arguments presented solely to Blair himself, even though there was certainly a 
strongly centralised concentration of power in government (Kampfner, 2004: 195). 
When I draw quotes from Blair, or indeed other close members of the government, they 
are understood as carefully crafted language representative of the dominant viewpoint 
of this small state leadership group that then forms the party line on such issues.   
 
The management strategies and techniques identified are illustrated in Table 3 on the 
following page. The emphasis is very much on dominance, directing and re-framing the 
different social identities to fit with an emergent super-ordinate international social 
identity. However, the means by which this is sought varies with the interactive context. 
As contestation increases dominance is harder to pursue and in certain circumstances 
the Blair government are forced to compartmentalise and heavily compromise their 
association with some of the social identities. There is only so far this can be pushed 
though, and as a strategy this is not sustainable long-term given the interactive context, 
particularly if there is a desire to remain associated with the social identities in question.   
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Table 3 – The Management of Social Identities by the Blair Government 
 
Human Rights 
and 
Humanitarian 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Challenging 
- Denial 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
Compartmentalisation 
- Context 
dependent 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Challenging 
- Denial 
- Dismissal 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
Compartmentalisation 
- Context 
dependent 
Dominance  
- Directing 
- Challenging 
- Denial 
- Dismissal 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
Compartmentalisation 
- Context dependent 
 
Legal 
 
Dominance 
- Directing 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Challenging 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
- Utilising  
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Challenging 
- Dismissal 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
Compartmentalisation 
- Context dependent 
Military 
 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Re-assuring 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Re-assuring 
- Dismissal 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
- Defence of group 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Re-assuring 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
- Defence of group 
UN 
 
Dominance 
- Directing 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
- Utilising 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Challenging 
- Blaming 
- Threatening 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
- Unifying 
- Utilising 
Dominance 
- Directing 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
- Unifying 
- Utilising 
International 
 
Merging 
- Blurring of 
boundaries 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Dividing 
Merging 
- Blurring of 
boundaries 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Dividing 
- Challenging 
Merging 
- Blurring of 
boundaries 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Dividing 
 
 
 
1. Phase 1 - Initial Contestation: 2001-2002  
‘[A] new role for Britain in the World’ (Blair, 2002zc) 
 
1.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity 
The human rights and humanitarian social group raised a number of concerns about the 
UK’s approach to detention in the context of counter-terrorism in 2001-2002. Even 
before the attacks of September 11th in New York, Amnesty International (AI) was 
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critical of changes to the government’s anti-terror legislation.2 The concerns of this 
group intensified further following the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Bill put forward in 
November 2001. AI warned that the measures contained in the Bill risk the indefinite 
detention of innocent people without charge or trial; they even related these reservations 
to the detrimental effect of internment in Northern Ireland (AI 2001b; see also AI, 
2001c; AI, 2001d; Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2001a).3 In particular, both HRW and 
AI highlight the discriminatory nature of Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act (ATCSA) (e.g. AI, 2001e; 2002b; 2002c), which violated international 
obligations regarding detention and the right to a fair trial.4  
 
This social group has also been very vocal raising objections to the conditions and 
procedures for the detention of terror suspects at Guantánamo Bay. AI (2002e) has 
called for action with regards to the UK nationals held at the base. Whilst, the Blair 
government is unlikely to have had any direct control over what has been an American 
policy of seemingly indefinite detention at the former Naval Base, there is little 
comment in opposition to the US position in this period. We may not expect a firm 
public rejection of the policy given the close relationship between the USA and UK, 
however Blair’s position in private was also largely non-critical (Cook, 2004: 82). In 
public, reference is made to the ‘unusual situation’ (Blair, 2002zc) from which the USA 
and UK are ‘still getting information’ (Blair, 2002x). The importance of being able to 
interrogate detainees on the basis of new information and checking it with those 
prisoners held at Guantánamo Bay is often cited (e.g. Blair, 2002zc). Whilst the position 
articulated by Blair is not reflective of the entire Labour government, (e.g. Cook, 2004; 
Short, 2005), such an outlook does present a challenge to the international detention 
regime and indeed the human rights and humanitarian social identity. In order to sustain 
such a position, Blair’s discourse reflects a variety of strategies involving, dominance, 
intersection representation and compartmentalisation.  
 
                                                 
2 This was because the measures in the Terrorism Act 2000 discriminated on the basis of motivation for 
crime as opposed to the severity of the crime (AI, 2001a). 
3 Indeed, AI did not shy away from actually comparing the government’s measures to internment (2001b; 
2002d). AI (2002a) are also critical of practices in domestic prisons, particularly with regards to young 
people in detention. The organisation stresses that many international obligations are not being fulfilled. 
However this thesis is predominantly concerned with detention relating to anti-terror measures so an 
assessment of the domestic difficulties in the prison service, whilst important to highlight, is beyond the 
scope of this project.    
4 This measure was the subject of much criticism and was replaced in 2004. 
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In terms of dominance, this social identity is framed in line with the counter-terrorism 
agenda. For example, responses to the criticisms cited above are based on the protection 
of the majority and the right to life and to live free from terror (e.g. Blair, 2001r). There 
are subtle attempts to direct the constitutive elements of the human rights and 
humanitarian social identity along these lines. This is in addition to challenging the 
arguments of this group as mentioned above, by seeming to defend the situation at 
Guantánamo in defiance of the core human rights ethos of equality, and absolute 
support for the international detention regime.  
 
Interactions with this social group are also based on denials of the arguments presented. 
This is illustrated by frequent references to the identity of the UK and in particular the 
identity of the Labour government led by Blair. For example, as the Labour government 
promotes and values human rights, evidenced by the Human Rights Act (1998), the 
actions of the Blair government should be viewed in this framework.5 Identity provides 
a basis for denial in response to accusations that the government is compromising the 
human rights and humanitarian social identity. As such, intersection representation is 
also apparent through bolstering that which is shared. However this is based on a super-
ordinate counter-terrorism agenda, suggesting that intersection representation supports a 
strategy of dominance. 
 
Intersection representation is also evident in Blair’s portrayal of this social identity in 
terms of the right to life and the right to live free from terror, as mentioned above in 
relation to dominance (e.g. Blair, 2001r). Through bolstering elements that validate 
association with this social group, accusations of running counter to it can be 
minimised, allowing detention policies to still be presented within a human rights 
framework both to the public and as a means by which the Blair government can 
reconcile the potentially diverging demands to themselves. Such a strategy appears to 
allow room for manoeuvre with regards to the normative constraints pertaining to 
detention standards. However, as demonstrated above, these arguments are not accepted 
by members of this social group thus association with the human rights and 
humanitarian social identity remains in a state of contestation.   
 
                                                 
5 Whilst not directly related to detention, such reasoning is also very notable in relation to the just cause 
for intervention in Afghanistan. Blair stresses on several occasions that as ‘we’ are peaceful people, 
intervention will only take place on the basis of a just cause (e.g. 2001zc); furthermore, ‘[w]e are a 
principled nation, and this is a principled conflict’ (Blair, 2001zl). 
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As a consequence, we should not be surprised that compartmentalisation also 
accompanies the strategies of dominance and intersection representation. Even within 
the discourse assessed, context is noted as highly determinant in guiding changes in 
foreign policy, the goals remain the same, but what is meant by them and how they are 
best achieved is seen as a matter of interaction with context. Such an approach is 
apparent in the following passage: 
 
We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. They do not. We hold essentially 
liberal values. They do not. As we look into these issues it is important that we never lose sight of our 
basic values. But we have to understand the nature of the enemy and act accordingly (Blair, 2001q, 
emphasis added). 
 
Validating the human rights and humanitarian social identity and strengthening 
association with this group is juxtaposed with the apparent need to take measures that 
are counter to this. The social identity is compartmentalised based on a different context 
and situation (this is also evident in the statements of the Blair government concerning 
Guantánamo, as cited on page 120).  
 
There is a significant amount of contestation with this social group in 2001-2002, 
reflected in the numerous strategies employed, as outlined above. We can see that 
normative constraints lead to compartmentalisation, which is the least sustainable of all 
the strategies. The Blair government cannot simply defect from the international 
detention regime, interactions with the broader social identities context therefore place 
significant restraints on the means by which such a course of action can be pursued.  
 
1.2 The Legal Social Identity 
The legal social identity is also evident in the discourse of the Blair government in 
2001-2002. Significant challenges from this social group to contestations of the 
international detention regime do not emerge until later periods. However, in 2002 the 
government does receive a setback with regards to the power to detain foreign terror 
suspects, potentially indefinitely. This is in relation to a Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC) ruling that determined such measures discriminatory and not 
compatible with the European Convention (AI, 2002b). As if pre-empting the backlash 
to come, the discourse falls within the categories of dominance and intersection 
representation.  
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This social identity, like that in the previous section, is very much re-framed and 
directed in line with the broader war on terror. There is a notable shift in the discourse 
from a need to ‘protect at all costs the civil liberties of the innocent’, to a system that 
focus’ more on the rights of the victim, protection of the general public and conviction 
(Blair, 2002k). Change and reform are heavily emphasised (Blair, 2002k), with a degree 
of subordination of this group to an emergent international counter-terrorism social 
identity (Blair, 2002i). As such, a dominant strategy is apparent. 
 
This is supported, however, by intersection representation in terms of bolstering the 
dimensions on which there is much overlap between the legal social identity and the 
emergent international social identity. For example, the strengthening of laws is a 
particularly prominent theme, in relation to issues such as asylum and immigration, 
counter-terrorism, the incitement of religious hatred, extradition and deportation. The 
need to tighten the law to deal with a minority, is deemed to be ‘balanced and 
proportionate to the risk we face’ (Blair, 2001y) and in line with many other countries.6 
Strengthening the law is indeed argued to provide a very powerful message ‘from the 
civilised world to terrorists everywhere’ that effective action will be taken, and this is 
considered to form a ‘very important deterrent’ (Blair, 2001zzc).  
 
Whilst frustrations arise regarding the lack of acceptance in the courts of some of these 
measures in later periods, at this stage the emphasis is on setting the direction for 
change as well as strengthening and tightening the law to cope with the perceived level 
of threat. Normative constraints from association with this social identity are therefore 
channelled in a certain direction to fit with the Blair government’s counter-terrorism 
objectives so as to enable validation. As we shall see in the subsequent time periods, as 
such an approach again relies on acceptance the reduction of normative constraint from 
this social identity is short lived.    
 
 
1.3 The Military Social Identity 
The British Armed Forces are also part of the social identities context with which the 
Blair government interacts. They play a significant role in foreign policy, fundamental 
to a vision of the world based on a belief in the power of diplomacy backed by military 
                                                 
6 By this Blair means other countries making changes as opposed to the same changes as the UK.   
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force (Kampfner, 2004: 57). They also add immensely to ‘Britain's strength and 
international standing’ (Blair, 2001zv). 
 
Whilst many of the issues highlighted in this Chapter regarding detention are largely 
political and not military matters, certain aspects do affect this social group.  
For example, the context in which the military operations take place is one where there 
is a very close association with American counterparts and US foreign policy more 
generally. The USA is not subject to the same constraints as the UK under the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), raising concerns as to whether the Pentagon will be 
‘attentive to conduct that could result in war-crimes charges’ in any joint ventures 
(Roth, 2002). Furthermore, US policies to restrict the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions and hold detainees indefinitely at Guantánamo Bay affects the overall 
context in which UK troops operate and are judged by potential adversaries. Admiral 
Sir Michael Boyce, then Chief of Defence Staff reportedly warned in December of 2001 
that ‘a ‘single-minded aim’ of destroying the Taleban and al-Qaeda with a ‘high-tech 
Wild West’ operation would not be enough to win the hearts and minds across the Arab 
world’ (Kampfner, 2004: 150). Counter-normative behaviour regarding detention 
certainly corresponds to these concerns. However, there is no direct and significant 
contestation from this social group, particularly with regards to detention, in 2001-2002. 
I must also note however that the scope for contestation is very limited.7  
 
In this context, the discourse of the Blair government concerning the Armed Forces, 
both prior to the military intervention in Afghanistan and after, mainly revolves around 
the articulation of purpose in terms of security, humanitarian issues and the wider 
positive impact on the world. There is much emphasis on direction (e.g. as part of a 
broader context in which ‘[f]ighting for these values is a cause the world needs’, Blair, 
2002i). This is alongside re-assuring this social group in the face of significant 
criticisms and questions over legality concerning proposals for their involvement in 
military intervention in Iraq. For example, in addition to the threat posed by Iraq, and 
keeping the terror attacks of September 11th salient in people’s minds,8 Blair’s speeches 
                                                 
7 As General Sir Mike Walker has stated, ‘The Armed Forces of this country take their oath of allegiance 
to the Sovereign as Head of State, and they are constitutionally bound to follow the lawful directions of 
the duly elected Government of the day. It would be unthinkable for the Armed Forces not to do as they 
are directed – or, worse, to act without authorization. That is the road to anarchy’ (Walker, 2008: 404). 
The retired General is strongly opposed to the involvement of soldiers in politics. However, as we shall 
see in later periods others have been more outspoken when legality and resources are in question. 
8 Blair warns of ‘a real danger we forget the lessons of September 11’ (2002i). 
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focus on the just cause of military intervention and the humanitarian component of 
going to war (e.g. 2001zc; 2002x; 2002i). In making these arguments, Blair and his 
inner circle draw on debates internationally about the use of force for moral ends. 
Historical analogies based on involvement in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan are 
utilised to suggest that ‘unless you do have the capability to use force if necessary, it is 
very hard to make the world a more secure and more peaceful place’ (Blair, 2002zr). 
Kosovo in particular is used to quell reservations about acting outside UN authorisation 
(Blair, 2002t). These techniques are suggestive of a dominance strategy where appeals 
are made to super-ordinate understandings, as mentioned earlier with regards to 
directing, reflective of an emergent international social identity, largely based on a 
particular approach to counter-terrorism. This is alongside expressions of pride, duty 
and courage and recognition of the high esteem in which the Armed Forces are held 
around the world. Blair (2001zc) suggests that, ‘[t]here is no greater strength for a 
British Prime Minister and the British nation at a time like this than to know that the 
forces we are calling upon are amongst the very best in the world’, bolstering this 
social identity. The latter emphasises an overlap, indicating a subtle strategy of 
intersection representation to accompany dominance.  
 
As with the legal social identity, normative constraints from association with this social 
group are channelled in a certain direction to fit with the government’s objectives so as 
to minimise digression. There is little contestation in this period to challenge such an 
approach, so dominance is only subtly accompanied by intersection representation.   
 
1.4 The United Nations Social Identity  
Like the previous two social groups, there is little public criticism from the UN with 
regards to the counter-terrorism detention practices of the UK in 2001-2002. Instead, the 
UN more generally highlights the importance of the rule of law and human rights in ‘an 
increasingly dangerous world’ (Annan, 2002a). Despite this, the discourse in relation to 
this social identity is still very revealing with regards to the management strategies 
employed, indicative of the nature of interactions. The strategies of dominance and 
intersection representation are both apparent.  
 
In terms of dominance, this is largely based on statements targeted at the direction of 
this social identity. Change and reform are frequently stressed. There is much reference 
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to the UN as in a state of becoming,9 generating a degree of scope for directing the 
organisation’s future priorities (Blair, 2002x). As I have argued in relation to the other 
social identities already assessed in this Chapter, this tends to be in light of an emergent 
super-ordinate social identity largely based on a particular approach to counter-
terrorism, one where inaction is framed as weakness and avoidance as opposed to 
reasoned calculation (Blair, 2002x). For example, whilst there is an expressed belief in 
the UN route to tackle the threat of Iraq, this is only framed in terms of action; action 
against the ‘defiance’ of the UN by Iraq (Blair, 2002zd).  
 
Attempts to strengthen this position are evident in the various references to Kofi Annan, 
in particular, the former Secretary-General’s stated understanding that diplomacy needs 
to be backed by force, capitalising on the legitimacy and universalism the then 
Secretary-General confers (Blair, 2002x).10 The language of the UN, in terms of 
Resolutions, is also utilised to construct a legal basis for military action in Iraq (Blair, 
2002zd). The need to frame the discourse in such terms as well as on the basis of 
restraint (for example claims that the USA and UK are not rushing to military action) is 
very apparent. There is much emphasis on overlap and dialogue with the UN (Blair, 
2002x), especially in the build up to the use of force in Afghanistan, thus intersection 
representation accompanies the dominant approach.  
 
Remaining within the UN framework is certainly of great importance for the UK, 
particularly when considering military involvement. Indeed, Sally Morgan, Blair’s 
adviser on domestic affairs reminded him prior to the military intervention in Iraq that 
‘every Labour manifesto since 1945 had referred to the UN Security Council as the 
highest international authority’ (Kampfner, 2004: 192). This social identity is also a 
crucial component of Blair’s ‘Doctrine of the International Community’, and great 
emphasis is put on strengthening the UN through reform to enable this doctrine to be 
put into practice (Blair, 2001zy). Thus, bolstering is concurrent with direction here. 
The influence of this social identity appears to have limitations or at least allows scope 
for manoeuvre as it is juxtaposed with discourse on change and reform. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Blair is drawing on the words of then Secretary-General Kofi Annan here. 
10 References are also made to Ruud Lubbers, then UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in the build up 
to military intervention in Afghanistan (Blair, 2001x).    
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1.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity   
As has been advanced throughout this thesis, the liberal democratic social identity in 
international society has been and continues to be exceptionally important to the UK, 
both in terms of how political elites have understood, and attempted to represent, the 
UK internationally. However, what is meant by this has been significantly challenged in 
2001-2006. This section draws attention to the strategies of merging and dominance in 
relation to this large international social identity which are apparent in 2001-2002. 
 
Merging between domestic and international spheres is very apparent in the discourse 
assessed. National self-interests and the collective interests of the international 
community are viewed in unison as opposed to conflict (Blair, 2002i). Blair presents a 
position that confronts the traditional understanding of international relations by 
suggesting there has been a merging of utilitarianism and utopianism, with no more 
spheres of influence.11 In relation to this broader understanding of international relations 
and the international context Blair (2001zv) states that ‘[i]n the war against terrorism 
the moralists and the realists are partners, not antagonists’. The vision presented is one 
based on universal values behind which states must unite, with Britain assuming a 
leading role in these developments.12 These sentiments certainly seem to fit with 
constructivist portrayals of the predominance of the liberal democratic social identity in 
international society as demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 3.  
 
However, such an approach is also accompanied by dominance, in terms of directing 
new normative understandings, emergent international coalitions, and a re-definition of 
parameters. This is largely based on an outlook that favours close relations with the 
USA. As Kampfner notes, Blair in particular had ‘an extremely acute sense of American 
power’, based on immense US capability and reach (2004: 152). The UK is positioned 
side by side with the USA, accepting the doctrine of pre-emption and other US counter-
terrorism policies that come with this close relationship. The objectives of ‘being at the 
heart of Europe and engaging with China, Russia and India’ are subordinated to such 
priorities (Kampfner, 2004: 236). Whether or not this understanding has provided the 
                                                 
11 Blair (2001l) also talks about ‘another decisive shift away from selfish individualism and towards a 
society based on community and shared values’ in relation to domestic issues, but as we can see this 
community approach is also apparent in Blair’s public statements regarding the international sphere.  
12 Britain’s strength through memberships of international organisations and alliances as a consequence of 
its history is understood by the Blair government to place this role on the UK, particularly as a unifier, 
even before the September 11th attacks (Blair, 2001e). With this, they state comes the responsibility to 
and duty to make the world safer.  
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UK with the most beneficial course of action is of course debateable. Certainly this 
approach seems to neglect the nuances of soft power, social influence, and example-
setting, arguably crucial to reducing the occurrence of terrorist attacks.   
 
Accompanying such a positioning in the international sphere is an emphasis on the 
civilized and non-civilized world as binary opposites (e.g. Blair, 2001q),13 a stress on 
the need for action even if there is a lack of social consensus,14 and an agenda based on 
enhanced engagement particularly where there is a perceived threat from disorder 
(Blair, 2002f). The latter is seen in expeditionary and interventionist terms, where the 
negative impact of inaction is weighed more heavily than making mistakes in action 
(Blair, 2002t). Also evident in this emergent social identity is a reduction in the 
significance of deterrence as a policy option, if not total abandonment (Blair, 2002t).  
 
In conjunction with these normative priorities, the dominant social identity 
internationally (formed on the constitutive elements above) came to encompass states 
beyond those satisfying the criteria of a liberal democratic social identity. For example, 
relations with Pakistan were forming and those with Russia advancing in the context of 
coalition building (e.g. Blair, 2001zv; 2001zo). By integrating such states into an 
emergent coalition, the importance of normative regimes governing human rights and 
detention appear to be vastly reduced, as the social identity to which they largely pertain 
no longer appears to be dominant in international society, from the perspective of the 
Blair government.   
 
Alongside this reformulation of a dominant international social identity, significant 
divisions and parameters are also put up. Boundaries are very apparent between a 
‘civilized’ and ‘non-civilized’ world (as mentioned above); suggesting that a civilized 
world exists and that there are enemies of it (Blair, 2001q), and rendering elements of 
the world very much excluded from ‘civilized’ status.15 A defining feature of such 
positioning in relation to these categories is based on whether or not states stand with 
the USA in the fight against terrorism.16 There is a sharpening of distinctions between 
                                                 
13 Kampfner (2004: 216) notes Blair’s private comments complaining that British parliamentarians were 
not as eager as US politicians to do the right thing.  
14 For example, Blair (2002t) states that the intervention in Iraq would be better done ‘with the broadest 
international support…but it does have to be done’ regardless of whether or not this is achieved. 
15 States such as Saudi Arabia are considered to be ‘friends’ of the civilized world. 
16 This stark division is very clear in statements concerning ‘a war, if you like, between the civilised 
world and fanaticism’ (Blair, 2001r), or a battle ‘between the free and democratic world and terrorism’ 
(Blair, 2001o). 
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groups with the use of binaries and comparisons, most significantly those associated 
with the categories of justice, good and evil (Blair, 2001zd; 2001zv).17 
 
A range of very interesting complex dynamics are at play in the shifting status of 
international social identities, and group memberships. The factors identified above 
form constitutive elements of an emergent dominant social identity in international 
society in this time period. These present a significant challenge to a liberal democratic 
social identity based on the rule of law and human rights, a complicated dynamic to 
manage, particularly given the number of audiences involved. This is negotiated by 
attempting to re-define that which forms the prototypical social identity internationally, 
supported by a degree of merging. 
 
 
2. Phase 2 - Attempts to Sustain Contestation: 2003-2004 
‘11 September has changed the psychology of America. It should have changed the 
psychology of the world’ (Blair, 2003n). 
 
2.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity 
As in 2001-2002, the Blair government’s detention policies are again highly criticised 
by the human rights and humanitarian social group. A large set of concerns are raised 
which is certainly very damaging for the Blair government, significantly compromising 
their ability to validate close association with the human rights and humanitarian social 
identity. In response there is an intensification of the techniques employed in 2001-
2002, falling predominantly under dominance, intersection representation, and 
compartmentalisation.  
 
AI and HRW have both been extremely critical of Part 4 of ATCSA since the legislation 
came into force in 2001. AI (2004b) refers to Part 4 as a form of internment, and the 
system for appeals against the Secretary of State’s determination of individuals as terror 
suspects through SIAC trials, as a ‘shadow criminal justice system’ that falls far short of 
fair trial standards (AI, 2003a).18 Further questions were raised in 2003 as to whether 
                                                 
17 Whilst not in the discourse analysed, an interesting question posed by Blair was mentioned in a BBC 
Program presented by John Ware, ‘No Plan, No Peace’ (October 2007). Contributors suggest that at a 
meeting before the invasion Blair asked a group of Iraqi experts whether or not Saddam Hussein was 
‘uniquely evil’. 
18 The potential for indefinite detention without charge or trial on the basis of secret evidence is 
highlighted by AI as a very significant concern. This is alongside the lower burden of proof that is 
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some of the evidence relied on in SIAC trials was gained under torture, which AI 
(2003b) stresses is prohibited under international law.    
 
Such arguments are however dismissed. David Blunkett (2003a), for example maintains 
that the ATCSA has improved the UK’s ability to fight terrorism. Furthermore, with 
regards to questions on torture evidence, the former Home Secretary employs a degree 
of compartmentalisation stating: 
 
Let me make it clear, we unreservedly condemn the use of torture and have worked hard with our 
international partners to eradicate this practice. However, it would be irresponsible not to take appropriate 
account of any information which could help protect national security and public safety (Blunkett, 
2004d). 
 
Jack Straw’s private comments published in the Guardian are also less than critical of 
the use of evidence gained through torture by a third party, presenting a challenge to the 
arguments of this social group. He asserts that: 
  
It does not follow that if it is extracted under torture, it is automatically untrue (cited in Leigh, 2005). 
 
Both statements certainly do very little to strengthen the international detention regime, 
particularly with regards to torture.19  
 
Other concerns relating specifically to torture involve accusations that certain 
individuals are being held under ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading conditions in violation 
of international law’ at Belmarsh prison (AI, 2004c), as well as criticisms of 
government policy to establish Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with countries 
known to torture in order to deport terror suspects.20 Overall, the Blair government is 
accused of defecting from international obligations seeking detention policies that 
undermine human rights protections as well as compromising the government’s ability 
to establish an effective anti-terror strategy (HRW, 2004c). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
required from the Secretary of State compared to normal court proceedings (AI, 2003b). AI are also 
highly critical of the government’s appeals against SIAC acquittals (2004d). 
19 These comments, made in November 2004, are after the Court of Appeal ruling in August 2004, that 
rendered torture evidence admissible in certain circumstances (so long as UK personnel did not instigate, 
were not involved and the abuse did not take place on UK soil), undermining the global ban on torture 
(HRW, 2004a).   
20 AI and HRW highlight the unreliability of such agreements and the significant risk of torture and ill-
treatment that individuals will face (e.g. HRW 2004b). 
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In response the Blair government focuses on the nature of the threat faced, and the need 
to strike a balance between human rights and security. Such arguments, employing 
elements of compartmentalisation, serve to direct the terms of the debate.21 Blair 
(2003c) states, for example, that ‘people have to understand if we want to deal with this 
new menace we have to take the measures necessary to deal with it properly’. The 
arguments of this group are dismissed on the basis of security imperatives and a 
different understanding of civil liberties and human rights, privileging the right to life 
and the right to live free from terror.  
 
Blair (2004ze) also draws on his background as a ‘lawyer with a strict belief in the rule 
of law and civil liberties’ to support this position. Blair grounds his reasoning in this 
identity which serves to strengthen his arguments through intersection representation. 
Blunkett (2004b) is equally firm in emphasising his ‘commitment to human rights’ and 
uses a speech to Harvard Law School to also challenge and deny the notion that the UK 
and USA are ‘destroying traditional human rights and freedoms’. To do so the former 
Home Secretary underlines the importance of ‘the most fundamental human rights … 
those of life, liberty and security of person’, based on the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and which have been compromised by terrorists. He argues that ‘human 
rights and the institutions which sustain them’ must be balanced ‘with the basic right for 
life and freedom from fear’ (Blunkett, 2004b). 
 
The Blair government also faces a vast amount of criticism regarding the situation at 
Guantánamo Bay. They are urged to do more with respect to the UK nationals and 
residents held at the base, as well as to use their influence with the US President to 
ensure fair trials take place (Ross, 2003). Blair’s public response to the situation at 
Guantánamo Bay is again largely supportive of the US policy. Blair stresses that the 
government are satisfied with the treatment of UK nationals detained at Guantánamo 
(2003s) and reminds us of the context in which the situation arose (2003zm), one of 
‘huge danger for ourselves and our Armed Forces’ (2003zo). In direct response to the 
human rights and civil liberties concerns raised by organisations such as AI and HRW 
calling for UK residents to be returned to the UK, Blair states: 
the people who are out in Guantánamo Bay are people who got there via a particular process to do with 
the Afghan conflict and I just ask people to be a little understanding of the fact that there are also issues to 
                                                 
21 Blunkett (2004a) calls for a ‘rational debate … based on facts’. 
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do with our national security that we have to be careful of, and my experience of these debates is that very 
swiftly a civil liberties issue turns into a national security issue (2003zw).22  
 
The dangers of civil liberties are highlighted, presenting a significant challenge to the 
human rights and humanitarian social identity. Blair also draws attention to the 
‘uncomfortable fact’ that ‘there is still information that is being checked with people in 
Guantánamo Bay that does have a genuine interest and use for us in fighting terrorism’ 
(2003s), suggesting that in this context, the normative constraints associated with this 
social identity do not take precedence.23  
 
In addition to such compartmentalisation, Blair (2003zy) minimises the degree to 
which this seems to be apparent by stressing that ‘the very fact that we are in discussion 
about making sure there are fair procedures for trial’ is an ‘indication that we actually 
treat people differently. So even though this arose out of this appalling brutal attack on 
America on September 11, nonetheless we make sure that justice is done for people’.24 
The detrimental effect of compartmentalisation on the Blair government’s association 
with the human rights and humanitarian social identity is by small measure reduced.  
 
Thus, in 2003-2004, the human rights and humanitarian social identity is a very difficult 
one to manage, again forcing the Blair government to adopt a compartmentalisation 
strategy, in addition to dominance and intersection representation, where validation of 
association is heavily compromised.  
 
2.2 The Legal Social Identity 
Interactions with the legal social group are quite mixed in 2003-2004, however, on the 
whole the government faces mounting opposition with regards to anti-terror legislation, 
in particular that which aims to establish new standards and procedures for detention. 
The Blair government also encounters much criticism with regards to their position on 
                                                 
22 When the Tipton 3 are returned and released without charge Blair simply states that there are 2 sides to 
every story and their detention ‘arose out of a situation where people were picked up in Afghanistan in 
circumstances where British and American troops were fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban’ (2004k). Blair 
also asks for more credit to be given to the American’s in terms of their standards for fair trials, the 
former Prime Minister states that, ‘[a]ny Military Commission that they have is subject to rules that I 
think would be regarded as reasonably strict by anybody (2003zo).   
23 Indeed, HRW highlight the UK’s reported invocation of ‘Article 103 of the U.N. Charter to argue that 
its obligations to the Counter Terrorism Committee under Resolution 1373 took precedence over its 
obligations to the Human Rights Committee’ (HRW, 2003a). The context dependent nature of this 
argument is clear.  
24 Blair also draws comparisons with Iraq’s defiance of the Geneva Conventions in terms of their 
parading of prisoners in public (2003r). 
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Guantánamo Bay. Their response employs the same management strategies as in 2001-
2002, dominance and intersection representation. However, further techniques are 
employed in light of increased contestation.  
 
Much of the contestation in 2003-2004 centred on Part 4 of the ATCSA, as mentioned 
above in relation to the human rights and humanitarian social group. In December 2004 
Part 4 was deemed to be in breach of the ECHR by the Law Lords. A majority of eight 
to one ruled that the provisions for indefinite detention discriminated on the grounds of 
nationality. As there was a comparable threat from UK nationals as opposed to just 
foreign nationals, Part 4 was ruled to be in breach of Article 14 of ECHR. This ruling 
compromised the government’s derogation under Article 5 of ECHR, because if UK 
nationals, which were a comparable threat, were not seen to require the same treatment 
then such derogations cannot be ‘strictly required’ (HRW, 2004d).  
 
Lord Hoffman’s (2004) statement in the ruling is clear in challenging the government as 
he asserts that:  
 
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional 
laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these. 
 
Prior to the Law Lords ruling in December 2004, the Blair government had spent much 
time publicly defending Part 4 ATCSA.25 In response to the Newton Report that 
reviewed the ATCSA and concluded that Part 4 should be replaced, David Blunkett 
(2003a) argued that he would be ‘failing’ in the ‘duty of public protection if the Part 4 
powers were removed from the armoury of measures available to protect the United 
Kingdom from specific terrorist threats’.26 The Law Lords ruling in December 2004 
clearly undermines these arguments. The Blair government’s attempts to direct the 
terms of the debate by drawing on a framework of protection, that emphasises the ‘basic 
right for life and freedom from fear’ (Blunkett, 2004b), and ‘security and order’ as a 
direct path to liberty (Blunkett, 2003a), appear to have been firmly rejected by this 
social group.  
 
                                                 
25 This was indeed supported by the Court of Appeal in August 2004, where the admissibility of evidence 
gained through torture was also upheld for SIAC proceedings.  
26 The conclusions of the Newton Report are further rejected in the government’s own report on Counter-
Terrorism Powers (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2004: 10-11). 
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The Blair government is also very challenging and critical towards the legal social 
group in 2003-2004. The former Prime Minister (2004k) focuses on the need to keep 
‘law up to date with the reality on the ground’, and appears to view the Courts as an 
obstacle to such progress. In relation to tightening domestic law Blair (2004zl) 
recognises that ‘in the end we have to work within a framework set down by the Courts 
as well’, suggesting that such procedures are viewed as a hindrance to effective counter-
terrorism policies.27  The former Home Secretary, David Blunkett (2004a) goes even 
further and verges on compartmentalisation in his statement that:  
 
As Home Secretary, I must balance legal theory with the practical job of protecting people.  
 
The traditions of legal theory are juxtaposed with the demands of the context, however, 
Blunkett is not proposing to work outside a legal framework here, but to dispute the 
principles that predominate.  
 
This challenging approach is also apparent in the international context when Blair uses 
his speech in Sedgefield in 2004 to question international law and oppose the absolute 
principle of non-intervention. 28 He questions and rejects this principle as he perceives it 
to currently stand. Earlier in the year Blair had also stressed that:   
 
our demand is not that we should be subject to different rules from the rest of the world, but on the 
contrary that everybody should be within a proper framework of international law (2004q). 
 
The Blair government expects ‘all international colleagues … [to] abide by the law in 
the way that we do’ (2004f), yet this is juxtaposed with revisionism, a very difficult 
position to adopt.  
  
                                                 
27 Earlier, in March of 2004, the government was refused permission to appeal against the SIAC ruling 
that had rejected the Secretary of State’s determination of a Libyan man as a ‘suspected international 
terrorist’ (AI, 2004e).    
28 The Blair government have certainly received a vast amount of criticism with regards to the legality of 
intervening militarily in Iraq. One notable case was the resignation on the eve of the war of Elizabeth 
Wilmhurst, a legal adviser who had served in the foreign office for 30 years (Kampfner, 2004: 304). Blair 
has noted that ‘lawyers continue to divide’ over the decision to intervene, yet the former Prime Minister 
attempts to shift the debate away from one of legality to that of politics by suggesting that ‘their legal 
opinions bear… a remarkable similarity to their political view of the war’ (2004h). For the legality to be 
in question is much more detrimental than political disagreement. Additionally, the lack of legality for the 
‘occupying force’ in Iraq after the initial combat phase was a significant concern for the government, one 
raised by the Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith (Kampfner, 2004: 317; Short, 2005). However, the 
legality of the Iraq intervention is not the focus of this thesis. I mention this only briefly to demonstrate 
Blair’s overall approach to this social identity.  
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Intersection representation is also apparent in relation to the legal social identity, 
supporting the dominance strategy outlined above. This is in terms of bolstering this 
social identity. The repeated references to ‘tightening’ and ‘strengthening’ the law by 
members of the Blair government, stressing the importance of the rule of law, are 
aspects of this. The Blair government also employ the language of international law in 
relation to Iraq, utilising association with this identity to suggest that such action is in 
defence of international law, and that those that act outside a framework of international 
law are a threat (Blair, 2004q).     
 
However, whilst the Blair government have employed the management strategies of 
dominance and intersection representation in 2003-2004, the government’s close 
association with the legal social identity has been brought into question. Further 
criticisms, concerning the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay and the proposed 
military tribunals, from both Lord Steyn (2003) and Lord Goldsmith (2004) (the former 
Attorney-General), have challenged this even more, particularly given the government’s 
defensive responses outlined in the previous section on the human rights and 
humanitarian social identity.29  
 
2.3 The Military Social Identity 
Discourse concerning the Armed Forces is again frequent in 2003-2004, as expected 
given their continuing engagement in combat operations. Again there is not much 
contestation, especially publicly, with this group. Questions are however raised of the 
government in relation to this social group (if not necessarily by the members of the 
Armed Forces themselves), particularly concerning the betrayal of soldiers. This is 
largely based on the reasons for the military intervention in Iraq, legality, and 
equipment shortages in the field. Armed Forces personnel were led to believe they were 
going into combat to protect the country from a direct threat and to liberate Iraq from 
Saddam Hussein, however, this significantly shifted to a battle to free Iraq from 
terrorism and a global conflict between ideologies, subsequent to the initial invasion. 
Also, various media sources reported allegations of an equipment shortfall, both in 
terms of medical kit (e.g. BBC, 2004a) and protective armour (e.g. BBC, 2004b). 
                                                 
29 The government’s response on Guantánamo Bay has been outlined in relation to the human rights and 
humanitarian social group. Clearly there is a significant overlap here with the legal social group, however 
the discourse of the government is largely directed at the concerns raised by the human rights and 
humanitarian social group and does not alter the strategies identified in relation to this group.  
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Whilst not directly related to the detention of terror suspects, the Blair government’s 
responses form part of the broader interactions with social identities in this context.   
 
The Blair government’s statements again largely fall within the category of dominance. 
There is much emphasis on how current missions do help to protect the peace and 
security of Britain and the world and that the soldiers do see a real and positive 
difference in people’s lives in Iraq as a consequence of their military actions (Blair, 
2003f). The ‘gloom-laden observations of armchair generals’ (Kampfner, 2005: 316), 
are dismissed, at the same time as directing the purpose of this social group, as is their 
job to do. Purpose is very much linked to the broader war on terror, and a super-ordinate 
social identity based on the coalition fighting terrorism, perhaps detracting from the 
more immediate divisions within the country and internationally regarding the issue of 
the UK presence in Iraq. Blair’s (2004a) expressions of the gratitude of the international 
community when addressing the military provide an indication of super-ordinate 
orientation in relation to the UK Armed Forces; one that was questioned in private by 
Admiral Boyce who is reported to have ‘expressed misgivings about the American’s 
approach to the war on terror’ more generally (Kampfner, 2004: 305).   
 
Linked to notions of purpose were questions of legality. This is a strong concern for the 
Armed Forces, given developments in the international sphere such as the ICC. As 
Kampfner notes, ‘military chiefs in the UK were deeply worried that they and their 
soldiers could be prosecuted at the International Criminal Court (ICC) if the war were 
deemed unlawful’ (2004: 378).30 Blair publicly reassures members of the Armed 
Forces that he wouldn’t commit forces unless he believed such measures were morally 
right, that military intervention was the last resort (2003i), it was a just cause (2003t) 
and was absolutely necessary (2003b). Discourse concerning the subsequent military 
presence is also heavily linked to the UN mandate post-intervention. 
 
Concerns about overstretching the Armed Forces were also raised in private by Admiral 
Boyce according to Kampfner (2004: 305), which certainly had the potential to 
undermine norms of professionalism and capacity to deliver sufficiently on the ‘hearts 
and minds’ component of the war. The latter is granted great importance by the Blair 
government, particularly the need to persuade people to turn away from the ideology of 
                                                 
30 In order to address this concern, Admiral Boyce, then Chief of Defence Staff, sought definite 
assurances from the Attorney General Lord Goldsmith on the legality of the planned military intervention 
in the immediate build up to hostilities in Iraq (Jackson, 2008: 402). 
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terrorism and extremism. Such an emphasis diverges from the factors directly 
associated with and within the control of the Armed Forces, involving them in a global 
battle of ideologies. Doing so, in the global context of 24 hour news media, highly 
legalised warfare, and an unpopular intervention, meant that the conflict was subjected 
to an unprecedented degree of scrutiny.  
 
Thus, accusations of abuse by the armed forces, particularly in relation to detainees, 
were particularly damaging. The Blair government frequently speak to the defence of 
this group, stressing that such behaviours do not apply to the vast majority of soldiers, 
who in very difficult circumstances do a magnificent job and are trained very well. Blair 
(2004a) is clear in articulating that he is in a lucky position as the Prime Minister of the 
UK, to have such confidence and strength in the Armed Forces, stressing their capacity 
to be the ‘new pioneers of soldiering in the 21st century’. Admiration for their skill, 
professionalism, courage and sense of duty are some of the issues touched upon in the 
discourse, which serves to further bolster this social identity. The gratitude for the work 
that the Armed Forces are doing, and their major role in the foreign policy and defence 
of the UK bring the above two techniques firmly within the category of intersection 
representation (Blair, 2004zzc). 
 
Interactions with this social group serve to demonstrate the importance of the evolving 
super-ordinate social identity predominately based on counter-terrorism, founded on the 
constitutive principles previously mentioned. Whilst intersection representation is 
evident, this is largely to facilitate the dominant approach.  
 
2.4 The United Nations Social Identity 
Whilst most of the discourse of the Blair government in 2003-2004 that relates 
specifically to the UN, focuses on issues of intervention and post-conflict 
reconstruction, various areas of concern are raised by this social group regarding the 
detention policies of the UK in the war on terror. This largely relates to the trade-off 
between human rights and security, as well as more specifically, the government’s 
position on the admissibility of evidence gained by torture, in court proceedings. The 
Blair government’s interactions with the UN, whilst not always on the topic of detention 
are largely based on dominance and intersection representation as will be advanced 
in this section. 
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In 2004 Kofi Annan spoke of a world where there was a dangerous possibility that the 
fabric of ‘rules, institutions and principles built up to promote prosperity and protect 
peace … may be starting to unravel’ at a time when they are most needed (Annan, 
2004a). In terms of combating terrorism the UN suggests that ‘any sacrifice of human 
rights…demeans us all and also diminishes the prospects for successfully combating the 
scourge of terrorism’ (Report of the Secretary-General, 2004: 4). The notion of a trade-
off is rejected. Human rights are also, furthermore, strongly linked to legitimacy, where 
‘in order for a state to criticize others with legitimacy, that State must pay attention to 
its own observance of human rights’ (Corell, 2004). The UN is particularly critical of 
the UK’s breach of Article 15 of the CAT, concerning the admissibility in court 
proceedings of evidence gained through torture (AI, 2004f).31 
 
Such arguments do not fit well with the discourse of the Blair government, where there 
is a great deal of emphasis on a trade-off between human rights and security. Statements 
directed at the UN are however largely based on the intervention in Iraq. Dominance as 
a strategy is certainly very evident here, in terms of directing, challenging, and 
blaming, as well as threatening. The Blair government is insistent that ‘we must 
uphold the authority of the United Nations’ (Blair, 2003c); and action must be taken if 
the will of the UN is breached (Blair, 2003b).32 The situation is framed as a test of the 
UN, one where the organisation’s authority is at stake (Blair, 2003e). On the eve of the 
war Blair (2003n) further stated ‘that the greater danger to the UN is inaction’. 
 
Blame is placed on the Security Council for not agreeing on a second Resolution 
regarding Iraq, and forcing the USA and UK to act outside the rule-based system (Blair, 
2004h). Accompanying such rhetoric is significant contestation regarding ‘how you 
make the rules and how you decide what is right or wrong in enforcing them’ (Blair, 
2004h). Blair (2004h) states that the ‘UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights is a 
fine document. But it is strange the United Nations is so reluctant to enforce them’. 
                                                 
31 The Blair government’s responses to such criticisms have been assessed in relation to the human rights 
and humanitarian social group so will not be covered again here. The purpose of this section is to deal 
specifically with the management strategies employed in relation to the UN, thus establishing the context 
within which concerns from this social group are viewed.  
32 Blair is also directing on other issues stressing that the UN needs ‘to understand that faced with the 
threats we have, we should do all we can to spread the values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, 
religious tolerance and justice for the oppressed, however painful for some nations that may be; but that at 
the same time, we wage war relentlessly on those who would exploit racial and religious division to bring 
catastrophe to the world’ (2004h).  
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There is a sense of Blair knowing the rules promoted by the UN better than the UN 
itself, despite the contestations regarding detention.33 
 
In addition to dominance as above, intersection representation is also evident. The 
Blair government utilises the language of the UN in terms of Resolutions, and stresses 
that they remain committed to the UN, and the importance of their role in the post-
conflict phase is portrayed as something around which members of the UN can unite 
(Blair, 2003zu; Blair, 2004m).34 Blair (2004q) bolsters this social group and his 
government’s association with it by stating:  
 
whatever difficulties there are historically about the UN's role in Iraq, my assessment is that both within 
Iraq and within the international community, the UN is the body that has the international legitimacy to 
be able to certify and help guide the process of political transition.  
 
Despite divisions in the recent past, Blair is suggesting the UN retains sufficient 
legitimacy to have authority on the Iraq issue and is drawing the UK closer to this social 
identity. Thus dominance is closely accompanied by intersection representation, 
particularly in the post-conflict phase in Iraq. The criticisms above that relate to 
detention are likely to have been drowned out by the arguments concerning 
intervention, which overall served to create a degree of distance to this social identity, 
weakening the social influence of the UN’s normative arguments.  
 
2.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity   
Challenges to the liberal democratic social identity are again apparent in 2003-2004. 
The discourse certainly denotes shifting dynamics in the international sphere, as the 
Blair government attempt to establish a degree of unity under a complex super-ordinate 
identity, blending elements contained in the doctrine of the international community, the 
liberal democratic social identity and the emphases of the war on terror. The strategies 
of dominance and merging are both evident. 
                                                 
33 Indeed this is reflected in the insistence that the UK ‘had gone to war to uphold UN resolutions – even 
though the UN itself had steadfastly refused to back the very cause he was making’ (Kampfner, 2004: 
374). 
34 Blair claims that ‘in the United Nations we have come back together now’ (2003zi). The UN backing 
for the presence of coalition forces is achieved through Resolutions 1483 and 1511 and the legitimacy this 
denotes is subsequently stressed. The UN High-Level Panel Report (December 2004) is also seen as 
something around which to unite (2004zz). The report focuses on establishing a new consensus for 
collective security, drawing on themes from the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine. This report is 
constructed in the discourse as something around which reform can take place enabling the UN to act 
effectively.  
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The emphasis on community, and the world as a community, continues and indeed is 
increasingly evident in 2003-2004. The value of community both domestically and 
internationally is a strong theme, with parallels created between them. There is a degree 
of merging where boundaries are again blurred. Blair (2004h) builds on the notion of 
community, stating:  
 
The doctrine of international community is no longer a vision of idealism. It is a practical recognition that 
just as within a country, citizens who are free, well educated and prosperous tend to be responsible, to feel 
solidarity with a society in which they have a stake; so do nations that are free, democratic and benefiting 
from economic progress, tend to be stable and solid partners in the advance of humankind. 
 
Blair (2003a) suggests that ‘there has never been a time when domestic and foreign 
policy were so closely linked’, and later argues that such a situation demands ‘an 
entirely different, more just and more modern view of self-interest’, based on blurred 
boundaries (Blair, 2004h).35   
 
However, what exactly constitutes the large social identity with which the Blair 
government appear to be employing a merging strategy is highly contested. Dominance 
is again evident, particularly in terms of directing, and challenging previous 
understandings.36 In his Sedgefield speech in 2004 Blair (2004h) speaks ‘passionately’ 
of the ‘mortal danger of mistaking the nature of the new world in which we live’. The 
former Prime Minister argues later in 2004:  
 
A world that is fractured, divided and uncertain must be brought together to fight this global terrorism in 
all its forms, and to recognise that it will not be defeated by military might alone, but also by 
demonstrating the strength of our common values - by bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq, as we 
have done to Afghanistan; by pursuing with the same energy peace in the Middle East between Israel and 
Palestine; by accepting it is our duty to combat poverty and injustice on the continent of Africa and 
elsewhere in the world (Blair, 2004zs). 
 
This agenda draws a variety of factors together and appears to provide the constitutive 
elements of an international social identity based on tackling these and other issues, as 
                                                 
35 Whilst this ethos has been apparent throughout the discourse of the Blair government, this particular 
statement clearly highlights why assumptions regarding the interests of a state may not always be that 
helpful, and indeed a constructivist problematisation of this is essential.   
36 Significant challenge is presented, for example, to nothing less than the traditional conception that ‘has 
held sway since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648; namely that a country's internal affairs are for it and you 
don't interfere unless it threatens you, or breaches a treaty, or triggers an obligation of alliance’ (2004h).     
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well as promoting universal values.37 Global threats such as that from poverty, global 
warming, WMD and terrorism are all stressed. The former Prime Minister is very 
optimistic with regards to this agenda emphasising the willingness of the international 
community ‘to confront the challenges we have together on a concerted basis’ (Blair, 
2003zl). The UK’s role is considered to be central in bringing together the different 
actors, particularly the USA and the EU, thus assuming a directing position in relation 
to an evolving and dynamic international social identity.  
 
As with the previous period, there is again much emphasis on new alliances and group 
formations in the changing world. This is particularly notable in relation to an alliance 
struck with General Gaddafi of Libya. Blair suggests that our view of the world and 
whole thinking has to change in the post-September 11th world, and in response we must 
offer leaders such as Gaddafi the chance to work with the War on Terror grouping. This 
is seen by Blair as a signal that the USA and UK can work with the Arab world.38 
Alongside this emphasis on new members, parameters, boundaries and divisions are 
again extremely apparent characterised predominantly as ‘a struggle between fanaticism 
and extremism on the one hand, and people who believe in freedom and in tolerance on 
the other’ (Blair, 2003zy). 
 
Thus, there are a variety of dynamics at work in the international sphere. Much of the 
discourse of the Blair government appears to be attempting to merge elements of the 
liberal democratic social identity with the anti-terrorism agenda that has a different 
membership base. There are many contradictory factors here which are extremely 
difficult to merge. One highly visible example concerns Guantánamo Bay, where the 
international normative standards and regimes associated with a liberal democratic 
social identity are juxtaposed with those perceived to pertain to the loosely and 
dynamically defined counter-terrorism social identity in the international sphere. We 
can understand how the influence of the international detention regime is highly 
contested as the international social identity to which it largely pertains is being heavily 
challenged by the Blair government. Indeed, Blair’s (2003n) warning that we cannot 
allow the ‘natural urges of our democracy towards peace’ to be seen as a weakness is 
                                                 
37 Blair pictures a world working together, based on ‘universal values’, and for mutual benefit (2004h). 
This approach to international relations is based on the ambition for humanity to reach the goals as set out 
in the UDHR and the UN Charter, notably the protection of human rights, freedom, democracy and the 
rule of law.   
38 Other noted relations in this period are with India, Pakistan, Poland, the Ukraine (often in relation to the 
EU) and the Commonwealth. 
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very telling. However, as this thesis argues, international social identities are not the 
only context with which political elites must interact. Such a contradictory approach is 
certainly hard to sustain given the wider context of social identities and social influence.    
 
 
3. Phase 3 - The Unravelling of Contestation? 2005-2006 
‘Let no-one be in any doubt, the rules of the game are changing’ (Blair, 2005zb). 
 
3.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity 
Many of the key criticisms raised by the human rights and humanitarian social group 
regarding the Blair government’s detention policies continue to intensify in 2005-2006. 
The response again utilises a complex array of dominance, intersection 
representation and compartmentalisation, employing the same techniques as in the 
previous periods, however, the discourse used is increasingly dismissive of the 
arguments of members of this social group. 
 
The controversial Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 was replaced in 2005 with control orders 
in the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Human rights groups have been very critical of 
these new measures suggesting that they also violate human rights (AI, 2005c), do not 
meet international human rights obligations (HRW, 2005i), and fall short of the 
requirements outlined in the Law Lords rejection of Part 4 ATCSA (AI, 2005d).39 HRW 
and AI are also extremely critical of the government’s proposals to increase the length 
of pre-trial detention for terror-suspects from 14 days to 90 days. AI has referred to such 
measures as ‘draconian and unnecessary’, and which ‘effectively amount to internment 
in all but name’ (AI, 2005e).  
 
The human rights and humanitarian social group has been highly critical of the ‘serious 
attack on human rights’ that the Blair government’s detention policies present. In 
addition to compromising the right to a fair trial as above, this group also accuses the 
government of undermining the global ban on torture ‘attempting to circumvent’ for 
example the principle of non-refoulement (AI, 2005f; HRW, 2005b). HRW (2005c) 
suggest that the Blair government is leading a ‘growing trend’ in defiance of 
international law by seeking to establish MoUs with countries such as Jordan and 
                                                 
39 Prior to passage into law, AI called for ‘the withdrawal of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill (PTB), as it 
will effectively end the rule of law and the separation of powers by placing key powers in the hands of the 
executive’ (2005g). 
 144 
Algeria that are known to torture. They are ‘condoning’ (Crawshaw, 2006) and 
‘encouraging’ (AI, 2006g) torture through their detention policies, including their 
statements in favour of the admissibility of evidence gained through torture in court 
proceedings.  
 
The government’s response and interaction with such criticisms from this group is to 
again attempt to reformulate the concept of human rights. Whilst intersection 
representation is apparent in terms of strengthening human rights and bolstering this 
group, dominance and compartmentalisation are paramount. For example, Charles 
Clarke (2005a), the former home secretary, stated on several occasions in 2005 that: 
 
Our strengthening of human rights needs to acknowledge a truth which we should all accept, that the right 
to be protected from torture and ill-treatment must be considered side by side with the right to be 
protected from the death and destruction caused by indiscriminate terrorism. 
 
Whilst Blair (2006i) himself does not go so far as to overtly balance torture with 
security, the former Prime Minister does dismiss the concerns of the human rights and 
humanitarian social group with regards to the lack of reliability of MoUs, and argues 
that the human rights and humanitarian social group ‘have got the world the wrong way 
round’.  
 
Furthermore, the ECHR is framed by Charles Clarke (2005a) as outdated, ‘established 
over 50 years ago in a quite different international climate’, one where John Reid (2006) 
suggests concerns such as ‘unlawful detention … torture and punishment without trial 
came centre stage’ due to the very recent horrors of WWII. Blair (2006zf) argues that 
‘traditional civil liberty arguments are not so much wrong, as just made for another 
age’; the debate now is not ‘about whether we respect civil liberties or not; but whose 
take priority’ (Blair, 2006zb). Compartmentalisation, informed by super-ordinate 
priorities, is therefore apparent, as human rights are deemed to be context dependent in 
relation to the individuals concerned. This has again been evident with regards to 
Guantánamo Bay. Whilst Blair (2006m) conceded that ‘it would be better that it is 
closed’, this is again juxtaposed with a reminder of the circumstances in which the 
situation arose – the attacks of September 11th. These issues are grounded in Blair’s 
(2006zb) suggestions that our framework for evaluating the appropriateness of the 
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proposed procedures needs to shift to one placing greater emphasis on protection and 
the rights of the ‘law-abiding majority’.40  
 
Thus, the government’s interactions with this social group also largely fall within the 
category of dominance, where political elites attempt to direct the terms of the debate. 
They also deny the human rights concerns arguing that ‘the analogies with things like 
internment are just fatuous frankly’ (Blair, 2005zr). Indeed, in response to criticisms 
regarding the proposed 90 day pre-charge detention period Blair (2005zr) remarks ‘I 
find it really odd for people to say this is such a terrible thing because it seems to me 
that if you balance it up properly it is perfectly fair’. Further dismissals such as this are 
also found in relation to the US practice of rendition. Blair (2005zzf) rejects accusations 
that ‘I, or the Americans, or anybody else approve or condone torture, or ill treatment, 
or degrading treatment’ as ‘completely and totally out of order in any set of 
circumstances’. However, this clearly depends on the definition of torture as practices 
such as water-boarding have featured on a list of approved interrogation techniques for 
the USA, and as John Bellinger has stated, has been used on three occasions between 
2001 and 2003, most famously on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.   
 
More challenging however are accusations that critics are detached from the reality of 
the situation (Blair, 2005zzb), and should not be dominating the debate. Blair (2006zf) 
suggests that ‘NGOs and pressure groups with single causes can be benevolent but can 
also exercise a kind of malign tyranny over the public debate’. Blair’s (2005zm) 
frustrations that the government is forced to be distant from this social identity are 
apparent in the following statement: 
 
I am not doing it because I am authoritarian or don't care about the civil liberties of this country.  I care 
deeply about the civil liberties of this country, but I care about one basic civil liberty which is the right to 
life of our citizens and freedom from terrorism and I think if these measures are necessary we should take 
them.  
 
Also, in response to an e-petition from Liberty, Blair (2006zzh) emphasises that all 
counter-terrorism measures are set ‘in the context of our general commitment to human 
rights and the protection of individual freedoms, including the enactment of the Human 
                                                 
40 This also relates to rhetoric concerning reform of the criminal justice system. Blair (2006a) goes even 
further than previous periods in 2006 to proclaim the unsuitability of the 19th Century values 
underpinning the criminal justice system, for the 21st Century World.  
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Rights Act 1998 which made the rights enshrined in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) enforceable in domestic courts’. Self-identity informing 
interpretation of one’s own actions and stressing overlap with this identity again appears 
to be a theme here, indicative of intersection representation. As ‘we’ are the 
government that introduced these human rights protections into domestic law, current 
actions cannot be seen as anything other than extremely necessary.  
The above certainly demonstrates attempts to re-frame civil liberties and human rights 
with narrow priorities that are perceived to fit the global war on terror and the evolving 
super-ordinate social identity that appears to dominate for the Blair government. Whilst 
AI and HRW argue that the UK should be taking a leading role in promoting human 
rights to tackle terrorism, the global impact of their detention policies is thought to have 
the opposite effect.    
 
3.2 The Legal Social Identity 
There is also a continuation of contestation with the legal social group in 2005-2006. 
The Blair government faced setbacks with regards to the Law Lords ruling rendering 
torture evidence inadmissible in court, in line with international law (House of Lords, 
2005; BBC, 2005a), as well as the High Court ruling that control orders are 
incompatible with human rights law (Ford, 2006). The then Attorney-General, Lord 
Goldsmith (2006) was also increasingly outspoken against procedures at Guantánamo 
Bay,41 contradicting Blair’s earlier claims of utility with regards to the detention 
facility. Contestation regarding the proposals to circumvent non-refoulement did not 
begin to surface with this group until after 2006 (see Ford, 2007; Gardham and Rayner, 
2008), however, much of the Blair government’s discourse appears to be pre-empting 
such a backlash. Their interactions with the legal social identity fall under the categories 
of dominance and intersection representation as in the previous periods. However, in 
2005-2006 the language employed in relation to dominance intensifies and at times 
compartmentalisation is also apparent.  
 
In terms of dominance and directing, the Blair government are extremely forthright in 
making a case for a revision of the criminal justice system based on understandings of 
the current context. Blair (2005zm) argues that ‘new types of crime’ cannot be tackled 
                                                 
41 Whilst Lord Goldsmith usually stresses the importance of a balance between security and fundamental 
rights (see Goldsmith, 2006), this is not deemed to be proportionate with regards to Guantánamo Bay and 
the US military tribunals. Indeed, whilst supportive of control orders, deportations and 90 day detention, 
the former Attorney-General argues that the right to a fair trial is one that cannot be compromised.  
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‘by the rules of the game we have at the moment’. The current legal system is 
characterised in terms of restraint, an obstacle for the government to find a way around 
to confront the problems of the day. The former Home Secretary Charles Clarke 
(2005b) called for ‘a legal framework’ where there is a better balance between rights as, 
‘[w]e cannot properly fight terrorism with one legal hand tied behind our back’.  
 
The concerns that have been raised by members of the legal social group, in particular 
those made by Lord Hoffman at the end of 2004, are dismissed based on a changing 
context. Lord Hoffman’s (2004) statement is worth repeating here:  
 
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional 
laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these. 
 
Blair (2005y) argues, in the weeks following the attacks of July 7th 2005 in London, 
that, ‘I doubt those words … would be uttered now … I think the mood on this thing 
does change’. In light of this the Blair government implies that it would be irresponsible 
to block proposals concerning the detention and deportation of terror suspects.  
 
The Blair government’s discourse concerning the legal social identity certainly takes on 
a challenging tone in the aftermath of the July 7th attacks. Blair (2005zb) argues that 
‘[s]hould legal obstacles arise’ in relation to detention policies, the government ‘will 
legislate further including, if necessary, amending the Human Rights Act in respect of 
the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights’.42 The situation is 
almost as though war has been declared on the courts, indeed ‘an ongoing battle in the 
Courts and in Parliament to deal with the issue of deportation’ is certainly recognised 
(Blair, 2006zi).  
 
There is a clear, if guarded, message signalled to the judiciary with regards to 90 day 
detention, to ‘be aware that there is a proper role for the judiciary and there is a proper 
role for government and for Parliament’ (Blair, 2005zm). Blair (2005zm) stresses that 
the ‘threat is real’ and as the police are asking for these powers ‘you have got to have 
good reasons to say no to that’. Whilst the independence of the judiciary is recognised 
as a ‘principle of our democracy’ that must be upheld (Blair, 2005y), suggesting 
                                                 
42 The HRA was designed for the judiciary to pass judgement on the compatibility of legislation with the 
HRA, moving away from an absolute principle of Parliamentary sovereignty (Clements and Young, 
1999), however, this statement suggests a reversal of such safeguards.    
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elements of bolstering and intersection representation, the emphasis on direction and 
this group as an obstacle is paramount.43 Blair (2005zm) denies ‘trying to browbeat the 
Judiciary or to substitute the role of government to the proper role of judges’, yet the 
need for those members to understand ‘the rules of the game’ as he does is made very 
clear. A degree of incomprehensibility and ‘alarm’ is evident in relation to court 
decisions, as the former Prime Minister stresses ‘the absolute urgency for people to 
understand this is an active threat and we have to deal with it with the measures that are 
necessary’ (Blair, 2006zi, also see Reid, 2006). 
 
A very interesting passage articulating this view and the need for revision of the legal 
social identity follows. Blair (2006zb) states that:  
 
it is the culture of political and legal decision-making that has to change, to take account of the way the 
world has changed.  It is not this or that judicial decision; this or that law.  It is a complete change of 
mindset, an avowed, articulated determination to make protection of the law-abiding public the priority 
and to measure that not by the theory of the textbook but by the reality of the street and community in 
which real people live real lives. 
 
With specific reference to the ECHR, the former Home Secretary John Reid is also very 
direct in challenging this social group. He argues that the Convention: 
drawn up by British lawyers in the aftermath of the second world war was shaped inevitably by that war 
and by what was happening, not only during that war in places like Germany but across the iron curtain. 
And from the struggle to defeat fascism and the fascist state, and stand up to Stalinism, came an 
understandable focus on protecting the individual from the overweening evil power of the fascist state 
(Reid, 2006). 
This is not considered to be relevant today, but instead is framed as a context 
dependent set of principles. John Reid goes on to be highly critical of the Chahal 
judgement by European lawyers that prevents the deportation of terror suspects to their 
home countries if there is a risk of torture and ill-treatment. He also employs a 
comparative argument, stressing that the terrorists:   
would have no compunction about all unlawful killing or detention. They would have no compunction 
breaking all the laws of war in the Geneva Conventions while demanding the protection of the Geneva 
Conventions. That is what we are trying to tackle with the means of an increasingly constrained 
                                                 
43 Attempts to stay within the legal framework are also apparent when Blair is questioned on the US 
practice of rendition. He states, ‘it all depends on what you mean by rendition. If it is something that is 
unlawful I totally disapprove of it; if it is lawful, I don't disapprove of it’ (Blair, 2005zzf). 
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democratic society - constrained by international conventions and laws, so as the enemy has become less 
and less constrained in intention and capability, we have become more constrained by the intrusion, 
inspection and standards which we set upon ourselves in conducting that struggle, rightly so (Reid, 2006). 
The emphasis is very much on this social identity as a constraint on action, as an 
obstacle to the protection of the majority. Whilst the importance of the rule of law is 
recognised (note Reid says ‘rightly so’ at the end of this passage), and strengthening the 
law is given priority due to its role in deterring terror suspects from entering the UK 
(Clarke, 2006), the employment of dominance and compartmentalisation suggest that 
bolstering is on very narrow terms.  
 
3.3 The Military Social Identity 
Questions start to be raised by various members of the UK Armed Forces in 2005-2006 
with regards to the Blair government’s policies. For example, in the annual Dimbleby 
Lecture of December 2006, the then recently retired head of the British Army, General 
Sir Mike Jackson, identified a dangerous ‘mismatch between what we do and the 
resources we are given with which to do it’. A previous statement by General Sir 
Richard Dannatt (published in the Daily Mail (Sands, 2006)) seemed to provide the 
catalyst for the emergence of a more public dialogue between the government and the 
military than had been evident previously. However, this becomes more apparent after 
the period of analysis, in 2007 and 2008.  
 
The Armed Forces have certainly been placed in a very complex situation, where they 
are caught in the ‘potential cross-fire’ between society and government (Strachan, 2006: 
73). Indeed, in the context of an unpopular war in Iraq there is the significant worry 
raised by General Sir Michael Walker in 2005 that ‘[s]ome of the opprobrium attached 
to the war [in Iraq] is also attached to the fact that the armed services are taking part in 
it. We are, if you like, guilty by association with a decision to go to war that not the 
whole of this country enjoined’ (as cited in Schofield, 2005).  
 
As with the previous periods, the Blair government attempts to counter such perceptions 
by emphasising the purpose of the Armed Forces’ actions. The wider implications of the 
military’s job in both Afghanistan and Iraq, for both the region and the rest of the world, 
are stressed. This is largely situated in a broader framework of an evolving dominant 
super-ordinate social identity internationally. Blair (2006zzd) suggests for example that, 
‘[w]e are not fighting a state, we are fighting a set of ideas, an ideology, a group of 
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extremists that share the same perspective that is a hatred of our way of life and what 
we believe in’. The immense importance of the military’s task is underlined. Whilst the 
Blair government recognise that this is not something soldiers probably thought they 
would ever be involved in when they joined, now due to the changed context and the 
different type of enemy, this is the case and there is no alternative. Soldiers are now on 
the frontline in the Global War on Terror, in a battle of ideologies that goes far beyond 
the traditional capacity of the Armed Forces. Values are taken to form the battleground 
in this context as we are reminded that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are ‘not just 
about security or military tactics. It is about hearts and minds about inspiring people, 
persuading them, showing them what our values at their best stand for’ (Blair, 2006zh). 
Direction of purpose along such lines certainly places significant if not unrealistic 
constraints on this group in their application of military force and provides a framework 
from which their actions will be severely judged.  
 
In the years to come Blair (2006l) argues that ‘the sacrifice made by British troops, and 
also by other countries' troops, will be seen for what it is - a sacrifice in the name of 
freedom and democracy’. He suggests, in a speech to the military, that ‘[w]hat we have 
done therefore in intervening in this way, is far more momentous than possibly we 
appreciated at the time’ (Blair, 2006zh). Legitimatisation through references to the 
elections in Iraq, the support of the Iraqi people, and the presence of a post-conflict UN 
Resolution are also highly salient means of re-assurance. This is accompanied by 
defence of the group in relation to accusations of abuse, with the Blair government 
emphasising the good work of the British Armed Forces (Blair, 2005e).44  
 
There is also a degree of intersection representation here in expressions of praise and 
gratitude that generally accompany these comments, as well as identification of the 
pride that ‘shines through’ (Blair, 2006zv). This is related to the need for support from 
the general public for the forces in combat. The need to be proud of these soldiers in 
their defence of ‘our country's security and that of the wider world’ in hostile conditions 
(Blair, 2006zh), precipitates later statements by General Sir Richard Dannatt (2007) on 
the lack of understanding and support for the Armed Forces in the British public. Such 
                                                 
44 The UK Armed Forces behaviour in terms of detention in Iraq was also coming under increasing 
scrutiny, for example ‘holding around 10 "security internees" in Iraq without charge or trial, including at 
least one person who holds both UK and Iraqi citizenship’ (AI, 2005h).  
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rhetoric serves to bolster this social identity and clearly focuses on areas of overlap 
between the actions of this group and the Blair government’s objectives. 
 
As mentioned in previous time periods, whilst the Blair government’s detention policies 
are not challenged by this social group, they are still part of the complicated social 
identities environment in which policies are made, and interactions give a further 
indication of super-ordinate orientation.    
 
3.4 The United Nations Social Identity 
The main areas of concern that are raised by the UN in 2005-2006 with regards to 
detention, relate to the use of diplomatic assurances or MoUs to return terror suspects to 
countries known to torture, as well as more generally stressing the importance of human 
rights and the rule of law in countering terrorism (this is in contrast to being seen as an 
obstacle to tackling such threats). The Blair government’s interactions with this social 
group are less confrontational than in 2003-2004, but the overall strategies of 
dominance and intersection representation remain.  
 
Kofi Annan stressed in 2005 that ‘the prominence of human rights and the rule of law in 
our conduct of international affairs’ needs to be elevated (Annan, 2005a). Indeed the 
former Secretary-General identifies a ‘lack of respect for human rights and human 
dignity [as] the fundamental reason why the peace of the world today is so precarious, 
and why prosperity is so unequally shared’ (Annan, 2006). From such a perspective 
‘compromising human rights cannot serve the struggle against terrorism’ (Annan, 
2005b). In stark contrast to the Blair government’s rhetoric that has strongly juxtaposed 
the requirements of counter-terrorism with human rights, even prohibitions on torture, 
Kofi Annan (2005c) expresses the judgment that ‘[h]uman rights law makes ample 
provision for strong counter-terrorist action, even in the most exceptional 
circumstances’. Thus, the Blair government’s previous attempts to bring this social 
identity in line with their perception of the global war on terror and the evolving super-
ordinate social identity, has clearly not been accepted.  
 
Indeed, the Blair government’s detention policies are on the receiving end of much 
criticism, particularly with regards to non-refoulement. Manfred Nowak (2006: 2), the 
UN Special Rapporteur on torture, has stated that:  
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diplomatic assurances, which attempt to erode the absolute prohibition on torture in the context of 
counter-terrorism measures. … are not legally binding and undermine existing obligations of States to 
prohibit torture, are ineffective and unreliable in ensuring the protection of returned persons, and 
therefore shall not be resorted to by States. 
 
He further highlights that: 
 
Diplomatic assurances are sought from countries with a proven record of systematic torture, i.e. the very 
fact that such diplomatic assurances are sought is an acknowledgement that the requested State, in the 
opinion of the requesting State, is practising torture (Nowak, 2006: 10).  
 
Such sentiments are supported by Louise Arbour, the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. Her address on Human Rights Day, on the 10th of December 2005, argues that: 
 
even if some post-return monitoring were functioning, the fact that some Governments conclude legally 
non-binding agreements with other Governments on a matter that is at the core of several legally-binding 
UN instruments threatens to empty international human rights law of its content. Diplomatic assurances 
basically create a two-class system among detainees, attempting to provide for a special bilateral 
protection and monitoring regime for a selected few and ignoring the systematic torture of other 
detainees, even though all are entitled to the equal protection of existing UN instruments. 
 
Thus, representatives of the UN have spoken out very clearly against a key component 
of the Blair government’s approach to terrorism.45 Some of the responses to such 
criticisms have been discussed earlier in relation to the human rights and humanitarian 
social identity, where the opposing arguments continue to be stressed. Here I shall focus 
on the discourse directly relating to the UN.   
 
In support of the Blair government’s position the strategies of dominance and 
intersection representation are employed in relation to this social identity. As with 
previous periods a directing approach is utilised, for example in terms of restructuring 
the UN to meet global challenges – especially the issue of reforming the Security 
Council to increase legitimacy, and the need for leadership from the UN on a range of 
issues (Blair, 2005zd; 2005zg; 2005zt; 2006x). Blair (2006y) in particular expresses the 
need for the UN to act earlier to tackle global concerns, that problems are urgent and 
that the consequences will be felt all around the world. The emphasis continues to be on 
action, with inaction viewed as a weakness.  
                                                 
45 The deportation of terror suspects was one track of a twin-track approach to countering terrorism 
(Clarke, 2005c).  
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However, dominance in 2005-2006 is largely limited to this, perhaps given the troubled 
relationship apparent in 2003-2004 and the significant criticisms above. Intersection 
representation addresses some of these issues, drawing the social identity closer, to 
publicly and symbolically validate membership. Blair stresses that the UN can be 
absolutely essential in solving the world’s problems in certain circumstances, 
bolstering this social group. Indeed the former Prime Minister argues that ‘[t]he 
principles of the UN have always had a moral force’ yet ‘[t]oday they receive the 
sharper impulse of self-interest’ (Blair, 2005zg). Thus the values and principles have 
been there for some time, but these now have much more potential as they are so tied up 
with an ‘enlightened’ view of self-interest. Such expressions appear to take on board 
some of the Secretary-General’s concerns with regards to the juxtaposition of human 
rights and security. However, this is certainly not yet reflected in the detention policies 
of the Blair government.  
 
Unifying under the ‘Millennium Development Goals on poverty, on education, [and] 
across a range of indicators for Africa’ (Blair, 2005l) as well as under the UN processes 
in place in Afghanistan and Iraq is also emphasised. Blair (2005ze) argues that:  
 
whatever feelings people have about the original decision in respect of Afghanistan or Iraq, what you 
have now is a United Nations process in which all sensible people should be backing the right of those 
two countries to elect their own government. 
 
In addition to unifying, utilising is also at play here. UN involvement certainly 
strengthens the legitimacy and credibility of Blair’s call for the country and the world to 
unite and allows the former Prime Minister to draw this social identity closer, almost 
setting the UK up as a prototypical member.46 Such a strategy is also employed in 
relation to counter-terror measures at home. Charles Clarke argues that the ‘ambitions 
of the Security Council resolution’ on counter-terrorism need to be met, and this is what 
the new Prevention of Terrorism Bill seeks to do (Clarke, 2005b). Such an argument 
would however appear to be quite difficult to sustain given the criticisms raised by the 
UN outlined above.   
 
 
                                                 
46 In response to the actions of Iran, Blair directs them to stop meddling in a country governed by a UN 
process and where UN supported multinational forces are present. The UN clearly strengthens statements 
and grants a vast amount of legitimacy.  
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3.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity   
The portrait that is painted by the Blair government of international social identities is 
increasingly complex in 2005-2006. The effect of September 11th is still very prominent 
as are other ways in which the world is changing, for example, ‘[n]ew powers are 
emerging’, and as Blair (2006zt) further acknowledges, ‘[i]n the decades to come there 
will be many international negotiations, debates, occasionally, if only in a diplomatic 
sense, confrontations’. However, the strategies that are employed in this complex 
environment are still those of merging and dominance.  
 
The emphasis is again on the doctrine of the international community with a ‘strongly 
activist’ and value based approach to military intervention, ‘climate change, world 
trade, Africa and Palestine’ (Blair, 2006n). In this context the boundaries are blurred 
both between the domestic and the international, as well as in the international sphere 
itself. Blair (2006zt) argues, for example, that Britain’s national interests can only be 
pursued in ‘close concert with others’, as interdependence continues to be a 
fundamental characteristic of the international environment. In such a climate, 
particularly with regards to terrorism, Blair (2006zh) argues that there is no possibility 
for isolationism, as ‘global terrorism means we can't opt-out even if we wanted to’. 
Blair (2006zh) goes on to state that ‘[t]o be engaged is only modern realpolitik’, as ‘all 
countries depend for their strength on the relationships that they can have with other 
countries’ (Blair, 2006l). 
 
The need to act as a unified international community is prominent in the discourse.47 
Blair suggests that the ‘divisions of the past’ must be put behind them and the emphasis 
is on unified messages. For example, the former Prime Minister argues that: 
 
it is time we sent out a clear unified message from the international community and said that is no longer 
legitimate, not merely in terms of committing acts of terrorism but in terms of supporting or inciting it, 
that that is not something that can have any hiding place in respectable opinion (Blair, 2005zd).  
 
The power of legitimacy or in this case de-legitimising activity is clearly recognised as 
is the need to build social consensus in order to achieve this. The attacks of September 
11th continue to be seen as attacks on ‘the civilised values of the entire world’ (Blair, 
2006l), and the ‘we’ that emerges is not deemed to be restricted to the West, but all 
                                                 
47 Whilst at all other times unifying has been indicative of an intersection representation strategy, here it 
is very much used to direct under a super-ordinate social identity.    
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‘those who believe in religious tolerance, openness to others, to democracy, liberty and 
human rights administered by secular courts’ (Blair, 2006n). 
 
Thus, the merging process is again limited by the construction of parameters and 
divisions. Setting a definition of ‘we’ based on the above, serves to exclude those who 
do not meet these criteria. This is largely framed in the context of terrorism where Blair 
suggests we are seeing ‘the age-old battle between progress and reaction, between those 
who embrace and see opportunity in the modern world and those who reject its 
existence; between optimism and hope on the one hand; and pessimism and fear on the 
other’ (Blair, 2006n). Dictatorship is also seen as in the long run incompatible with 
human progress (Blair, 2005b), providing further exclusions.  
  
The strategy of dominance is apparent here, in terms dividing as above, as well as 
directing and defining the super-ordinate social identity internationally and 
subordinating other identities to this. International rules, for example, are understood to 
provide the basis for relations between states (Blair, 2006b); however, Blair (2005zb) 
suggests that these require greater clarification. Certain rules are given preference for 
example that ‘you don't in any shape or form implicitly or by any act support terrorism 
or assassination in … other countries’ (Blair, 2006b). This is highlighted in relation to 
Iran and Syria as they are given the option to ‘either come in and participate as proper 
and responsible members of the international community; or they will face the risk of 
increasing confrontation’ (Blair, 2006ze).  
 
Blair (2006zh) extends this notion of ‘fighting a war’ based on tackling terrorism, to one 
based on influencing ‘how the world should govern itself in the early 21st century’, 
founded on global values. An international agenda moving beyond direct perceptions of 
security to one that will tackle global issues such as the Middle East peace process, 
poverty in Africa and climate change is suggested in order to ‘get real support for the 
tough action that may well be essential to safeguard our way of life (Blair, 2006n). A 
social identity based on tackling these issues is situated within a counter-terrorism 
framework, based on action, engagement, and values. However, the capacity of the UK 
to be leading such an agenda is clearly questionable given the criticisms raised 
throughout this Chapter with regards to detention.  
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Conclusion  
The analysis in this Chapter has demonstrated why previous assessments of defection 
and compliance are extremely limited. An emphasis on ‘doing’ and interactions creates 
a very different narrative of normative influence and contestation to that which is 
generated by studies focusing on personality, degree of internalisation, the nature of the 
norm, or indeed the overriding imperatives of power and interests as explored in 
Chapter 1. Such an approach advances our understanding of the complex and interactive 
processes involved, as grounded in the micro-foundational insights provided by the 
social identity approach. Decisions to defect from or comply with the international 
detention regime are not straightforward assessments; they are interactive processes that 
evolve.   
 
As evidenced throughout this Chapter, a dominance approach to these social identities is 
the most prominent strategy apparent in the discourse. This has involved appeals to an 
emergent super-ordinate social identity defined predominantly in terms of a particular 
approach to counter-terrorism. The constitutive elements of this social identity, as 
apparent in the discourse assessed, are an emphasis on pre-emption (this influences 
perceptions of detention not just military intervention), action (with inaction 
characterised as a weakness), a trade-off between human rights and security, the 
privileging of the right to life and to live free from fear, and the notion that rules (both 
domestic and international) must take account of this very new context within which 
current decisions are made. These factors, in addition to those that are more direct (for 
example, not supporting terrorism and taking ‘appropriate’ measures to tackle 
terrorism), form the basis for membership in an emergent but dominant international 
social group from the perspective of the Blair government.  
 
However, such a social identity cannot, it appears, be isolated from other imperatives, 
creating a very complex and dynamic process of construction with regards to social 
identities in international society. Indeed, the Blair government attempt to merge the 
counter-terrorism agenda with elements of the liberal democratic social identity and 
notions of the Doctrine of the International Community. Given the framework of 
understanding generated in Chapters 1 and 2 that suggests normative regimes have 
social influence as a means by which to validate social identity membership, it is not 
surprising that in this complex and shifting social environment, the influence of the 
international detention regime is not consistently evident. 
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Nevertheless, as has been advanced throughout this thesis, we cannot limit our 
understanding of international normative regimes to the international sphere. Analysis 
also needs to account for more domestically orientated social identities. Such an 
assessment demonstrates that a super-ordinate framework, such as that constructed, is 
not easily accepted by the various social groups relevant to counter-terrorism detention 
policies. The frustrations this generates are evident as the Blair government is forced to 
compartmentalise, and the opportunity to validate association with social identities such 
as human rights and humanitarian, and legal, are markedly reduced. Attempts to 
minimise the negative consequences of such distancing by means of intersection 
representation are certainly apparent but the lack of acceptance here has further 
restricted the Blair government’s ability to be associated with these social identities. 
The evidence of the multiple strategies employed go some way to demonstrating how 
important the social identities are to the Blair government, they do not simply 
compartmentalise or reject them.  
 
Thus, to understand the nature of constraint regarding the international detention regime 
we need to consider the broader social identities context and the role of interactions in 
processes of defection and contestations. Whilst scholars such as Keller (mentioned in 
Chapter 2) have identified the role of personality factors such as sensitivity to normative 
restraints, this only accounts for part of the picture of contestation and defection. How 
constraints are manifest can only actually be determined through interaction; ‘having’ 
does not equate to ‘doing’ as is argued in Chapter 2, and indeed can develop and evolve 
in the interactive context. Whilst research focusing on personality, internalisation, the 
nature of the norm, or pre-defined interests may increase parsimony, they reduce our 
understanding of the processes involved and lead to inaccurate explanations and 
expectations. The approach advanced in this thesis may not make specific predictions as 
to when defection will occur, however, it does allow us to further understand the ‘how 
possible’ questions associated with seemingly counter-normative behaviour. With 
regards to the sustainability of such practices, the social identities context is clearly not 
managed sufficiently to diffuse criticism and validation of association remains heavily 
challenged. This is not a sustainable approach towards social identities that are core to 
the UK.  
 
There are always many possible viewpoints on how to approach issues of public 
protection and the right to life and to live free from terror, which have been emphasised 
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by the Blair government throughout 2001-2006. Despite the importance of international 
normative regimes, such as that prescribing standards for detention and prohibiting 
torture, individuals have many memberships or associations with social identities to 
draw on. Some of these emerge in certain circumstances through individual interactions 
often on a small scale. There will always be room for challenge and different 
interpretations regardless of how internalised at a collective level normative regimes 
appear to be, as the role of individuals and interactions is very important. Indeed, the 
use of internment and stress positions by the UK is more recent than we often 
acknowledge with regards to the conflict with the IRA. 
 
This Chapter has demonstrated the significance of interactions with the broader social 
identities context to understand processes of normative influence, contestation and 
defection, in a hard case where defection may lead one to immediately resort to pre-
defined interests to explain behaviour. To limit research on this basis would miss the 
interactive processes that are key to understanding the how possible questions raised by 
contestation and defection. Chapter 5 will further examine the framework developed in 
this thesis in relation to the USA which presents an even harder case as the international 
detention regime is more heavily compromised and the role of the broader social 
identities context is very much in question.  
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Chapter 5 – The Management of Social Identities – The case of 
the USA 
 
‘Very simply the reason for their detention is that they're dangerous.  Were they not 
detained, they would return to the fight and continue to kill innocent men, women and 
children… It is a security necessity, and I might add it is just plain common sense.’ 
(Rumsfeld, 2004a) 
 
‘There seems to be a new world order, an acceptance of utter illegality. You have all 
these wonderful treaties after World War Two – the Geneva Conventions, bans on 
torture – and all of them have been torn up. Effectively you are allowing international 
law to be re-written’  
(Gareth Pierce, lawyer for Moazzem Begg, cited in Rose, 2004b: 39) 
 
The international detention regime has been placed under significant strain by the Bush 
administration during the course of the war on terror. Defections have been well 
documented by academics, journalists, and legal professionals as well as political 
commentators and practitioners. Criticisms have included US practices regarding unfair 
trial procedures, denial of habeas corpus rights, indefinite detention without charge or 
trial, arbitrary detention, prolonged incommunicado detention, secret detention, 
enforced disappearances, humiliating and degrading treatment, as well as torture, cruel 
or inhuman treatment. Torture in particular, long associated with only the most 
‘barbaric’ regimes, has become the subject of intense debate, entering into mainstream 
public discourse in the USA shortly after the September 11th attacks (Rutenberg, 2001). 
Leaked photographs documenting abuse alongside media images of the detention 
facilities at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, have been extremely damaging in the battle for 
public perception. Guantánamo has become what some commentators refer to as an 
‘icon of oppression’ (Rose, 2004b: 11), others have gone further and accused the Bush 
administration of constructing a ‘secret culture of torture…in the heart of a liberal 
culture’ (Luban, 2006: 52).   
 
This thesis has been engaged with the question of how such policies, contrary to the 
expected behaviour of liberal democratic states, became possible, in terms of the 
negotiation of normative constraints, particularly for states such as the USA and UK. 
These states have invested a great deal of time and resources in the establishment of 
human rights regimes, standards for practices regarding detention, and campaigns aimed 
at the eradication of torture. The USA, the focus of this Chapter, is the home of the 
Lieber Code (1863), which provides an early codification of certain privileges to which 
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prisoners of war are entitled.1 The USA has furthermore, ratified all the Geneva 
Conventions, with the exception of the two protocols in 1977. Later, in 1988, the USA 
signed the Convention against Torture (CAT) (1984) which they then ratified in 1994. 
Federal law in the USA also firmly prohibits the use of torture, as well as ‘severe mental 
pain or suffering’ that is prolonged in nature (US Code, Title 18, Article 2340).2  
 
The Bush administration has also stressed their commitment to the rule of law, human 
dignity, and freedom, as well as issuing proclamations each year on Human Rights Day 
(early December) in support of human rights globally (e.g. Bush 2001zzf; 2002zzg; 
2003zzf; 2004zzf; 2005zzd; 2006zze). Yet, many of these statements appear hollow and 
hypocritical. For example, the Human Rights Reports of the State Department have 
strongly criticised the harsh interrogation practices of various countries, such as Burma, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Yet these very same practices (for example ‘stress and 
duress’ techniques such as sleep and food deprivation, uncomfortable positions, or 
exposure to cold) have been used by the USA in the interrogation of terror suspects with 
the approval of the Defense Department (Malinowski, 2005: 140).  
 
In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, 2001, the Bush administration focused 
attention on fighting a new war, supported by new rules, in a changed international 
context. The detention of terror suspects and ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ was brought 
to the fore in the public arena, largely because of contestation and defection from 
internationally held appropriate standards. Detention was also granted a particularly 
prominent role by President Bush himself, through repeated assertions of the numbers 
of terror suspects captured by the USA and her allies.3 Revealing these numbers in the 
early months of the war on terror seems to be used (problematically I must add) as a 
means of demonstrating progress in tackling the threat of terrorism.4 Detention was 
                                                 
1 The Lieber Code is the first attempt to codify the laws of war. Section III covers prisoners of war, 
hostages and deserters, and article 76 of the code specifically stresses that prisoners of war (PoWs) must 
be ‘treated with humanity’. Section VI refers to the exchange of PoWs and Section VII parole for PoWs.  
2 Article 2340 refers to the prolonged ‘severe mental pain or suffering’ that is caused by ‘intentional 
infliction and threatened infliction’, the administration or threatened administration of ‘mind-altering 
substances’, the ‘threat of imminent death’, or threats that another person will be subjected to death or 
abuse. 
3 Bush begins asserting numbers as early as October 1st 2001 where he states, ‘[t]here's 150 detained, and 
more to come’ (Bush, 2001zj). This number rapidly rises to over 1000 arrested in America by October 
26th (Bush, 2001zu), and over 2400, as a part of broader coalition efforts, by June 11th 2002 (Bush, 
2002zf).   
4 The latter is based on the logic that the larger the number of suspected terrorists ‘hunted down’ and 
detained the smaller the threat of attack becomes. Also the harsher the conditions seem the more such 
practices will serve as a deterrent to terrorist activity. A similarly problematic tactic has also been 
employed by Bush in related to the number of insurgents killed in Iraq; this is taken to show that there are 
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placed firmly on a war-time footing, focusing on the removal of terror suspects from the 
USA, the removal of insurgents or ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ from the broader 
battlefield including Afghanistan and Iraq, and using detention for the purposes of 
interrogation and intelligence gathering. Detention was not orientated toward 
rehabilitation or even prosecution. Rehabilitation was dismissed very early on as 
impossible for the ‘evil-doers’ detained, and prosecution certainly fell well behind the 
priority of preventing another attack. There was also a strong determination of guilt, 
regarding the detainees, throughout the discourse assessed. Indeed, these factors have 
framed many aspects of the Bush administration’s detention policies, particularly in the 
Pentagon and Justice Department, as well as filtering into the ethos of the FBI and 
CIA.5  
 
Part of the CAT and the international detention regime is to prevent the occurrence of 
conditions that are likely to lead to torture or abuse. This has certainly not been the case 
with the denial of Geneva protections, the use of indefinite detention, pre-trial assertions 
of guilt, keeping some detainees hidden from ICRC, disappearing detainees through 
rendition, and holding them in undisclosed locations around the world. There is a vast 
array of scholarship regarding torture and how to prevent it, with organisations such as 
ICRC campaigning to increase awareness (See ICRC website; also Fresard (2004); 
Munoz-Rojas and Fresard, 2004). The impact of the decisions and statements of the 
Bush administration would not have been unknown. Thus, we are again left with a 
puzzle. This Chapter, as with that previously, focuses on the question, of how such 
practices, contrary to the international normative regime prescribing detention standards 
and prohibiting detention, became possible. I again focus on the interactive processes 
involved in negotiating normative constraint, in relation to the broader social identities 
context.6 The management strategies employed by political elites in the Bush 
administration, will provide an insight into these interactions.  
                                                                                                                                               
now less insurgents to fight. The possibility that harsher measures may create more insurgents due to the 
multiple audiences and variety of communicative strands to these policies does not gain any attention in 
the discourse of the administration.  
5 In response to FBI Director Mueller’s assertion that it would be important not to taint any evidence 
regarding terror suspects so as to assure potential for prosecution, the then Attorney General John 
Ashcroft is reported to have stressed the need to ‘think unconventionally’ and focus on prevention as 
opposed to prosecution (Woodward, 2002: 42). Bush himself stated in 2001, ‘[t]he culture in our agencies 
have changed. We are now interested in preventing attack.  We're now interested in finding those who 
may attack America, and arrest them before they do’ (Bush, 2001zu).   
6 Whilst others have focused on the fluctuating balance of power between the Executive, Congress and 
the Courts (for example, Kroenig and Stowsky, 2006; Lindsay, 2003; Rudalevige, 2006), or indeed the 
contestation across government departments (Roberts, 2007), this Chapter is concerned with the publicly 
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Table 4 – The Management of Social Identities by the Bush Administration  
 
 2001-2002 2003-2004 2005-2006 
Human Rights and 
Humanitarian 
Dominance 
- Dismissal 
- Denial 
- Challenging 
Compartmentalisation 
- Context 
dependent 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
Dominance 
- Dismissal 
- Denial 
Compartmentalisation 
- Context 
dependent 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering  
Dominance 
- Dismissal 
- Denial 
- Challenging 
- Displacing 
Compartmentalisation 
- Context 
dependent 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
 
Legal Dominance 
- Directing 
Compartmentalisation 
- Context 
dependent 
Merging 
- Centrality 
Dominance 
- Denial 
Compartmentalisation 
- Context 
Dependent 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering  
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Denial 
- Blaming 
- Challenging 
Compartmentalisation 
- Context 
dependent 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering  
Military Dominance 
- Directing 
- Embedding 
Intersection 
Representation  
- Bolstering 
 
Dominance  
- Directing 
- Embedding 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
- Defence of 
group 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Embedding 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
 
United Nations Dominance 
- Directing 
- Defining 
- Threatening 
Intersection 
Representation  
- Bolstering 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Defining 
- Dismissal 
- Denial 
Intersection 
Representation  
- Bolstering 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Defining 
- Dismissal 
- Denial 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering  
 
International  Dominance 
- Directing 
- Leading 
- Dividing 
Separation 
- Distancing 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Leading 
- Dividing 
- Defining 
Separation 
- Distancing 
Dominance 
- Directing 
- Leading 
- Dismissal 
- Dividing 
Intersection 
Representation 
- Bolstering 
- Utilising 
 
 
This Chapter follows the same format as Chapter 4 and is broken down into three time 
periods to allow changes to be tracked and highlighted, 2001-2002, 2003-2004, and 
                                                                                                                                               
articulated management strategies and negotiation of normative constraints in relation to the social 
identities examined in Chapter 3. 
 163 
2005-2006. Table 4 on the previous page details the strategies and techniques that are 
apparent. Again I focus predominantly on the discourse of the state leader as 
representative of the administration and close advisers. When referring to President 
George W. Bush’s statements these are not understood as purely reducible to Bush 
himself, but generally reflect carefully crafted language representative of the small state 
leadership group. The President’s statements are again supplemented with those of other 
members of the administration. The management strategies employed by the Bush 
administration in relation to the social identities that are under consideration in this 
thesis, largely resemble that of dominance,7 but are also supplemented with 
compartmentalisation, intersection representation and merging. The techniques 
evident in pursuit of these strategies again vary with both social identity and time 
period.    
 
 
1. Phase 1 - Initial Contestation: 2001-2002  
‘The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today’ 
(Bush, cited in Woodward, 2002: 37) 
 
1.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity 
The human rights and humanitarian social group began to raise many concerns 
regarding the detention of terror suspects in 2001-2002. Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
(2001b) were early to ‘caution against ill-considered changes to U.S. law and policy that 
would erode basic rights to personal liberty’, including changes to detention policies.8 
The organisation was particularly critical of the broad reach of the Military Order on the 
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 
issued on November 13, 2001 (Bush, 2001zzb).9 HRW and Amnesty International (AI) 
also express concerns with regards to the situation at Guantánamo Bay (e.g. Fellner, 
2002), with AI (2002f) calling for the protection of law to be granted to Guantánamo 
detainees. Torture is also an issue about which there is significant unease in 2001-2002. 
For example, in response to the resurgence of debate on the topic in the USA, HRW 
                                                 
7 This strategy is consistent with the insights of scholars who have highlighted the rhetorical constraints 
on political opposition in the USA at this time (Krebs and Jackson, 2007), in particular, drawing attention 
to the framing of threat and the impact of norms determining what constitutes patriotic behaviour 
(Cramer, 2007).  
8 HRW, as well as AI, also raise concerns about the detention of foreign terror suspects under 
immigration charges in the USA (HRW, 2001d; AI 2002h, HRW, 2002a). 
9 HRW (2001e) argue that the Order, which details the use of military commissions, ‘sacrifices 
fundamental rights to personal liberty and to a fair trial that go far beyond what is permitted even in times 
of crisis’. Whilst improvement to the rules governing these military commissions is recognised in April 
2002, HRW (2002b) suggest they are still flawed. 
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(2001c) express their belief that torture is simply not an option.10 AI (2002g) goes on to 
highlight the risks of torture and ill-treatment inherent in the Bush administration’s use 
of incommunicado detention.11 The discourse of the Bush administration in 2001-2002 
largely reflects a dominance approach based on dismissal, denial and challenge to the 
above concerns. This is accompanied by compartmentalisation of human rights in this 
context, and very limited intersection representation.   
 
Rumseld (2002a), for example, is dismissive of the ‘hyperbole’ and ‘allegations, that 
have been made by many from comfortable distance’. He suggests that such reports ‘are 
undoubtedly [made] by people who are uninformed, misinformed or poorly informed’. 
The following two passages are particularly revealing with regards to both denials and 
dismissals: 
 
You know, it's perfectly possible for anyone to stand up and say, "Henny Penny, the sky's falling, isn't 
this terrible what's happening?" and say that; and have someone else say, "Gee, I view with alarm the 
possibility that the sky's falling!" And then it gets repeated. And then some breathless commentator 
repeats it again. And then it goes on for three days. Now, does that make it so? No. At some point does 
the air come out of that balloon? You bet.  
 
I think … if someone looked down from Mars on the United States for the last three days, they would 
conclude that America is what's wrong with the world. America is not what's wrong with the world. And 
what's taking place down there [Guantánamo Bay] is responsible, it's humane, it's legal, it's proper, it's 
consistent with the Geneva Conventions. And after a period, that will sink in, let there be no doubt. 
 
Such arguments are further supported by the President himself, who states that:  
 
there's no evidence that we're treating them outside the spirit of the Geneva Convention.  And for those 
who say we are, they just don't know what they're talking about (Bush, 2002g).12 
 
Indeed, the dangers of civil liberties are highlighted in the following statement, 
challenging the human rights and humanitarian social identity: 
 we must not let foreign enemies use the forums of liberty to destroy liberty, itself. Foreign terrorists and 
agents must never again be allowed to use our freedoms against us (Bush, 2001zzc). 
 
                                                 
10 HRW (2002c) are also critical of US opposition to the draft optional protocol to CAT that would 
establish a system of inspections, internationally, to visit places of detention. 
11 These concerns are accompanied by many expressions of the importance of human rights in the post 
September 11th period, from both organisations.    
12 President Bush emphasises that the detainees are being well-treated and have good medical care.  
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Such a position certainly goes beyond a rejection of the arguments of this social group, 
suggesting their ideals facilitate the terrorist cause. Predominantly the emphasis above 
has been on denials and dismissals and constructing a dominant narrative. However, 
this last statement also goes some way to demonstrating how this social identity has 
been subordinated to the dominant framework of counter-terrorism.   
 
In addition to the above approach, human rights are also, at times, juxtaposed with 
context. Bush (2002i), for example, speaks of the ‘need to respect people’s rights’ 
whilst at the same time balancing this with the ‘most important job … to protect 
innocent Americans’. Justification of military commissions is also along these lines 
(Bush, 2001zzd). Whilst Bush often refers to ‘inalienable rights’ (2002za), the extension 
of these to detainees at Guantánamo is certainly restricted, as they ‘are killers’, ‘[t]hey 
don't share the same values we share’, and ‘[t]hey would like nothing more than to 
come after America, or our friends and allies’ (2002s).13 Comparison is used to back up 
such compartmentalisation, particularly that relating to military commissions, in that 
detainees ‘will be given a heck of a lot better chance in court than those citizens of ours 
who were in the World Trade Center or in the Pentagon were given by Mr. bin Laden’ 
(Bush, 2001zzh).  
 
The effects of compartmentalisation are slightly reduced by very limited intersection 
representation. Before the September 11th attacks, Bush (2001n) refers to the USA as 
‘one of the great bastions of human rights’. However, subsequent to the attacks this is 
generally limited to the ‘chief’ right, the right to life (Bush, 2002d). Thus, whilst some 
bolstering is apparent in relation to this social identity, this is either juxtaposed with 
threat (as above regarding compartmentalisation), or this is highly restricted to the right 
to life. The emphasis on defending ‘freedom no matter what the cost’ (Bush, 2002n), 
greatly reduces the salience of this social identity, indeed, at times it is seen as a 
weakness, used by the terrorists.   
 
1.2 The Legal Social Identity 
Whilst 300 law professors signed a letter criticising Bush’s Military Order (as 
mentioned above), calling the military commissions ‘legally deficient, unnecessary and 
unwise’ (Seelye, 2001), there were no further public challenges from the legal social 
                                                 
13 The utility in terms of intelligence gathered from these detainees is also emphasised.   
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group in 2001-2002. Various management strategies are, however, still apparent. These 
range from initial merging to both dominance and compartmentalisation.  
 
The rule of law is frequently presented as central to US identity; this is indeed the case 
throughout the whole 2001-2006 period of analysis. The USA is characterised as ‘a 
nation of laws’ (Bush, 2002m), where the rule of law provides the basis for US 
democracy (Bush, 2001l). The judiciary is credited as an integral part of the US system 
of governance, with ‘a strong and independent judiciary’ being essential to freedom 
(Bush, 2001l). There is indeed an annual law day at the beginning of May ‘to celebrate 
[US] legal heritage’ (Bush, 2001l). President Bush, furthermore, refers to the equality of 
law where ‘[n]o one is above the law, and no one is beneath it’ (Bush, 2002m) law is 
simply merged with all other aspects of identity.  
 
After the attacks of September 11th however, a degree of tension is also apparent with 
regards to this social identity. Merging is still evident yet elements of friction and slight 
divisions from this social identity are also visible. For example, Bush often remarks that 
al-Qaeda must have thought, ‘that all we would do after the attack was maybe file a 
lawsuit or two’ (e.g. Bush, 2002zf). The frequent use of this statement suggests a 
questioning of the centrality of the legal social identity and is indicative of an 
association of law with weakness and inaction.  
 
Bush also juxtaposes the identity of being ‘a nation of law’, with being ‘a nation under 
attack’ (Bush, 2001zd): 
 
Ours is a land that values the constitutional rights of every citizen.  And we will honor those rights, of 
course. But we're at war, a war we're going to win (Bush, 2001zi). 
 
There is a sense that the administration will abide by law and the constitution because of 
the centrality to identity, but the context may determine otherwise, suggesting a degree 
of compartmentalisation. The messages that are generated are at odds in that the USA 
will abide by law, but at the same time the USA will not allow law to get in the way in 
the fight against terrorism. There are constant reminders that ‘[w]e’re dealing with 
terrorists’ (Bush, 2001zzc), who require a different set of rules. This is evident in the 
memorandum signed by Bush on February 7th 2002, where the administration rejected 
the legal provisions of the Geneva Conventions, particularly common Article 3, 
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governing the treatment of detainees (Greenberg and Dratel, 2005).14 There is an 
apparent lack of trust when it comes to the judicial process and their capacity to try 
terror suspects, with the administration often second-guessing the actions of the legal 
profession (Greenberg, 2006: 7).  
 
Law is further marginalised in terms of Bush’s Military Order setting up the system of 
military commissions to try terror suspects. Kassop (2003: 520) argues that: 
 
To dismiss with a broad brush the ability of the judicial branch to review governmental actions simply 
because the subject matter is foreign policy or war overlooks past precedents and suggests a view that is 
uncomfortably at odds with basic principles of constitutional government. 
 
However, to say that the legal social identity has simply reduced in salience in relation 
to the war on terror, and that this identity enjoys less applicability in this context, would 
be to miss out some of the important nuances of the apparent change in interactions with 
this group. Bush (2002a) may have been dismissive at times, stating for example, ‘I 
wasn't interested in lawyers, I wasn't interested in a bunch of debate’,15 yet the President 
could not simply ‘switch off’ this social identity. Instead, a strategy of dominance 
emerges where attorneys are placed ‘on the front line of war’ (Bush, 2001zq), with the 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) charged with ‘pushing antiterrorism efforts to the limits 
of the law’ (Goldsmith, 2007: 42). As opposed to a traditional focus on legal precedent 
(by nature backward looking), the President is more encouraging of looking forward to 
circumstances that may arise, both to avoid restraint on actions that may be required by 
the USA as well as to prevent possible future terrorist activity (Goldsmith, 2007: 133-
134).16 This social identity is brought into line with the preventive and forward-leaning 
posture of the Bush administration. There is thus much emphasis on direction and 
dominance as the legal social identity is drawn into the overall super-ordinate 
framework of the war on terror, and merging is restricted. 
 
                                                 
14 Common Article 3 was determined non-applicable to either al-Qaeda or Taliban detainees, and the 
Geneva provisions more broadly were seen as non-applicable to the conflict with al-Qaeda.  
15 There was to be no ‘lawyering this thing to death’ only a demonstration of resolve (Woodward, 2002: 
96). 
16 In the context of tackling terrorism the role of law and the legal profession was one of making sure the 
USA was not restrained as well as avoiding the subsequent prosecution of administration officials. 
Scholars have criticised this characterisation of ‘lawyer as absolver’ (Luban, 2006: 68) or lawyers 
‘lend[ing] such policies a patina of respectability’ (Holmes, 2006: 119). This is in a context where the 
decision on how to legally interpret the situation of detainees is emerging and evolving (Bush, 2002g). 
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Thus, merging, compartmentalisation and dominance are all evident in this period, 
demonstrating that even though there were not any substantial challenges from the legal 
social group in 2001-2002 the need to manage this social identity was very apparent. At 
this stage, these strategies do appear to be accepted as there is little contestation; this 
may however be largely reflective of the time it takes for cases to come to court. 
 
1.3 The Military Social Identity 
Whilst law was often associated with weakness by the Bush administration in the post 
September 11th context, the military were portrayed as a show of strength and might. 
This emphasis is apparent even before the terror attacks in 2001, and was a central 
element of Bush’s 2000 election campaign as well as the broader neo-con agenda. The 
management strategies apparent in 2001-2002 predominantly reflect a dominance 
approach, supported by elements of intersection representation.  
 
The US military are granted much centrality in the discourse, contributing to the 
‘meaning and conscience and soul’ of the country (Bush, 2001p).17 Furthermore, service 
personnel are credited with being ‘ambassadors from the land of freedom’ (Bush, 
2001p). Centrality is certainly suggestive of a merging strategy with other social 
identities, yet the discourse is very focused and directed. There is a great deal of 
emphasis from both Bush and Rumsfeld on change, building a force for the future, 
moving away from nation-building,18 and ‘redefining the terms of war’ (Bush, 2001e).19 
Rumsfeld’s interactions with the military certainly indicate a dominant approach, 
promoting risk-taking and forward thinking (Woodward, 2006: 53), establishing a chain 
of command through the Secretary of Defense to the Whitehouse, wrestling back 
civilian control of the Pentagon, and taking on ‘entrenched military interests’ 
(Woodward, 2006: 363).20 Thus, the line has been crossed from merging to dominance 
even before there was a clear overarching mission of eradicating terrorism.  
                                                 
17 Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld each give a large number of speeches to the different services in the US 
military, often stressing that the military is ‘[o]ur first priority’ (Bush, 2002e). These speeches are often 
used to articulate new defence and security policies such as pre-emption (Moens, 2004: 170) 
18 Nation building was seen to have contributed to a drop in readiness under Clinton due to reduced 
combat training. Such missions were also considered to be related to under-funding and low morale 
(Moens, 2004: 37). 
19 This is reflective of the forward-leaning strategy of the Bush administration more generally. 
20 The independence of military advice was also brought into question. 
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After the September 11th attacks, with a more salient agenda, this only intensifies.21 
Many of the constraints on military planning were further reduced (Woodward, 2004: 
37), for example, Rumsfeld is reported to have stressed the need to think 
unconventionally, and, through using fewer troops, elevate the risk in military planning 
(Woodward, 2004: 35).22 In relation to the questions of concern in this thesis, a lesser 
number of troops is unlikely to have helped avoid the conditions conducive to the abuse 
of detainees.  
 
The Bush administration also went against military culture in rendering the Geneva 
Conventions non-applicable. As Major Michael Dan Mori outlines, ‘[i]n the military, 
you capture someone and assume that he is a prisoner of war until you have a hearing 
that says he is not a prisoner of war…in the David Hicks case, the military was stopped 
by civilian leadership’, this was due to Rumsfeld’s memo dated January 22nd 2002 
(Neuborne, Priest, Lewis, Dratel, Mori and Gillers, 2006: 26). The Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, is also reported to have argued against the 
administration’s position stating that the Geneva Conventions are ‘ingrained in U.S. 
military culture’, that ‘an American soldier’s self-image is bound up with the 
Conventions,’, and that ‘[a]s we want our troops, if captured, treated according to the 
Conventions, we have to encourage respect for the law by our own example’ (from 
Feith (2004) cited in Goldsmith (2007: 113-114)).23 Whether or not the Geneva 
Conventions technically applied in a legal context was therefore not the only issue of 
concern for the military (Woodward, 2006: 86). This position was overruled.24  
 
                                                 
21 Rumsfeld has expressed the opinion that, ‘the war transforms the military’ (Woodward, 2002: 135). 
The implications of the wars chosen were certainly not lost on the administration who wanted a strong 
military ready to fight wars, not to build nations. 
22 Rumsfeld’s clashes with a ‘risk adverse’ military culture are well documented by Woodward (e.g. 
2006: 53). Disputes over troop numbers between neocons and realists in the Bush administration have 
also been noted by scholars such as Dolan and Cohen (2006: 51-52). Powell in particular was concerned 
that the military would be talked into using too small a force in Iraq (Woodward, 2004: 80). 
23 Roberts (2007: 202) reports that there were further memos in this period ‘which show how strenuously 
many qualified experts in the government and the armed forces argued against the departures from the 
Geneva Conventions but failed to carry the day’. However, the voices of military lawyers are often 
overlooked as much has yet to be declassified, despite the protests of some military lawyers to have their 
objections made public. We do know that concerns were raised by the US military though in 2002 (Mora, 
2004) regarding Rumsfeld’s authorisation of abusive interrogation techniques (see Haynes (2002) in 
Greenberg and Dratel (2005: 237)). Mora’s opinions did not however reflect a unitary military voice on 
the matter.  
24 As Hasian (2007: 711) later suggests, in response to Rumsfeld’s ‘flippant remarks’ about the length of 
time detainees could be made to stand (see Haynes (2002), in Greenberg and Dratel, 2005: 237), ‘[r]eal 
warriors need leaders who understood both the letter and spirit of these laws’ as opposed to belittling their 
content.  
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In order to support these policies the Bush administration appears to have focused on 
embedding the military in the super-ordinate framework of the war on terror and 
celebrating their achievements in this context (for example, the heroism displayed 
(Bush, 2001zm), the weapons technology used in this war (Bush, 2001zzg), and the 
sheer patriotism on show (Bush, 2001zm)). Intersection representation is apparent 
through bolstering areas of overlap. Techniques involve, praise, appreciation, emphasis 
on capability (Bush, 2001ze; Bush, 2001zr), as well as highlighting funding and the 
administration’s concerns for the living conditions of soldiers as well as their families 
(Bush, 2001b; 2002b). Reminders of 9/11, juxtaposing the military’s humanitarian 
actions with those of the enemy, and emphasising their ‘noble mission’ to defend 
civilization, all further serve this purpose (Bush, 2001zr). Bush (2001zm) addresses 
some of the norms of the military, stressing their clear objectives and just goals, at the 
same time as heavily embedding this social identity in the super-ordinate war on terror 
framework.  
 
However, several other key norms of the US military, for example, the need to 
overestimate the numbers of soldiers required, the need for clear exit strategies and 
Geneva Convention applicability, were undermined in 2001-2002. The main 
management strategy evident in the discourse is dominance, attempting to fit the 
military into the super-ordinate framework of the Bush administration’s war on terror. 
Whilst there is unrest behind the scenes, this does not surface in 2001-2002, indeed this 
would have been inappropriate as challenges could have created significant uncertainty 
amongst personnel. Publicly there is acceptance of this super-ordinate framework.  
 
1.4 The United Nations Social Identity 
Interactions with the UN differ significantly from the previous two social identities, 
perhaps not surprisingly given that the neo-con agenda even prior to September 11th, 
was very critical of involvement in multilateral institutions. The 2001-2002 period of 
analysis begins with rather strained relations due to the decision to ‘kick the United 
States off’ the Human Rights Commission and permit Sudan to join (Bush, 2001m).25 
Bush (2001zz) states later in the year, that such a move ‘undermines the credibility of 
this great institution’, and jeopardises the ‘moral authority’ on which the UN depends. 
By suggesting that the UN lacks credibility and has lost its way, the stage is certainly set 
                                                 
25 US proposals for exemptions for their peacekeepers from ICC jurisdiction were also rejected by the UN 
Security Council in 2002 (HRW, 2002d).  
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for a strategy of dominance, which is facilitated by elements of intersection 
representation. 
 
In the discourse assessed, the UN is defined almost solely in terms of the super-ordinate 
framework of the war on terror; the organisation’s capacity to meet its responsibilities 
and uphold its values is presented through this lens. Bush (2001zz) emphasises that the 
‘struggle’ of the war on terror is a ‘defining moment for the United Nations’ and that 
the ‘United Nations was founded in this cause’. The attacks of September 11th are 
furthermore framed as an attack on the UN, but the administration argues that the UN is 
too weak to stand up for itself.  
 
The USA is also positioned as more humanitarian than the UN, where the former is 
fulfilling a duty to future generations in confronting ‘the true challenges of the 21st 
century’ (Bush, 2002zl). Bush (2002zj) reminds listeners that the ‘United States helped 
found the United Nations’. Thus there are hints at intersection representation, 
bolstering that which the USA shares with the UN, as well as citing the UNSC 
Resolutions the USA is attempting to uphold. However this is exceptionally narrow and 
very limited in 2001-2002, with discourse more firmly reflecting dominance. The 
following statement is highly illustrative of this form of dominance, facilitated by 
intersection representation: 
 
And my message to the United Nations was this: We want you to succeed as a[n] international body. The 
world is different, the threats are real, we can do a better job if we work together through the United 
Nations, and here's your chance to succeed. You have a choice, and the choice is whether you'll be an 
effective peacekeeping organization, or whether you'll be like the League of Nations. Your choice (Bush, 
2002zq).26 
 
Where there is overlap, this is emphasised, however if the UN perceives the world in a 
different way to that directed by the Bush administration, the argument threatens that 
the organisation will cease to be relevant. Vice-President Cheney partially instigated 
this approach insisting that if the USA went down the UN route in the build up to the 
Iraq war, the framing of such action must be in terms of testing the UN’s resolve 
                                                 
26 Smith (2004: 212) notes that this line of attack may have made Iraq the most prominent issue, ‘but it 
did not create an environment where many member states had much incentive to cooperate’. The author 
goes on to highlight the problems of such an approach, suggesting that this will have made it more 
difficult for the USA to ‘pass even the most benign resolutions’ in the future (2004: 212). Whilst such 
rhetoric may have been useful for preparing the US public for war, Smith suggests that ‘this same rhetoric 
clearly had a direct negative impact on the negotiating environment in New York’ (2004: 212).  
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(Kamfner, 2004: 193).27 Responsibility for US action is shifted onto the context and the 
organisation itself. Indeed, waiting for the UN to make a decision is ruled out as un-
fitting for any representative of the USA including any ‘elected member of the United 
States Senate or House of Representatives’. Instead Bush (2002zk) stresses that ‘if 
you're representing the United States, you ought to be making a decision on what's best 
for the United States’. Any normative pressures from taking a stance contrary to this 
social identity are therefore heavily reduced.  
 
John Kampfner notes the remarks of a member of Blair’s inner-circle stating that ‘Bush 
gives the impression that the UN is just a process to get through’ (2004: 274). The UN 
is also described by the administration as ‘a diplomatic mud pit’ (Woodward, 2004: 
189). Thus any identification with this social identity is exceptionally limited in 2001-
2002, allowing the administration to be largely free from the normative pressures to 
validate membership.  
 
1.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity   
Another social identity under consideration in this thesis is that of the liberal democratic 
state in international society. Such an identity is not highly apparent in the discourse 
assessed. Whilst Bush makes claims that the administration has ‘rejected 
isolationism…and protectionism’ they actually begin 2001 on a decidedly non-
internationalist and more regionalist stance. Concerns about American withdrawal were 
rife, with the administration ending the ABM treaty, as well as pulling out of the Kyoto 
agreement and the International Criminal Court, the latter raising doubts over continued 
support for peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. There are indications of a new 
approach internationally even before the attacks of September 11th, as Bush (2001k) 
states ‘[w]e must all look at the world in a new, realistic way’; however what this 
actually means becomes much more apparent after the attacks. The predominant 
management strategy evident in relation to social identities in international society in 
2001-2002 is dominance. However, a degree of separation is also apparent.  
 
The dominant framework that emerges after September 11th focuses on ‘one universal 
law, and that's terrorism is evil’ (Bush, 2001zy). The accompanying discourse of 
                                                 
27 Cheney had little confidence in the UN route in the build up to military intervention in Iraq (Moens, 
2004: 176). There was the perceived danger that a new UN Resolution would separate the dual goals of 
disarmament and regime change, understood by the Bush administration as part of the same overall goal 
(Moens, 2004: 182).  
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President Bush certainly directs any international social identities along these lines. He 
argues that ‘the civilized world must take seriously the growing threat of terror on a 
catastrophic scale’ (Bush, 2002r) and focuses on the goal of achieving freedom and 
peace in the world (Bush, 2001zf). Bush clearly asserts a leadership position, stating 
that ‘the world is ready for leadership’ (Bush, 2001zf) and at this ‘defining moment in 
history… this country must lead’ (Bush, 2002a). 
 
As opposed to focusing on an international liberal democratic social identity, the Bush 
administration is much more pre-occupied with the notion of ‘coalitions of the willing’, 
or as Kampfner terms, ‘multilateralism a la carte’ (Kampfner, 2004: 159).28 Cameron 
(2002: 68) provides another term, ‘utilitarian multilateralism’, to capture the lack of 
concern for the credentials of those states the USA engaged with on the specific issue of 
terrorism. Coalitions are built, whose membership is based on those that ‘understand it's 
now time to unite to defeat evil’ (Bush, 2001zk), are working to isolate terrorists (Bush, 
2001zv) and are sharing ‘the responsibilities and sacrifices’ of the ‘cause’ (Bush, 
2002o). Whilst Bush suggests that the fundamental principles of this international social 
identity are founded on ‘progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom’ (Bush, 
2001zh), the offer to ‘join this cause’ is extended to ‘[a]ny nation that makes an 
unequivocal commitment against terror’ (Bush, 2002o). 
 
The administration was also deeply concerned with the need to avoid other countries 
influencing the terms of intervention and the prosecution of the war on terror (Hurrell, 
2002: 200).29 As President Bush is reported to have stated, there may come a point 
where they are ‘the only ones left’. He continues, ‘That’s okay with me. We are 
America’ (Woodward, 2002: 81). The Bush administration’s general sentiments are 
summed up in the following statement by President Bush in an interview with Bob 
Woodward (2002: 341): 
 
                                                 
28 The idea of coalitions of the willing is not new to this time period. The idea emerged as a neocon 
initiative in the Defense Planning Guidance 1992, the draft of which was supervised by Wolfowitz, 
Cheney and Libby (Dolan and Cohen, 2006: 43). Debates regarding understandings of coalitions are 
apparent in Woodward (2002: 113; 180; 281). 
29 I must point out though that this was not a consensus across the administration. There was in fact much 
division between those taking a more realist approach to the international realm and those informed by 
neo-conservatism. That the President did appeal for multilateral support is often taken to be a compromise 
between the two (Dolan and Cohen, 2006: 51).   
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action – confident action that will yield positive results provides kind of a slipstream into which reluctant 
nations and leaders can get behind and show themselves that there has been – you know, something 
positive has happened toward peace. 
 
This perspective recognises that nations will never all agree, you just have to act, deal 
with the ‘international hyperventiliation’ (Rumsfeld, 2002b), and they will eventually 
see that the course of action you sought was right. As such a degree of separation and 
distancing is apparent. This is also evident in the following statement: 
 
I understand the propaganda machines are cranked up in the international community that paints our 
country in a bad light (Bush, 2002zzf). 
 
There is no indication that this may be a sign that the particular course of action may be 
‘wrong’, or not beneficial to the world, instead the USA is at times in rhetorical 
opposition to membership of any form of international social identity. Whilst the notion 
that nations will never all agree certainly stands as a truism, this approach to criticism, 
based on absolutism is not conducive to interaction that would serve to generate 
normative influence. 
 
Furthermore, the Bush administration’s approach to international society in general, is 
also very divisive in orientation. The message that you are either with us or against us 
has been heavily plugged by the Bush administration (e.g. Bush, 2001zk), based on a 
divide between those who love freedom and those who are classified as ‘barbaric’ and 
set themselves ‘against the entire world’ (Bush, 2001zze).30 Bush (2002zl) articulates a 
‘straightforward’ choice ‘between a world of fear, or a world of progress’, where the 
‘world community’ must make a stand. Whilst the President argues that the ‘vast 
majority of countries are now on the same side of a moral and ideological divide’ 
(Bush, 2001zzg), Saddam Hussein being isolated ‘from the civilized world’ (Bush, 
2002zr), this binary logic wasn’t popular in much of Europe.31  
 
                                                 
30 There is a danger here that countries such as Syria and Iran are forced into the position of an out-group 
developing their own alternative or oppositional norms, counter to Blair’s strategy of attempted inclusion 
as mentioned in Chapter 4.   
31 The French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Rafferin reproached those with ‘a simplistic vision of war 
between good and evil’, which, whilst not naming the USA or the Bush administration, talks to their 
characterisation of the situation (Moens, 2004: 187). Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief, also 
chided the USA for this binary position, stating, ‘[i]t is all or nothing. For us Europeans it is difficult to 
deal with because we are secular. We do not see the world in such black and white terms’ (cited in 
Kampfner, 2004: 248).  
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Given the emphasis on division and separation from any international social identity 
that falls outside the dominant framework of the war on terror, the normative influence 
of the liberal democratic social identity would appear to be exceptionally weak.  
 
Thus, considering the social identities context as a whole in 2001-2002, the potential 
constraints of the international detention regime are vastly reduced.  
 
 
2. Phase 2 - Attempts to Sustain Contestation: 2003-2004 
‘We do not condone torture. I have never ordered torture. I will never order torture. 
The values of this country are such that torture is not a part of our soul and our being’ 
(Bush, 2004zi) 
   
2.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity 
Criticisms from the human rights and humanitarian social group, regarding the Bush 
administration’s counter-terrorism detention policies, continue to increase in 2003-
2004. HRW and AI published a large number of reports, and wrote various letters to the 
Bush administration expressing concern over the treatment of detainees and their 
indefinite detention. The practices of the Bush administration are characterised as a 
‘backward step for human rights’ (AI, 2003c). The administration’s response again 
employs the strategies of dominance (particularly denials), compartmentalisation and 
intersection representation.  
 
Much of the discourse is based on dominance, dismissing arguments that suggest there 
has been any wrong-doing, and utilising a range of denial techniques, including 
dissociation (Stuckey and Ritter, 2007). Again this is predominantly in terms competing 
for the dominant narrative as opposed to directly appealing to a super-ordinate 
framework. Preceding the release of the infamous pictures from Abu Ghraib, Rumsfeld 
(2004b) addresses the mounting accusations of torture at Guantánamo Bay,32 rejecting 
such claims and stating that: 
 
When I hear those stories, those reports, the thought that comes to my mind is not the detainees and not 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  It is Fidel Castro and the prisoners he holds.  
 
                                                 
32 For example HRW called for a stop to the use of interrogation techniques that amount to torture such as 
‘stress and duress’ (Roth, 2004), suggesting such measures, which are considered contrary to human 
rights, are not the way to fight terrorism. 
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Such statements are significant in that they draw on comparison to strengthen denials, 
placing actions onto others.  
 
When the pictures do break, the administration are faced with accusations that much of 
the blame for the ‘systemic abuse’ (AI, 2004g) of detainees rests with the Bush 
administration, and their lawyers (HRW, 2004e; HRW, 2004f; HRW 2004g; Ross, 
2004); this is firmly rejected by the administration. In response to the pictures 
documenting abuse at Abu Ghraib, the President stresses his repulsion (Bush, 2004zf), 
that ‘[t]hey sickened my stomach’, and that the ‘acts were abhorrent’ (Bush, 2004u).33 
The abuse is restricted to a few people (Bush, 2004s) and Bush (2004r) stresses that this 
is ‘not the way we do things in America’. Consequently, the president is quick to 
dissociate America from these practices, stating that ‘[t]hese humiliating acts do not 
reflect our character’ (Bush, 2004y).  
 
The Bush administration also employs identity-based denials to further dissociate 
themselves from the abuses. For example:  
 
We don't torture people in America. And people who make that claim just don't know anything about our 
country (Bush, 2003zy). 
 
Furthermore:  
 
I don't like it when the values of our country are - are misunderstood because of the actions of some 
people overseas (Bush, 2004zk). 
 
Bush (2004u; 2004w) stresses that investigations are underway, that they are acting to 
stop such practices occurring, and detainees are being treated humanely; a fundamental 
difference distancing them from the practices of dictatorships. Predominantly the 
emphasis is on denials and dismissals and constructing a dominant narrative. However, 
a lack of transparency and accusations of immunity (some of the very factors Bush uses 
to differentiate the practices of the USA from those countries whose human rights 
records they criticise), are brought into the limelight by the human rights and 
humanitarian social group. Indeed, Bush’s (2004zi) statements that the USA ‘do not 
                                                 
33 There is of course no admission that the acts depicted in the photos show torture, they are instead 
classified as abuse. Rumsfeld notes that, ‘[w]hat has been charged so far is abuse, which I believe 
technically is different from torture. I’m not going to address the ‘torture’ word’ (quoted in Hochschild, 
2004). 
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condone torture’, and that the ‘values of this country are such that torture is not a part of 
our soul and our being’, are significantly compromised by memos showing Department 
of Justice Lawyers and Pentagon lawyers trying to work out ways to toughen 
interrogation and redefine torture.  
 
With regards to the terms and conditions of detention, the human rights and 
humanitarian social group also highlight, for example, ‘The Legal Limbo of the 
Guantánamo Detainees’ (AI, 2003d), the denial of the right to a fair trial through the use 
of military commissions (HRW, 2003b), and the deportation of terror suspects to be 
tortured.34 Compartmentalisation (supported by drawing on a super-ordinate 
framework) is again apparent as a response; there is a reminder of the context, the 
dangerous nature of the detainees and the need to keep them off the battlefield. For 
example, Bush (2003x) argues that ‘some terrorists are just plain cold-blooded killers. 
As such, ‘[s]urely nobody wants to let a cold-blooded killer out of prison that would 
help derail the process…it doesn't make any sense’ (Bush, 2003zp). In these 
circumstances the predominant emphasis is on hauling terror suspects in so they are no 
longer a problem (Bush, 2003a; Bush, 2003b). The human rights and humanitarian 
social identity does not appear to be salient.  
 
However, the above is also accompanied by intersection representation, perhaps to 
draw this social identity closer in the face of mounting criticism. For example, Bush 
(2004a) stresses that the USA ‘remains steadfastly committed to upholding the Geneva 
Conventions’; that they ‘are driven to defend the human rights of others’ (Bush, 
2003zc); and have a vision for a ‘more peaceful world’, ‘based upon human rights, 
human dignity and justice’, as well as a world that does not discriminate (Bush. 
2003zzc). Bush further bolsters association with this social identity by drawing from 
history. The President reminds the various audiences that: 
  
We are the nation that liberated continents and concentration camps. We are the nation of the Marshall 
Plan, the Berlin Airlift and the Peace Corps. We are the nation that ended the oppression of Afghan 
women, and we are the nation that closed the torture chambers of Iraq (Bush, 2003zc). 
 
                                                 
34 AI further describes Guantánamo as ‘an affront to the rule of law’ (2004h), as a ‘Scandal’ (2003e) and 
as ‘A Deepening Stain on US Justice’ (2004i). Both AI and HRW, as well as ICRC, have also 
experienced problems in gaining access to detainees and court proceedings (see HRW, 2004h; HRW, 
2004i; HRW, 2004j; also Rose 2004b: 106-108. The latter details ICRC’s 2003 concerns of this nature).  
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On the UN International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, Bush (2004zj) also 
states that: 
 
The non-negotiable demands of human dignity must be protected without reference to race, gender, creed, 
or nationality. Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right, and we are committed to building a 
world where human rights are respected and protected by the rule of law.  
 
Torture is firmly associated with ‘repressive regimes’ (Bush, 2004zj). Additionally, 
‘Terrorists and their allies’ are framed as the enemies of human rights, believing that 
‘the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Bill of Rights, and every 
charter of liberty ever written, are lies, to be burned and destroyed and forgotten’ (Bush, 
2004zu).  
 
However, regardless of these attempts at intersection representation, given the 
accusations from this social group, the Bush administration’s association with this 
social identity is highly compromised. An apparent desire to draw this social identity 
closer is not accepted.  
 
2.2 The Legal Social Identity 
Challenges from the legal social group also intensify in 2003-2004. After the successful 
conviction of John Walker Lindh in October 2002, and the 110 year jail sentence 
handed out to Richard Reid (the so called shoe-bomber) in January 2003 (see BBC, 
2003b), the Bush administration began to encounter difficulties with the courts in 
relation to terror suspects. In an Opinion issued on December 18th 2003, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit disagreed with the Bush administration’s designation of 
Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant and deemed that he could not be detained 
indefinitely on the President’s determination as he was not picked up in ‘a zone of 
active combat’. In June of 2004, the Bush administration received another set back, this 
time from the Supreme Court. In Hamdi vs Rumsfeld (2004), the Court did support 
Hamdi’s detention until the end of the conflict in Afghanistan, however, the traditional 
military powers of the president were challenged with regards to the broader conflict 
with al-Qaeda. Restrictions were placed on the president’s powers in that they were not 
considered to be indefinite. On the same day, in Rasul vs Bush (2004), the US Supreme 
Court ruled that foreign nationals detained at the Guantánamo detention facilities, had 
the writ of habeas corpus, they had the right to challenge the legality of their detention. 
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Federal jurisdiction was deemed to apply to Guantánamo, even though the USA did not 
have ‘ultimate sovereignty’.  
 
Jack Goldsmith, former head of the Office of Legal Council (OLC), October 2003- June 
2004, suggests that US ‘legal culture had become very suspicious of the 
administration’s grand assertions of executive power’ (2007: 135). Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s opinion (in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld) that the administration did not have a 
‘blank check’ in wartime is one indication that previous attempts at dominance and 
compartmentalisation were not accepted. However, these Court rulings, whilst 
significant did not demand a great deal from the Bush administration and on the whole 
upheld the traditional war time powers of detention.   
 
Further legal challenges did emerge in 2003-2004 though, in relation to the 
establishment of military commissions. Jack Goldsmith draws attention to the military 
lawyers who, ‘committed to their own well-developed legal system – the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice – threw up roadblock after roadblock to the[ir] development’ (2007: 
121). Rose (2004b: 136) also suggests that when the rules for military commissions 
were released in 2003, ‘they provoked outrage among lawyers’ as they restricted the 
defendant’s right to choose his lawyer and denied the defense counsel the means 
required to prepare an effective defence.  
 
In response the Bush administration employs dominance (predominantly in terms of 
constructing a dominant narrative through denial), compartmentalisation (supported 
by a super-ordinate framework), and elements of intersection representation to 
counter the challenges. In response to questions on interrogation techniques, Bush 
(2004zg) uses identity-based denials (dominance) and a degree of intersection 
representation stressing that:  
 
The instructions went out to our people to adhere to law. That ought to comfort you. We're a nation of 
law. We adhere to laws.    
 
As law is part of US history, we are asked to assume that current actions are in 
compliance. Accusations that the USA is no longer a nation of laws are dismissed as 
‘unfair’ criticism. Bush (2004zzh) argues: 
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our courts have made a ruling, they looked at the jurisdiction, the right of people in Guantánamo to have 
habeas review, and so we're now complying with the court's decisions.  
 
However, at the same time, Bush (2004zzh) highlights the dilemma faced by the 
administration, that ‘these are people that got scooped up off a battlefield, attempting to 
kill U.S. troops’ and there is a danger that if released they will ‘come back to kill again’. 
Whilst Bush (2004zl), on the one hand draws attention to America’s proud history of 
equality before the law,35 where ‘people are innocent until proven guilty’ (Bush, 
2004y)36 on the other the President suggests that the counter-terrorism context is 
exceptional. The intelligence gathered from detainees at Guantánamo is juxtaposed with 
the importance of letting ‘the world know that we fully understand our obligations in a 
society that honors rule of law’ (Bush, 2004zzh). This highlights a strategy of 
compartmentalisation, informed by a dominant super-ordinate framework, challenging 
legal constraint in these circumstances. Alberto Gonzales’ private statement, ‘I don’t see 
how terrorists who violate the laws of war can get the protections of the laws of war’, is 
also illustrative of compartmentalisation in relation to terror suspects (Goldsmith, 
2007: 41). Such a strategy, supporting dominance, suggests that law is characterised as 
a constraint in the counter-terrorism context, as something to work around or bring into 
line.  
 
2.3 The Military Social Identity 
In 2003-2004 the US Military were involved in three wars, in Afghanistan, Iraq and the 
global war on terror. This certainly reduced the scope for challenge from this social 
group; military generals and officers would not want to create a public backlash whilst 
the troops were in combat and risking their lives (Hasian, 2007).37  
 
Individual concerns did however emerge in this period. For example, in a meeting with 
Jaymie Durnan, January 8th 2003 (a Special Assistant to Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy 
Secretary to Paul Wolfowitz), Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora stressed, ‘In 
                                                 
35  This is in relation to ‘The Civil Rights Act of 1964 [which] gives all Americans another reason to be 
proud of our country … the laws of this nation and the good heart of this nation are on the side of 
equality’ (Bush, 2004zl). 
36 This statement is in relation to accusations and investigations into abuse by US soldiers. 
37 Hasian (2007: 697) suggests that scope for criticism from the military was very much restricted as 
officers and generals would not want to ‘give the impression that they are leading some rebellion against 
the political leadership’. This meant that options such as mass resignations were ruled out in favour of 
more gradual tactics of reform. Involvement in the actions that were disapproved of further restricted the 
form that criticism could take. Hasian suggests this had to be directed at the ‘decision makers who are 
violating the nation’s guiding principles’ (2007: 697). However, Hasian also notes a desire not to 
embarrass the President.   
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addition to their unlawfulness, the abusive practices – once they become known to the 
American public and military – would have severe policy repercussions: the public and 
the military would repudiate them’ (Mora, 2004: 10). In a meeting the following day, 
Mora goes on to stress, that: 
 
Even if one wanted to authorize the U.S. military to conduct coercive interrogations, as was the case in 
Guantánamo, how could one do so without profoundly altering its core values and character? Societal 
education and military training inculcated in our soldiers American values adverse to mistreatment. 
Would we now have the military abandon these values altogether? (2004: 11). 
 
Mora’s memo emphasises that members of the military involved in coercive 
interrogation were not a ‘rogue element’ (2004: 12), and that there was a chain of 
command to the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DoD). He also argues that 
such practices could not be justified by the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario as this was not the 
case with detainees in Guantánamo. Mora ends his memo stating that he is confident 
that prisoner abuses stopped after January 15th 2003, however discussions about the 
OLC memos and the president’s authority to authorise torture continue.  
 
I do not claim that we can take Mora’s opinions to reflect the whole of the military’s 
thinking on the issue of detention and abuse. Indeed, General Myers was quick to 
comment in a television interview shortly after the release of the photos from Abu 
Ghraib that they were isolated incidents by ‘rogue soldiers’ (Zimbardo, 2007: 325). 
Furthermore, Lieutenant-Colonel Jerald Phifer had previously written to the (DoD) in 
October 2002 about frustrations that harsher interrogation techniques were not 
authorized in Guantánamo. Certainly, there was a divergence of opinion on issues of 
detention. Yet the presence of discontent was definitely apparent, leading to the leaking 
of the photos and the later release of personal accounts from soldiers referring to the 
degree of uneasiness caused by the withdrawal of Geneva protections and the confusion 
that this produced (Zimbardo, 2007: 424).  
 
The Bush administration’s discourse during 2003-2004 in relation to the military skims 
over this contestation and is very similar to that in 2001-2002. In this context, the Bush 
administration largely employs a dominance strategy. The US military are ‘called to 
defend our freedom’, and ‘to protect America and our friends and allies from these 
thugs’ (Bush, 2003i), suggestive of a directing approach. The importance of the US 
military in the dominant framework of the war on terror is also frequently expressed, 
 182 
embedding them in this context. Indeed, troops are politicised to a degree, as to criticise 
the war is deemed to be a criticism of the troops whilst they are fighting in the field 
(Lindsay, 2003: 538). 
 
When rallying the troops, Bush (2003a) repeatedly stresses that the enemy ‘kill without 
regard for the rules of war’, that they are ‘nothing but a bunch of cold-blooded killers, 
and that’s the way we’re going to treat them’, that ‘terrorists will not be stopped by 
mercy or conscience’, that ‘[t]here are no rules of war for these cold-blooded killers’ 
(Bush, 2003i) and that the enemy has ‘rejected every rule of warfare and morality’ 
(Bush, 2003zc). These statements construct a dehumanized image of the enemy, 
antithetical to aspects of military culture, which then provides a framework within 
which the military are tasked to perform.38 Such a dominant agenda would certainly 
serve to reduce any potential for public challenge to the Bush administration’s detention 
policies from this social group.     
 
To accompany such an approach there are also numerous sentiments of support,39 an 
emphasis on defense spending, gratitude to military families, and prominence given to 
the ‘exceptional skill and courage’ (Bush, 2004w), alongside capability that the US 
military has shown, bolstering this social group. The Bush administration employs a 
degree of intersection representation to assist in embedding the US military in this 
framework. President Bush also speaks to the norms of this social group stressing the 
clearness of the mission at hand, that ‘no one who falls will be forgotten’ (Bush, 2003s), 
that war has been ‘forced upon us’ (Bush, 2003g), and that the US military ‘serve the 
great ideals of America’ (Bush, 2003zc) as ‘part of a great force for good in this world’ 
(Bush, 2004zh). Additionally, the role of the Generals in planning, deciding troop 
numbers, and reporting back to the President the situation on the ground is frequently 
stressed (e.g. Bush, 2003zh; Bush, 2003zzb; Bush, 2004m; Bush, 2004zzh).40 Defence 
of the group is also apparent in relation to accusations of abuse. With regards to Abu 
                                                 
38 Hasian (2007: 708) also identifies ‘Rumsfeld’s constantly vacillating position on the treatment of 
detainees’, which has been recognized as a contributing factor to abuse. This in turn, has ‘helped tarnish 
the reputation of all the American troops who relied on expert leadership’ (2007: 708).  
39 Bush often refers to the website set up by the Department of Defense – AmericaSupportsYou.mil. 
40 This addresses accusations that there was not a clear military strategy (Woodward, 2006: 336) and that 
there was a mismatch between military and political concerns (2006: 300). The Military position 
reportedly could not get through to the administration. Woodward indeed refers to the administration 
closing off any negative or counter positions from the military (e.g. 2006: 371). Strachen (2006: 65) goes 
further to criticise this subordination of, as opposed to harmonisation with, military advice.  
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Ghraib, Bush (2004t) states that ‘the actions of the people in that prison do not reflect 
the nature of the men and women who wear our uniform’.  
 
A dominance strategy is therefore apparent both publicly and, one suspects, privately, 
where the US military are embedded in the framework of the war on terror. 
Intersection representation is also evident in the public discourse facilitating such an 
approach. 
 
2.4 The United Nations Social Identity 
With regards to the UN in 2003-2004, disagreements are much more overt. Whilst 
disputes are predominantly over the invasion of Iraq, they also involve issues relating to 
detention. For example, the Human Rights Commission ruled in March 2004, that 
governments have a responsibility to ensure human rights violations do not occur 
wherever they have effective control, thus extending these provisions to Guantánamo 
Bay. The importance of human rights treaty obligations, as opposed to just the laws of 
war (the predominant focus in the discourse of the Bush administration), is also 
stressed. Kofi Annan furthermore reminds states that international law is not a luxury 
that can be discarded, instead it is ‘the platform upon which the edifice of democracy 
rests’ (Annan, 2004b). Despite these criticisms, the Bush administration’s discourse 
regarding the UN again demonstrates dominance through directing and defining, as 
well as dismissal and denial. This is also again supplemented by intersection 
representation. 
 
President Bush begins 2003, in his State of the Union address, stressing that the USA 
does not need the authority of the UN to invade Iraq (Bush, 2003b). This theme 
continues in March 2003 as Bush (2003m) asserts: 
 
I'm confident the American people understand that when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we 
will act, and we really don't need United Nations approval to do so. 
 
This dismissal represents a technique of dominance as the social identity is only 
deemed credible, in terms of their fit with the overarching and super-ordinate 
framework of the war on terror as understood by the administration. Other techniques to 
achieve dominance again include defining the purpose of the UN and directing the 
social identity largely on a very narrow issue basis. For example, ‘[w]e have called on 
the United Nations to fulfil its charter and stand by its demand that Iraq disarm’ (Bush, 
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2003b); ‘[w]hy doesn't the United Nations stand up as a body and show the world that it 
has got the capacity to keep the peace’ (Bush, 2003c); and ‘[i]f the members rise to this 
moment, then the Council will fulfil its founding purpose’ (Bush, 2003l).41  
 
This strategy is facilitated by a degree of intersection representation, reflected in 
Bush’s statements that the USA is ‘enforcing the demands of the United Nation[s]’ 
(2003r), that ‘[i]n confronting Iraq, the United States is also showing our commitment 
to effective international institutions’, that ‘I was the person that took the issue to the 
United Nations’ and ‘[w]e’ve been working through the United Nations’ (2003m). 
Whilst this may not be true of all members of the Bush administration, Bush’s 
assertions serve to construct a degree of identification with the UN, focusing on the 
elements shared by the UN and the USA. For example:  
 
As an original signer of the U.N. Charter, the United States of America is committed to the United 
Nations. And we show that commitment by working to fulfil the U.N.'s stated purposes, and give meaning 
to its ideals. The founding documents of the United Nations and the founding documents of America 
stand in the same tradition (Bush, 2003zv).  
 
This demonstration of intersection representation accompanies denials that the 
administration went round the UN, and reminders of Resolution 1441 (Bush, 2003zf) as 
well as the previous Resolutions that were argued to provide a basis for military 
intervention. 
 
Thus, the strategies employed in relation to the UN show dominance through 
directing, defining and dismissal, as well as denial that the USA has gone round the 
UN. Dominance is further served by intersection representation, narrowly 
highlighting shared values and identification. Whilst much of the discourse suggests a 
lack of potential normative influence from this social identity, we must also note that in 
2003-2004 the administration was becoming increasingly aware of how crucial the UN 
would be to the political process following the initial conflict in Iraq. As Kampfner 
(2004: 351) writes, such rhetoric was taken by one senior UK official in Iraq as 
evidence ‘the Bush administration had ‘slowly and reluctantly’ begun to understand ‘the 
                                                 
41 Saddam Hussein is framed as a threat to the UN in that, ‘the more he ignored them, the weaker the 
United Nations became’ (Bush, 2004c). 
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legitimising role of the UN’’.42 However, this does not yet extend to US detention 
policies.  
 
2.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity   
An international liberal democratic social identity is again not very apparent in the 
discourse of the Bush administration. Instead, the emphasis is on issue-specific 
coalitions and the spread of freedom around the world; with the USA leading the world, 
yet separate from the constraints of any social identity in this sphere. This is in a context 
where there is significant criticism regarding the decision to invade Iraq, particularly 
from representatives of European states,43 and increasing concern and contestation 
about US detention policies. Various scholars have noted declining US legitimacy and 
influence, alongside a growth in anti-Americanism, particularly in Europe, as a result of 
the prison abuse scandals and US detention policies (Kagan, 2004; Nye, 2004; Tucker 
and Hendrickson, 2004). Kahl (2007: 8) also highlights the ‘widespread sentiment that 
the United States has discarded the Geneva Conventions altogether, including their 
prohibitions against targeting civilians’ in 2003-2004.44 The strategies employed by the 
Bush administration in this context are again reflective of separation, and dominance.  
 
In the discourse assessed, the Bush administration clearly continues to assume a leading 
role for the USA in the world. For example, Bush argues that ‘America is still the leader 
in freedom's cause’ (2003i), that America is the ‘beacon’ for free society (2004p), 
spreading ‘freedom across the earth’ (2004zu), and that ‘America is leading the world 
with confidence and moral clarity’ (2004zp). As such, the USA is, to a degree, set apart 
from the rest of the world. The President often refers to the USA as communicating 
with the world, in terms of laying ‘out the facts for the world to see’ (Bush, 2003i), 
sending a ‘signal to the world’ through action (Bush, 2003r), or indeed being 
‘misunderstood’ due to the pictures of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib (2004zk).Scholars 
have indeed commented on the ‘very serious divide’, based on both policy and doctrine 
                                                 
42 Although Woodward (2004: 360) reports that this was not to be taken as the UN running the country. 
Indeed, in his 2006 book, State of Denial, Woodward also highlights Garner’s difficulties getting the 
administration to engage more with the UN and ‘internationalize’ the effort (2006: 135).     
43 These are often dismissed as simply reflecting the ‘ascendency of power in Europe’ (Woodward, 2004: 
346). 
44 Kahl also refers to the Pew Global Attitudes study from June 2003, where ‘more than 90 percent of 
Jordanian, Moroccan, Palestinian, and Turkish respondents and more than 80 percent of Indonesian and 
Pakistani respondents felt that the United States “didn’t try very hard” to avoid Iraqi civilian casualties’ 
(2007: 7). Kahl adds that this ‘view was shared outside the Muslim world by more than 70 percent of 
Brazilians, French, Russians, and South Koreans’ (Kahl, 2007: 7). 
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that ‘separates the United States from its closest friends and allies’ (Dombrowski and 
Payne, 2003: 400). 
 
When Bush does refer to an ‘international community’ this appears to be highly 
dependent on the immediate audience, for example  when holding a joint press 
conference with Tony Blair in Northern Ireland (2003t), with Prime Minister Berlusconi 
(2004zf), and during a Presidential debate with John Kerry in 2004 (2004zy).45 In the 
first reference, with Tony Blair, Bush (2003t) remarks that: 
 
We believe that the just demands of the international community must be enforced, not ignored. We 
believe this so strongly that we are acting on our convictions.  
 
Two things are interesting about this statement, first it provides a very one-dimensional 
portrayal of the international community based on their demands for Iraq to disarm, and 
second, it demonstrates a major contradiction. On the one hand there is consensus in the 
international community; on the other there is a need to be separate and act alone. This 
supports the notion above that the USA is, to a degree, set apart from any international 
social identities. 
 
America’s task is understood as one of advancing ‘human freedom in a world at peace’ 
(Bush, 2003a). Bush (2003a) argues, that this ‘is the charge history has given us, and 
that is the charge we will keep’. As such, direction is apparent on these lines. Bush 
asserts that the world must ‘rise to this moment’, to ‘keep the peace’ with regards to 
Iraq (2003e), and ‘come together’ to send a ‘clear message’ to Iran and Syria (2003zq). 
The interests of the world are defined on the basis of a ‘spread of democratic values, 
because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder’ (Bush, 2003l).  
 
Bush also argues that Europe and America in particular must ‘work together to promote 
… human rights and human dignity and rule of law and freedom and justice’ (2004ze; 
2003ze). Whilst such words do begin to echo the liberal democratic social identity, this 
is very limited in the discourse assessed. Indeed, association with this social identity is 
                                                 
45 One other reference was apparent in 2003-2004 by President Bush, in a radio address to the nation 
(2003zza), however, this is in the context of a reference to the international coalition. This is based on the 
speeches and statements assessed in this thesis and may not include all references in this period. Mention 
of the international community is however found in the discourse of Colin Powell. 
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also restricted due to the level of contestation apparent with regards to the key priorities 
in the war on terror.   
 
More prominent again internationally is the emphasis on coalitions. Bush (2003za) 
highlights the fact that ‘America and a large coalition of nations are waging a global and 
unrelenting war against the terrorists’. Common interests and common goals are shared 
among members of the coalition (Bush, 2003zza; Bush, 2004zk), the numbers this 
involves fluctuate depending on the time period and the definition of the mission, this 
ranges from 30 (Bush, 2004zw) to 84 (Bush, 2004i). In this context Bush (2004b) 
suggests there has been an increase in international cooperation between ‘like-minded 
nations’, particularly with regards to the detention of terror suspects (Bush, 2003zi). 
Accusations that the USA is going alone are dismissed (Bush, 2004zw).46   
 
Bush also refers to a ‘community of free nations’, suggestive of a broadly defined 
international social identity founded on this fundamental element of being free. The free 
world is argued to have an obligation to make Iraq successful (2004y), and cannot ‘be 
neutral in the fight between civilization and chaos’ (2003zu). Bush (2003y) extends 
membership and American friendship to all those who want peace and anyone ‘who 
works and sacrifices for freedom’. However, this is juxtaposed with a continuation of 
divisions, based on the ‘principle: either you’re with us, or you’re with the enemy’ 
(Bush, 2003a); a world where the ‘civilized world’ is against the terrorists (Bush, 
2003zu).  
 
Thus, there are a variety of dynamics at play with regards to international social 
identities and the USA. The liberal democratic social identity is certainly not very 
prominent. The emphasis tends to be on coalitions based on countering terrorism, 
dealing with Iraq, and establishing world peace by the means privileged by the 
administration. Dominance is highly apparent in terms of super-ordinate priorities, as is 
a degree of separation of the USA from any international social identity partly through 
an emphasis on leadership.   
 
 
                                                 
46 Indeed Bush states, ‘[i]t denigrates an alliance to say we're going alone, to discount their sacrifices. 
You cannot lead an alliance if you say, you're going alone…They're sacrificing with us’ (Bush, 2004zw). 
In addition, Wehner (2008) cites multilateral efforts in relation to Libya’s abandonment of its chemical 
and nuclear weapons programmes in opposition to accusation that the USA is going it alone. 
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3. Phase 3 - The Unravelling of Contestation? 2005-2006 
‘The men and women who protect us should not have to fear lawsuits filed by terrorists 
because they're doing their jobs’ (Bush, 2006zt) 
 
3.1 The Human Rights and Humanitarian Social Identity 
Criticism from human rights groups such as AI and HRW was again highly evident in 
2005-2006. There were continued calls for the closure of Guantánamo Bay, highlighting 
the plight of child prisoners (e.g. AI 2006b),47 as well as the suicide attempts (e.g. AI 
2006c) and hunger strikes (e.g. AI, 2006d) taking place at the detention facility. AI 
argued that ‘this prison is a disgrace to American values and international law’ (Khan, 
2005a). Additional reports and testimony were also provided by both organisations on 
the US practice of rendition (e.g. AI, 2006e),48 and the unfair trials proposed through 
the use of military commissions (e.g. HRW, 2006a).  
 
AI and HRW have highlighted these concerns alongside the publication of testimony 
from prisoners, as well as from US soldiers who have witnessed or been caught up in 
the abuse of detainees (e.g. AI, 2005i; HRW, 2006b). Again, both organisations have 
called for the prosecution of those involved in torture and abuse much further up the 
chain of command than has been the case to date. For HRW this stretches as far as 
Donald Rumsfeld (HRW, 2006c), George Tenet (HRW, 2005d) and President Bush 
(HRW, 2005e). The Bush administration has again responded with denials, dismissals 
and trivialisation of these accusations, as well as challenging such criticisms by 
suggesting they serve the interests of the terrorists.49 The main strategy is dominance, 
supported by elements of compartmentalisation and intersection representation.  
 
The public dialogue between the Bush administration and the human rights and 
humanitarian social group is certainly very tense in 2005-2006. 50 The Bush 
administration has responded to allegations of torture and abuse with forceful denials. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (2005a), when pressed on the specifics of the CIA 
                                                 
47 As well as the children of prisoners.  
48 One prominent example is the testimony of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen who was in transit in New 
York when he was detained and sent to Jordan then Syria. He was reportedly tortured (LaHoodfor, 2005).  
49 This is accompanied by a great deal of absolutism. Interestingly, Woodward (2006: 406) notes that 
Bush was advised to be less pig-headed regarding his critics.  
50 Whilst the discourse of the Bush administration does not specifically address this social group very 
frequently, members speak to the concerns that the human rights and humanitarian social group have 
highlighted, often through journalists. This provides the basis for my assertions. Criticisms that abuse is 
‘Systematic and Chronic’ (HRW, 2005f), and that the government has been ‘creating [a] "climate of 
torture"’ (AI, 2006e) are particularly damning. 
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rendition flights in a Sky News interview with Julie Etchingham, employs identity 
based denials, stating: 
 
We are a country of laws and we do not believe in torture as appropriate in the international system.  
 
Rice (2005b) also stresses US obligations under domestic law and international 
conventions, which ‘extend to U.S. personnel wherever they are’. Porter Goss (head of 
the CIA June 2004-May 2006) has also made comments along similar lines, stating:  
 
This agency does not do torture. Torture does not work. We use lawful capabilities to collect vital 
information, and we do it in a variety of unique and innovative ways, all of which are legal and none of 
which are torture (cited in Diamond, 2005).  
 
Goss alludes to the ‘huge amount of misinformation swirling about on the subject of 
detainees’ (Diamond, 2005). HRW however are quick to point to the existence of 
several contrary reports by CIA officials (HRW, 2005d).51 
 
Bush (2006zt) employs a similar tactic noting the ‘conflicting information about 
Guantánamo’ that has been presented to the public, and stresses that ICRC has the 
‘opportunity to meet privately with all who are held there’ (emphasis added),52 and 
that the facility has received visits from ‘government officials from more than 30 
countries, and delegations from international organizations’. Bush argues that 
Guantánamo does live up to the obligations of ‘those who espouse human rights’, that 
there are ‘very few prison systems around the world that have seen such scrutiny’, and 
he invites critics to visit the facility to see for themselves (2005ze; 2005zi). 
Guantánamo is portrayed as a facility US troops and the American people can take pride 
in, one which is vital in the context of the war on terror, keeping dangerous people off 
the battlefield, and where detainees are treated humanely (Bush, 2005ze; Bush, 2006d). 
Bush (2006zt) also displaces some of the criticism arguing that ‘America has no interest 
in being the world's jailer’, however, ‘many countries have refused to take back their 
nationals held at the facility’. Whilst context is mentioned as a justification for 
Guantánamo (suggesting a degree of compartmentalisation), and there is some 
                                                 
51 Goss is also reported to have refused to discuss reports of secret detention centres in Eastern Europe 
suggesting that these sorts of stories have the capacity to provoke terror attacks as acts of revenge, 
particularly against allies that are accused of being involved in capture and interrogation (Diamond, 
2005).  
52 This is in a context where, in 2005, John Bellinger admitted keeping some prisoners away from the 
ICRC in other locations (BBC, 2005b). 
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displacement of responsibility, the predominant focus is on denials that the Bush 
administration is acting inappropriately. This stands in stark contrast to the reports and 
headlines coming out of both AI and HRW.  
 
President Bush is dismissive of these accusations, particularly the assertion by Irene 
Khan (2005b), Secretary-General of AI, that Guantánamo is ‘the gulag of our times’. 
The President referred to such allegations as ‘absurd’, stressing that ‘every single 
complaint against the detainees’ is investigated (2005za). President Bush (2005zz) also 
rejects reports that suggest the USA has been complicit in torture, even with regards to 
accusations of using secret prisons in Europe.53 Furthermore, he suggests that: 
 
It seemed like to me they based some of their decisions on the word of – and the allegations – by people 
who were held in detention, people who hate America, people that had been trained in some instances to 
disassemble – that means not tell the truth. And so it was an absurd report. It just is (Bush, 2005za).  
 
Through association with terrorists this social identity is significantly challenged.54 As 
Edmund McWilliams (2005), Retired Senior US Foreign Service Officer, suggests, such 
forceful dismissal and disparaging responses very rarely come from the leaders of 
democratic states, especially those claiming to be at the forefront of human rights 
promotion, as well as leading the campaign against the use of torture. The Bush 
administration has gone so far as to imply that accusations of human rights violations 
are part of the terrorist strategy (e.g. in the above quote, see also Goldsmith, 2007: 59). 
Whilst this may be true in some cases, this does not change the evidence of abuse, the 
memos redefining torture, and the Bush administration’s legal wrangles to render the 
Geneva Conventions non-applicable to ‘enemy combatants’ (also see Roberts, 2007: 
200). Indeed, as Irene Khan (2005c), Secretary General of AI has stated: 
 
President Bush's claim that prisoners at Guantánamo Bay "are being treated in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention" is belied by his own Executive Order of February 7, 2002 in which he ordered such 
treatment "to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity." The enormous loophole he 
                                                 
53 Direct reference is again made to the human rights and humanitarian social group in 2006, where the 
President responds to a question referring to the critical reports of AI and HRW, regarding the ‘U.S. 
handling of terrorist suspects’; the President states, ‘I haven't seen the report, but if they're saying we 
tortured people, they're wrong. Period’ (Bush, 2006r).     
54 Interestingly, the President neglects to mention who the allegations would come from if not those who 
suffered the abuse, hence people who reportedly ‘hate America’, as is stated in the above quote. Thus, any 
such criticism appears to put the accuser, in line with terrorists. 
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authorized gave a green light for abuse, from the use of stress positions for up to twenty-hour[s]…to 
prolonged isolation, the use of dogs and sexual humiliation.55 
 
Given the admission that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was water-boarded, a technique 
employed three times in the 2001-2003 period, there is little surprise Bush’s 
reassurances that ‘[t]hese procedures were designed to be safe, to comply with our laws, 
our Constitution, and our treaty obligations’ were not accepted by the human rights and 
humanitarian social group.  
 
Nevertheless, Bush (2006zt) goes on to stress the lawfulness of the CIA program 
employing ‘alternative’ interrogation techniques, the necessity of and successes from 
the program in terms of intelligence gained and that the program remains ‘one of the 
most vital tools in our war against the terrorists’. Such arguments are presented in a way 
that suggests the right of the USA to pursue such practices should be obvious to all 
(Foot, 2006). HRW’s response to Bush’s arguments was to demand cruelty be called 
what it is (Malinowski, 2006), and highlight the factual inaccuracies that have resulted 
from the CIA program.56 
 
In response to these and other accusations the Bush administration has dismissed these 
claims as helpful to terrorists, inaccurate and false even where there is evidence to the 
contrary. In doing so the Bush administration’s association with the human rights and 
humanitarian social identity, is extremely strained and distant. Intersection 
representation is apparent to a degree, drawing the social identity slightly closer. For 
example, Bush stresses the USA’s history of speaking out for ‘human rights and human 
dignity’ and that they will continue to do so (2005c), that the USA is a country ‘that 
safeguards human rights and human dignity’ (2005j), and that human rights ‘are not 
determined by race or nationality, or diminished by distance (2005zh). However, the 
strong emphasis on denials restricts this as it is an extremely confrontational way to 
interact with this social group. 
 
3.2 The Legal Social Identity 
Contestations with the legal social group also continue in 2005-2006 with the Supreme 
Court ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006). This ruling is generally seen as a critical 
                                                 
55 Khan goes on to cite Rumsfeld’s approval of unlawful techniques in December 2002. 
56 One piece of information, ‘which turned out to be entirely wrong – was used in Secretary of State Colin 
Powell’s speech to the United Nations to justify war with Iraq’ (Malinowski, 2006). 
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turning point in the administration’s counter-terrorism detention policies as the court 
struck down the system of military commissions authorized by President Bush in 
November 2001, largely because they lacked congressional approval and did not 
comply with the US military’s Uniform Code of Military Justice or the Geneva 
Conventions’ Common Article 3 (Roberts, 2007). The military commissions were 
deemed to fall short of fair trial standards. Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Common Article 3 applied to the armed conflict with al-Qaeda. Thus, the Court had 
ruled that all detainees, regardless of the presidential determination of status, must be 
treated humanely in all circumstance. This had implications beyond the military 
commissions that were the focus of the case, and put the administration’s CIA 
interrogation program on the line. These factors forced the administration to reveal 
many of the practices previously kept secret, in order to seek congressional approval as 
the Court’s ruling demanded. The Bush administration’s response again employs the 
strategies of dominance, compartmentalisation and intersection representation.   
 
As with the previous periods, the identity that ‘we’re a nation of law’ (Bush, 2005zzb), 
and that ‘any activity we conduct, is within the law’ (Bush, 2005zz) is stressed. Law 
and legality are continually bolstered as central to the US identity. The President 
reminds the audience on several occasions that he has taken ‘an oath to uphold the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States’ (2006i; 2005zzg), thus intersection 
representation is evident to a degree.  
 
The overall perspective is, however, very much one of policy driving law as opposed to 
law driving policy, suggesting a dominant and directing approach to this social 
identity. Law has got to fit with the demands of fighting a global war on terror, if not it 
is deemed to be a hindrance. For example, when the CIA program of interrogation of 
‘high value’ detainees was dealt a serious blow by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the Bush administration’s response was to highlight the value of this 
program,57 and that the personnel involved would not be able to proceed if they thought 
they were violating the law. This is as opposed to recognising any basis for these 
restrictive protections. The Bush administration focuses on the ‘vagueness’ of Common 
Article 3 to make this argument. The basis of the argument is that these ‘alternative’ 
                                                 
57 As Bush (2006zx) states, the ‘most potent tool we have in protecting America and foiling terrorist 
attacks, … is the CIA program to question the world’s most dangerous terrorists and to get their secrets’. 
The debate surrounding this program is constructed as one ‘that really is going to define whether or not 
we can protect ourselves’ (Bush, 2006zv). Law, could therefore, stand in the way of national security and 
the fight against terror. 
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‘tough’ interrogation techniques are needed, and if the law is deemed to have been 
broken in this respect, it is the law’s fault, not the personnel or the policy. The Bush 
administration set out to attack the ‘vague standards’ (Bush, 2006zv), providing 
clarification through the Detainee Treatment Act 2005, and the Military Commissions 
Act 2006. The Supreme Court is blamed for introducing this lack of clarity.  
 
The Geneva Conventions were also portrayed as a hindrance directly on the battlefield. 
In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Gonzales 
stated that ‘no one can expect members of our military to read Miranda warnings to 
terrorists captured on the battlefield, or provide terrorists on the battlefield immediate 
access to counsel, or maintain a strict chain of custody for evidence. Nor should terrorist 
trials compromise sources and methods for gathering intelligence, or prohibit the 
admission of probative hearsay evidence’ (cited in HRW, 2006a).58 These laws are 
portrayed as harmful, and counter-normative behaviour is denied in this context, 
suggesting a degree of compartmentalisation is also apparent.  
 
In addition to being a hindrance to US strategy, law is also characterised by the Bush 
administration as a ‘weapon’ of the ‘enemy’. This theme is apparent in The National 
Defense Strategy (Department of Defense, 2005: 6), where there is a passage describing 
the challenge posed ‘by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international 
fora, judicial processes, and terrorism’. Rumsfeld is reported to have been particularly 
concerned with ‘lawfare’ and ‘the judicialization of international politics’ from the early 
days of the administration (Goldmith, 2007: 59).59 President Bush also characterises law 
as a weapon of the terrorists, significantly challenging this social identity by stating: 
 
I'm asking that Congress make it clear that captured terrorists cannot use the Geneva Conventions as a 
basis to sue our personnel in courts – in U.S. courts. The men and women who protect us should not have 
to fear lawsuits filed by terrorists because they're doing their jobs (Bush, 2006zt). 
                                                 
58 Gonzalez himself came under criticism in this period. HRW cite a letter addressed to Gonzalez from  
‘more than 100 U.S. law professors’ which ‘stated unequivocally that waterboarding is torture, and is a 
criminal felony punishable under the U.S. federal criminal code’ (HRW, 2006d).   
59 ‘Lawfare’ refers to enemy tactics to criticise the US for legal violations as they are unable to match the 
US militarily. One example noted by Goldsmith is enemies claiming they have been tortured, damaging 
US identity and support. This was mentioned in the previous section on the human rights and 
humanitarian social group. Woodward (2006: 486) also notes Rumsfeld’s frustrations with the restrictions 
and of Parliaments and bureaucracy. Rumsfeld is reported to have viewed Europe ‘and the human rights 
industry that supported their universal jurisdiction aspirations’ as employing a form of lawfare to serve as 
a check on U.S. power (Goldsmith, 2007: 59). This perspective surfaced in the NDS 2005.    
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Bush (2006zl) also emphasises the protection of the public, and asserts that ‘[t]he 
American people need to know that this ruling, as I understand it, won't cause killers to 
be put out on the street’. 
 
The Supreme Court ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld certainly ‘impaired’ the Bush 
administration’s ‘ability to prosecute terrorists through military commissions, and … 
put in question the future of the CIA program’ (Bush, 2006zt).60 However, the Court 
also declined to hear the case of Jose Padilla. This decision served to uphold the ‘Bush 
administration’s assertion that it can unilaterally and indefinitely detain without charge 
anyone, anywhere, on the grounds that they are an “enemy combatant”’ (HRW, 2006f). 
Bush (2006zn), indeed, cites the court ruling as upholding the ‘decision about creating 
Guantánamo in the first place’ or at least, that they ‘were silent on it’ is taken as 
support. The Bush administration, furthermore, appears to have been able to circumvent 
many of the issues raised in Hamdan through further legislation. Thus, the scope of the 
legal challenge, whilst highly significant, has been fairly narrow.   
 
The Bush administration was forced to put many of their detention policies on a 
stronger legal footing in 2005-2006, and this is exactly what they did. Law is a social 
identity that is fundamental to the US, yet in the current context there appears to be a 
degree of mistrust, viewing law as a hindrance to the administration’s policies, and as a 
tool of terrorists. Centrality is taken to be a weakness. Thus, in terms of management, 
this is very much based on dominance, within the super-ordinate framework of the war 
on terror, supported by compartmentalisation and intersection representation.   
 
3.3 The Military Social Identity 
2005-2006 sees more instances of members of the US military speaking out against the 
policies of the Bush administration both in invading Iraq, and their policies for 
detention. For example, organisations such as Iraq Veterans against the War (founded 
in July 2004),61 and Veterans against Torture (2005) were gaining in profile. In 2006 
                                                 
60 John Yoo (2006) also expressed significant concern that Bush’s ‘wartime judgement’, with Congress’ 
support, was being replaced with the ‘speculation’ of five members of the US Supreme Court. Yoo 
criticises the Court for viewing military commissions in the same framework as criminal justice courts. 
The subsequent Military Commissions Act of 2006 is heralded by Bush (2006zzb) as ‘one of the most 
important pieces of legislation in the war on terror’.  
61 This organisation aims to give a voice and solidarity to those service personnel who are against the war 
for a variety of reasons, including the illegality of the war, civilian casualties, the dehumanization of 
Iraqis, and the overstretch the war has caused in the military. More recently, in 2008, this organisation 
was involved in the four day ‘Winter Soldier’ event, which also happened after Vietnam. This event 
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HRW published a report, ‘No Blood, No Foul’, detailing the first-hand accounts of 
soldiers who had seen abuse in Iraq (HRW, 2006b). Soldiers had spoken out to show 
how systemic detainee abuse was, and the problems inherent in rendering the Geneva 
Conventions non-applicable.62 Certainly, opinions within the military vary. However, 
there is evidence of a greater number of personnel speaking out against the Bush 
administration’s policies, with many leaving the Army (Shanker, 2006a). One of the 
fiercest criticisms came from Lieutenant General Greg Newbold who alleged, in Time 
Magazine, that  ‘the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness 
and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute those 
missions – or bury the results’ (Newbold, 2006). 
 
Indeed, in April 2006, there were repeated calls from retired Generals for the 
resignation of Donald Rumsfeld.63 General Zinni (2006: 228) highlights ‘poor 
intelligence, lack of planning, faulty political motivation, incompetent or inexperienced 
people placed in key positions, flawed assumptions, lack of understanding of the Iraqi 
culture, arrogance, spin, and the list goes on and on’. As Hasian (2007: 696) notes, 
whilst ‘there are many times when presidents and their subordinates can summarily 
dismiss, trivialize, domesticate, or otherwise ignore those who disagree with their 
policies…even the strongest of unitary executives has to listen…when disgruntled 
soldiers gain the attention of broader American public’. 
 
2005-2006 also sees the publication of the US Field Manual on Intelligence 
Interrogation issued by the Pentagon. The manual rules that ‘torture and cruel, 
inhumane and degrading treatment is never a morally permissible option, even in 
situations where lives depend on gaining information’ (cited in Daskal, 2006). 
Furthermore, the manual recognises that abuse leads to a loss of ‘moral legitimacy’, 
losing this is acknowledged to be detrimental to success in war.64 The manual explicitly 
                                                                                                                                               
enabled service personnel to discuss their experiences and the reality of the war on the ground in Iraq. 
Indeed, these groups have gained much more press attention in 2007-2008. 
62 Indeed, the JAG involvement in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, directly challenging the administration’s use of 
military commissions, was substantial. As Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift notes, ‘most countries, 
when a military officer openly opposes the president, it is called a coup. In the United States, it is called 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’ (Swift, 2007). 
63 This is documented in a series of New York Times articles e.g. Janofsky (2006); Shanker (2006b); 
Cloud and Schmitt (2006); Cloud, Schmitt and Shanker (2006). Hasian (2007: 702) suggests that 
Rumsfeld provided a source of criticism for the military that would avoid directly embarrassing the 
President. 
64 Woodward (2006: 410; 469) highlights such movements in military thinking. Furthermore, Major 
General Chiarelli and Major Michaelis (2005) identify the different role demanded of the military in Iraq, 
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prohibits the use of water-boarding. As Lieutenant General John Kimmons, Army 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, stated in response to the publication of this 
manual: 
 
No good intelligence is going to come from abusive practices. I think history tells us that. I think the 
empirical evidence of the last five years, hard years, tell us that (Kimmons, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, with specific reference to the Geneva Conventions and the Bush 
administration’s policy on this, former Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Rear 
Admiral John Hutson has stated ‘I don’t think we can win the war unless we live within 
Common Article 3’ (cited in HRW, 2006a). Counter-insurgency doctrine has also 
developed in this period, identifying similar themes, and noting the substantial amount 
of troops required for such missions, in direct challenge to Rumsfeld’s previous aim of 
troop reduction (Gordon, 2006-2007).65 
 
The Bush administration’s strategy in this period seems to fluctuate between 
intersection representation and dominance. The increased challenge from members 
of this group, a lack of success on the ground, and repeated media questions regarding 
troop levels and strategy, seem to have rendered a dominant approach less feasible and 
intersection representation is ever more apparent in this context. Bush (2006zzc) is 
keen to emphasise that he is listening and talking with the US Generals in Iraq ‘all the 
time’.66 Bush expresses his confidence in General Casey, and the troop numbers the 
General suggests (2005zzf; 2006y).  
 
                                                                                                                                               
involving more humanitarian tasks. The authors also note the limits of military power, in an article for 
Military Review.   
65 The Haditha ‘incident’ also emerges in this period with accusations of a massacre of 24 Iraqi men, 
women, and children (Asser, 2008). Whilst the details of the deaths are contested they did lead to the re-
training of personnel in the core values of the military.  
66 Although Woodward points out that this is often ‘sugar-coated information’ (2006: 477). Critical views 
from the military did not apparently get through (Shanker, 2006b; Woodward, 2006: 400), and military 
advice on not reporting body counts was certainly discarded (2006: 483). Woodward highlights the lack 
of independent military advice being sought by the Bush administration (2006: 404, 470), and goes on to 
suggest that this led to ‘groupthink’ (2006: 454). Whilst this largely presents a picture of the Bush 
administration excluding military viewpoints, Woodward also cites Andrew Card’s (then White House 
Chief of Staff) suggestions that had the General’s said more Bush would have listened (2006: 455-456). 
Indeed, in response to accusations that critical military advice was stifled Rumsfeld suggests that the 
issues emerging in the public were never raised with him. A Defense Department memo was circulated to 
this effect, ‘stat[ing] that senior military leaders were involved in every decision-making process, and 
Rumsfeld was said to have met hundreds of times with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and many senior field 
commanders’ (Hasian, 2007: 709). Rumsfeld, also portrays a set of circumstances more complex than 
those depicted by the Generals who had spoken out (Rumsfeld, 2006).   
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There is a clear benefit for the Bush administration in taking a step back from a public 
strategy of dominance, to focus on intersection representation where there is greater 
room for influence from this social group; this renders the administration’s decisions 
more credible in the circumstances. The administration also focuses on the honour the 
troops have earned, speaking to military norms. When discussing his interactions with 
military families, Bush uses this notion of honour to strengthen the administration’s 
position regarding Iraq. He states: 
 
One opinion I've come away with universally is that, you know, we should do everything we can to honor 
the fallen. And one way to honor the fallen is to lay the foundation for peace (Bush, 2005zm).  
 
The need for a continuing presence in Iraq is partially based on the honour of those who 
have died, to make sure ‘the sacrifice has been worth it’ (Bush, 2006zzh).67 There is 
quite a bit of contestation over this point in 2005-2006, particularly due to the protests 
of Cindy Sheehan, whose son died in Iraq, calling for the troops to be brought home, 
and rejecting the president’s use of fallen soldiers, like her son, to justify continuing US 
presence in Iraq. Bush deals with this criticism by suggesting her views are not 
representative, that force was used as a last option,68 and that the mission in Iraq is ‘vital 
to America’s security’ (2005zo; 2006zzc; 2006zzh). Support for military families more 
generally, is again a strong theme in the discourse of the Bush administration (e.g. 
Bush, 2005b; 2005zm; 2005zx).69 
 
The gravity of the US military’s role in the ‘landmark events in the history of liberty’ is 
frequently praised by the Bush administration (Bush, 2005b). In a context where the 
purpose of the troops in Iraq has been brought into question in various forums (e.g. 
media, political and academic), for example, there are many accusations of a lack of 
strategy, or indeed that ‘politicians [are] pretending that policy is strategy’ (Strachen, 
2006: 61), this emphasis facilitates the drawing in of this social identity to a super-
ordinate framework based on fighting the war on terror for a more peaceful world.  In a 
speech to the graduating midshipmen at the US Naval College, Bush (2005z) 
determined that those graduating were ‘now part of the greatest force for freedom in the 
                                                 
67 In his visits to military hospitals Bush encounters those with the opinion that the war in Iraq was not 
worth it (Woodward, 2006: 437; 438).  
68 Rice and others have supported this notion that force was used only as a last resort (Woodward, 2006: 
396). 
69 Cynthia Enloe gave a fascinating assessment of the importance of military families and girlfriends, and 
their targeting by the Bush Administration in a plenary lecture at BISA 2007, Cambridge.  
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history of the world – the Armed Forces of the United States’. In this context, the troops 
are again highly politicised as criticism of the war in Iraq is framed as criticism of the 
troops (Woodward, 2006: 423; 490).   
 
An increase in criticism has rendered a dominance strategy harder to achieve on its 
own, thus greater intersection representation is apparent in 2005-2006. This is 
accompanied by positive messages about the ‘clear’ strategy that is ‘working’ (Bush, 
2005z) and that ‘retention is high, recruitment is meeting goals, and people are feeling 
strong about the mission’; therefore the US military is in good shape (Bush, 2006g). 
Although the fact that the administration was looking to attempt to ‘increase the 
permanent size of both the United States Army and the United States Marines’ suggests 
this only reveals half a story (Bush, 2006zzh).  
 
3.4 The United Nations Social Identity 
Interactions with the UN in 2005-2006 are again quite confrontational. Several UN 
reports, such as the joint report on the ‘Situation of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay’, 
(UN, 2006a) came out against the Bush administration’s detention policies. The 
administration also came under particularly strong criticism from the UN Committee 
against Torture. Whilst praise was given to the USA in certain areas in their progress to 
combat torture, in others they were found to fall far short. For example, the Committee 
calls for the USA to: 
 
cease to detain any person at Guantánamo Bay and close this detention facility, permit access by the 
detainees to judicial process or release them as soon as possible, ensuring that they are not returned to any 
State where they could face a real risk of being tortured (UN, 2006b: 6). 
 
The UN Human Rights Committee, in July of 2006, also released a critical assessment 
of the US government’s human rights record, both at home and abroad (HRW, 2006e). 
The committee called on the Bush administration to provide the opportunity for those 
held at Guantánamo to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, to hold all those 
responsible for abuses accountable, and to end the use of secret prisons. Further 
criticism was aimed at the interrogation techniques employed by the USA, such as 
stress and duress, which they had not recognised as cruel, inhuman and degrading.  
 
Many of these concerns are also echoed in a statement by Martin Scheinin, the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
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countering terrorism. Scheinin (2006) expresses unease about a ‘number of provisions 
of the MCA [Military Commissions Act]’ which ‘appear to contradict the universal and 
fundamental principles of fair trial standards and due process enshrined in Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions’. This is in addition to: 
 
the protection of human rights in the context of countering terrorism such as the Patriot Act, immigration 
laws and policies, CIA secret detention centers, rendition flights, breaches of non-refoulement and the 
Government's denial of extra-territorial human rights obligations. 
 
Thus, the detention policies of the Bush administration have been brought under 
significant scrutiny by the UN in 2005-2006.70 These criticisms are met with strong 
denials and dismissals, as were similar concerns raised by the human rights and 
humanitarian social group. For example, when U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Louise Arbour (2005), stated on Human Rights Day that: 
 
The absolute ban on torture, a cornerstone of the international human rights edifice, is under attack. The 
principle once believed to be unassailable – the inherent right to physical integrity and dignity of the 
person – is becoming a casualty of the so-called "war on terror",  
 
the US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton is reported to have responded that it was 
‘inappropriate and illegitimate for an international civil servant to second-guess the 
conduct that we’re engaged in [in] the war on terror, with nothing more as evidence than 
what she reads in the newspapers’ (HRW, 2005g). This reflects the tone of response that 
was aimed at the human rights and humanitarian social group at the beginning of this 
section on 2005-2006, where accusations were both denied and dismissed.  
 
With particular reference to the UN, this is a period where the Human Rights 
Commission was severely discredited (an assessment shared by Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan), and replaced by the Human Rights Council which was also to suffer problems 
(HRW, 2006f). Accusations of corruption at the UN were also rife, and UN reform was 
very much on the agenda. In this context, the strategy of dominance can perhaps be 
more easily sought despite the above criticisms.     
 
                                                 
70 The lack of access to detention facilities granted to UN experts is also highlighted by AI and HRW (AI, 
2005j; HRW, 2005h). 
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The Bush (2005zr) administration (as reflected in the discourse of Bush in particular) 
focuses on defining the overarching mission of the UN. The direction stressed is based 
on the ‘calling’ to ‘advance … freedom and security’. Bush (2005zr) goes on to argue 
that ‘the world needs the United Nations to live up to its ideals and fulfil its mission’, 
demonstrating elements of intersection representation, bolstering this social identity 
to support the dominant approach. However, Bush (2006zv) goes further and questions 
the commitment of the UN a year later, stating: 
 
I hope the United Nations still strongly stands for liberty. I hope they would support my call to end 
tyranny in the 21st century.  
 
The USA is placed in a leadership position, ignoring the previous reports, and instead 
focuses on the overarching quest for freedom and liberty. Frustrations are highly 
apparent in the discourse in this regard, particularly with the perceived lack of 
commitment of the UN to the core mission of the Bush administration. Bush (2006zc) 
asserts his vision for the UN as one that is: 
 
effective, one that joins us in trying to rid the world of tyranny, one that is willing to advance human 
rights and human dignity at its core, one that's an unabashed organization – is unabashed in their desire to 
spread freedom. 
 
Bush supports such a directing stance and emphasis on reform by alluding to the lack 
of trust that has developed regarding the UN in the US public.71 This is given as a 
reason why John Bolton was deemed to be such a good candidate for UN ambassador. 
Bush (2005za) states that: 
 
We pay over $2 billion a year into the United Nations, and it makes sense to have somebody there who's 
willing to say to the United Nations, let's – why don't you reform? Let's make sure that the body works 
well and there's accountability and taxpayers' money is spent wisely.  
 
As the UN is defined in such fluid terms the dominant strategy would seem easier to 
achieve. Furthermore, such an approach serves to negate the negative impact of 
criticisms from this social group. There are hints at intersection representation, 
focusing on that which the USA and UN share, however, the primary strategy is one of 
dominance.  
                                                 
71 One interesting comment was as follows, ‘some of you were probably concerned here in Kentucky that 
it seemed like the President was spending a little too much time in the United Nations’ (Bush, 2006c).  
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3.5 International Society and the Liberal Democratic Social Identity   
In 2005-2006 perceptions of US moral authority continue to be negatively affected by 
their counter-terrorism detention policies (Foot, 2006), and the means by which they 
can validate a liberal democratic social identity are highly limited. Indeed, as Betts 
(2005: 1) argues, ‘much of the world seems exasperated by American foreign policy’. In 
this climate, the Bush administration largely employs a dominance strategy, which at 
times is supported by intersection representation. 
 
President Bush again discusses what the world is doing and must do (directing). This is 
generally in terms of speaking with one voice on security issues, such as difficulties 
with Saddam Hussein (2005i; 2005l) and Kim Jong-il of North Korea (2006zn). 
Beginning in September of 2005 though, Bush starts to refer to the international 
community more, for example in discourse concerning the international community’s 
demands of Syria (2005zza), their responsibilities in Iraq (2006b), their ‘working 
together to help Afghanistan's young democracy succeed’ (2006j), the need for the 
international community to be firm with Hamas (2006l) and speak with ‘one voice to 
the radical regime in Tehran’ (2006l). The importance of having others in the 
international community (or the world – Bush continues to use both terms) ‘send the 
same message’ is frequently stated (Bush, 2006zza).  
 
Accompanying this more multilateral rhetoric is a continuation of emphasis on leading 
the world in the direction of freedom, heading ‘toward an ideal world’ (Bush, 2005c), 
and seeking ‘the end of tyranny in our world’ (Bush, 2006h). This dominance approach 
is underpinned by strong notions of universalism. For example, ‘universal values and 
universal ideas’ (Bush, 2005c), that freedom and liberty are universal (Bush, 2006w) 
and that the ‘war on terror is universal’ (Bush, 2006n). In response to accusations that 
the USA are imposing their values on others, Bush (2006x) suggests that ‘those are the 
folks who must not think that freedom is universal’, that ‘it just applies to only a 
handful of us’. The emphasis is on end goals as opposed to the means by which they are 
sought, which serves to dismiss criticism. Bush (2006x) argues that: 
 
Much of my foreign policy is driven by my firm belief that everybody desires to be free; that embedded in 
the soul of each man and wom[a]n on the face of the Earth is this deep desire to live in liberty. That's 
what I believe. I don't believe freedom is confined just to the United States of America, nor do I believe 
that we should shy away from expressing our deep desire for there to be universal liberty.  
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Bush dismisses claims that such goals are ‘misguided idealism’ arguing that ‘the future 
security of America depends on it [their realization]’ (2006h). This is partly because 
‘[d]emocracies don't war with each other’ (2005zi),72 but also because of the great 
‘ideological struggle’ in the world (2005zi). One where those who oppose ‘human 
rights, freedom of religion, [and] the ability for people to express themselves in the 
public square without fear of reprisal’, are using ‘tactics that are trying to drive us from 
the world’ (Bush, 2005zi). Bush further argues that whilst ‘[s]ome would like us to look 
at the world the way we would hope it would be. My job as your President is to look at 
the world the way it is’ (Bush, 2006i). Thus, the super-ordinate framework clearly takes 
precedence, and again generates divisions based on binary logic internationally.  
 
Intersection representation is also apparent to a degree in 2005-2006. For example, 
Bush frequently stresses the US’s shared values with Europe and that disagreements in 
the past do not mean they cannot cooperate now (2005o; 2005u). Indeed, in relation to 
Iraq, Bush (2005zg) argues that despite previous differences, ‘the world understands 
that success in Iraq is critical to the security of our nations’. With regards to Iran the 
President also highlights that ‘the world is coalescing around the notion’ that they 
should not be able to develop a nuclear weapon (Bush, 2005zm). However, each of 
these statements, whilst drawing on areas of overlap, is still largely based on the super-
ordinate framework of the war on terror as understood by the Bush administration. 
Intersection representation is very much in terms of bolstering and utilising the 
overlap, for example, as mentioned earlier, drawing on the extra strength that speaking 
with one voice in the international community generates. 
 
Whilst there is still also much emphasis on transient coalitions to ‘defeat the dangers of 
our time’ (Bush, 2005d), there is greater engagement with international social identities 
in 2005-2006. The rhetoric is less confrontational and the separation apparent in the 
previous two time periods is not so evident. There is still a great deal of emphasis on 
leadership in this sphere, however this is firmly grounded in a dominance strategy in 
2005-2006, perhaps because of the set backs in the war on terror in terms of the less 
than desirable situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Complex dynamics are certainly at 
work in this period with a variety of factors brought together under a dominant super-
ordinate social identity founded on the war on terror. As Jack Goldsmith (2007: 212) 
                                                 
72 Bush (2006l) later inserts caveats when making these statements, asserting that democracy does not 
have to look like American democracy and is different in different cultures.  
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notes, the administration has made ‘little attempt to work with the other institutions of 
government’, perhaps then there is little reason to expect the administration to engage 
any further with any international social identities.   
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has again demonstrated that defection from the international detention 
regime needs to be understood as an interactive process of contestation. Political elites 
cannot simply defect from international normative regimes if their arguments are not 
accepted in the broader social identities context. Research that relies on material power 
and interests or a personality that is more ‘prone’ to defection do not engage with this 
interactive process which certainly influences the sustainability of such practices. By 
viewing the influence of international normative regimes as outlined in Chapters 1 and 
2, as a means by which to validate membership or association with a social identity (of 
which there are many) we can more easily comprehend contestations and fluctuations at 
the same time as influence. Including the broader social identities context in our 
analysis better equips us to approach the how possible questions of defection and the 
negotiation of normative constraints by orientating analysis towards the management 
strategies employed.  
 
As with the previous Chapter, all of the management strategies identified in Chapter 2 
are apparent in the discourse of the Bush administration. The techniques used in relation 
to these strategies again vary with social identity and time period. Dominance is the 
most prominent strategy, most frequently manifest in a range of denials, dismissals, and 
challenges to the criticisms. Also significant in this Chapter is a much weaker emphasis 
on international social identities than was apparent in relation to the Blair government. 
Additionally, separation is evident, which was not the case in Chapter 4.  
 
With regards to social identities in international society, the discourse of the Bush 
administration certainly diverges from that of the Blair government. There is much less 
engagement with forms of social identity internationally; indeed at times we see 
evidence of separation. This is highly significant for the framework established in this 
thesis, where membership and desire for membership are crucial for normative 
influence. We cannot expect international normative regimes to have influence if the 
membership to which they pertain is not apparent for the Bush administration; in such 
cases where membership is not experienced, there is thus no imperative to validate 
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membership through compliance with the constitutive normative regimes. Much norms 
research assumes membership of the international society in general and leaves little if 
any room for changes in the positioning of individuals (as representatives of states), in 
relation to different international social identities.  
 
The discourse of the Bush administration is very issue-specific in relation to 
international social identities, to a much greater extent than was evident in Chapter 4. 
The emphasis is on transient coalitions where the USA leads a group of states, brought 
together to tackle particular problems. There are moves to engage more internationally 
in 2005-2006, where the value of a more collective approach seems to gain further 
recognition and the discourse is less confrontational. However, the predominant 
emphasis is on an international social identity based on fighting the war on terror. Like 
in Chapter 4, this creates a complex framework of universalism and division, equality of 
human rights and restrictions on human rights, as well as the inclusion of a diverse 
range of members where counter-terrorism is the shared ethos. The influence of the 
international detention regime, as associated with the liberal democratic social identity, 
is heavily compromised in this dominant and separated approach to international social 
identities.  
 
However, as I have argued throughout this thesis, we also need to consider the broader 
social identities context when assessing the contestation of the international detention 
regime. The main strategy employed by the Bush administration is again one of 
dominance, focusing on denials, dismissals and challenges, but often on the basis of 
constructing a dominant narrative. These techniques, apparent in relation to several of 
the social identities, for example human rights and humanitarian, legal and UN, are very 
confrontational. This is clearest with regards to challenges, where the criticisms of these 
social groups are argued to serve the terrorist’s cause. These social identities are 
constructed under the super-ordinate framework of counter-terrorism, as understood by 
the administration, and are expected to fall in line.  
 
The predominant reliance on denials, dismissals and challenges in the discourse 
assessed does not appear to be a sustainable strategy, if there is a desire to maintain 
association with these social identities, given the mounting evidence of actions that 
disprove statements. Arguing that such practices are appropriate given the context also 
does little to draw the social identities closer or gain any status from proto-typicality. 
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Cheney’s statement that, ‘[n]obody should feel defensive or unhappy about the quality 
of treatment they’ve received. It’s probably better than they deserve’ (Sanger, 2002; 
Kampfner, 2004: 150)73 is an example of this and fundamentally challenges the 
constitutive elements of equality and humane treatment that are generally inherent in the 
social identities assessed. The use of intersection representation which could bolster 
association does not on the whole appear to be accepted by the different social groups. 
Reliance on historical association and identity-based reasoning to justify current actions 
suggests that the process of social identity validation was approached in a very one-way 
fashion, which inevitably leads to frustrations when confronted with challenges. 
Overall, the strategies employed and the means by which they are sought is indicative of 
a lack of appreciation for the interactive process of social identity validation. 
Association with these social identities is taken for granted.  
 
However, these social identities cannot simply be rejected, even by the USA, who is 
often considered to experience very few constraints on their actions. Bush certainly 
pushes association to the limits, but retains a fragile degree of identification through 
intersection representation. The apparent fear of constraints, the salience of attacks, and 
the existence of a very harsh penal system already in the USA are all factors that will 
have contributed to the defection from and contestation of the international detention 
regime. There are multiple factors for individuals and small leadership groups to draw 
on and there is always room to challenge interpretations.  
 
They also however need to manage the broader social identities context for such 
policies to be sustainable. The presidential campaigns of John McCain and Barack 
Obama in 2008 appear to have recognised the detrimental affect of the administration’s 
detention policies, speaking out as they have against Guantánamo Bay. Obama’s camp, 
furthermore, have made various noises about taking a more ‘European approach’ to the 
conflict between Russia and Georgia. The differences in the management strategies and 
interactive processes in this future context will be fascinating to see. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 This statement was made at a Republican fundraiser in Cincinnati, January 2002. Whilst the full text of 
the speech is not available, several respected journalists have cited the phrase.   
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis began with the following question; how have the normative constraints 
regarding detention practices been negotiated by the USA and UK in the war on terror, 
so as to allow for contestation of the international detention regime? Images of the 
abuse of detainees, harsh conditions of detention, and strong rhetoric contesting the 
applicability of the international detention regime have been highly prevalent in 2001-
2006. These practices challenge our expectations for behaviour. As argued in Chapter 1 
such expectations for compliance with the regime are generated by the association of 
the USA and UK with a liberal democratic state identity, and indeed the involvement of 
these states in human rights promotion and moves to eradicate torture in the world. The 
seemingly counter-normative behaviours of these states with regards to the international 
detention regime necessitate an explanation of how international normative regimes 
actually influence the behaviour of political elites given such stark examples of 
contestation. Not to do so leads to erroneous expectations of state behaviour, takes 
‘progression’ towards human rights norms for granted in international society, and 
conceals the need for normative regimes to constantly be re-made.  
 
In order to delve deeper into the processes involved in the contestation of the 
international detention regime I have drawn on constructivist research as well as 
insights from the social identity approach in social psychology. The framework 
established in Chapters 1 and 2 has enabled the following findings: 
 
1. The normative constraints of the international detention regime are negotiated 
through management of the social identities associated with the state by political 
elites 
2. Very complex social identity dynamics are apparent in international society for 
both the Bush administration and Blair government, which contribute to our 
expectations for behaviour pertaining to the international detention regime  
3. Contestation of the international detention regime is a broad and interactive 
process, as opposed to one-way. Political elites do not simply defect from or 
comply with this normative regime in the cases examined. Interaction with the 
social identities context constrains justifications of counter-normative behaviour, 
and the capacity to construct a sustainable and enabling framework for 
contestation.  
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In relation to the first point above, this thesis has found that in order to consider how the 
normative constraints of the international detention regime are negotiated we need to 
focus on the management of the different social identities associated with the state, 
those that are relevant to this regime. As I contend in Chapter 1, the literature on 
international norms does not tend to engage with this broader social identities context 
but instead generally focuses on a singular international norm, and defection or 
compliance by the state or state leaders (e.g. Shannon and Keller, 2007; Cardenas, 
2004). Scholars working from the social identity approach in social psychology have, 
however, demonstrated why it is so important to consider the broader social identities 
context in which political elites are situated, when evaluating the contestation of 
international normative regimes, as I argued in Chapter 2. In Chapters 4 and 5 I 
demonstrated that interactive processes of contestation are evident for both the Blair 
government and Bush administration with the social identities discussed in Chapter 3. I 
found that the discourse of Bush and Blair generally concentrates on the generation of a 
super-ordinate social identity, based on the war on terror, within which subordinate 
social identities are re-framed (this is however more apparent for Blair as opposed to 
Bush). This serves to facilitate continued validation of association or membership with 
these different subordinate social identities, such as the human rights and humanitarian 
social identity (both collectively and at an individual level), despite the contestation of 
the international detention regime by the USA and UK. This approach therefore 
accounts for contestation at a micro-foundational level through utilisation of the social 
identity approach.  
 
Second, very complex international social identity dynamics are apparent for both the 
Blair government and Bush administration. The predominant emphasis is on the new 
international, and super-ordinate, social identity, developed through both comparison 
(e.g. civilized as opposed non-civilized divisions internationally) and interaction (e.g. 
between political elites across the coalitions established in the war on terror). This 
emergent social group certainly challenges notions of an international liberal democratic 
social identity as dominant for these states in this context. Given that the social identity 
approach suggests that the influence of normative regimes depends on the salience of 
the membership to which they pertain, we can understand how appeals to a super-
ordinate social identity facilitate the contestation of the international detention regime 
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by the UK and USA.1 However, the discourse also portrays very complex and dynamic 
formations of international social identities for representatives of these states in 2001-
2006, for example, universalism and division, equality of human rights and restrictions 
on human rights, as well as the inclusion of a diverse range of members where counter-
terrorism is the shared ethos. Such complexity is certainly very difficult to manage, with 
many competing normative demands. The framework outlined in this thesis allows us to 
understand apparent fluctuations in the influence of international normative regimes in 
this context, as the liberal democratic social identity is competing with various others. 
Whereas some scholars (as mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2) have simplified international 
social identities, this thesis has embraced the apparent complexity, and, assisted by the 
micro-foundational insights of the social identity approach leaves room for changes in 
the positioning of individuals (as representatives of states), in relation to different 
international social identities.  
 
Third, the political context is one in which multiple social identities compete for social 
influence, and where leaders manage associations as well as develop and attempt to 
create new social groupings. This has been highlighted above. Reliance on a super-
ordinate social identity based on the war on terror has, however, been complicated as 
these constructions are not accepted by the other social identities assessed, thus as a 
strategy this does not appear to be sustainable. As has been advanced throughout this 
thesis, we cannot limit our understanding of international normative regimes to the 
international sphere. Contestation is not a one-way process, where powerful state 
leaders can simply act as they chose; interaction with multiple social identities is also a 
significant part of the picture. In this thesis I have provided evidence to challenge the 
dominant approach to norms in IR which focuses on the counter-veiling logics of 
compliance and defection behaviours (e.g. Goertz and Diehl, 1994; Slaughter and 
Raustiala, 2002). Instead I have demonstrated how this is a two-way process of 
contestation, where various audiences and members are involved in this interactive 
process. Bush and Blair, for example, both rely on their country’s historical 
involvement in human rights promotion and previous compliance with human rights 
standards at times where they are accused of defecting from these international 
standards (Blair also refers to the previous achievements of the Labour party in this 
regard). For example, as the Blair government introduced the Human Rights Act in 
                                                 
1 As evidenced in Chapter 5, the discourse of the Bush administration also demonstrates a degree of 
separation and less engagement with forms of social identity internationally. 
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1998, they ask for current actions to be seen in this light. As has been demonstrated in 
this thesis, such identity-based arguments are not accepted by the human rights and 
humanitarian social group and association with this social identity becomes very 
strained, evidenced by compartmentalisation and confrontational interactions with both 
Blair and Bush. Research that relies on material power and interests or a personality that 
is more ‘prone’ to defection do not engage with this interactive process which certainly 
influences the sustainability of such practices if the actors wish to validate association 
with this social identity. Political elites cannot simply defect from international 
normative regimes if their arguments are not accepted in the broader social identities 
context. 
 
These findings all advance our understanding of how the normative constraints 
regarding detention practices have been negotiated by the USA and UK in the war on 
terror, so as to allow for contestation of the international detention regime. This thesis 
has demonstrated that defection from the international detention regime needs to be 
understood as an interactive process of contestation. As advanced in Chapter 1, 
constructivists lack a persuasive account of the micro-foundational processes of norm 
influence which prevents them from engaging with the contestation of seemingly 
embedded international normative standards. The framework established in this thesis 
accounts for the influence of social identities and international normative regimes, 
whilst at the same time allowing us to understand contestation. I have demonstrated that 
by firmly embedding individuals in the broader social identities context and focusing on 
the management strategies employed by political elites we can understand the 
interactive processes of contestation generally missing from current constructivist 
accounts of international norms. Whilst research focusing on personality, 
internalisation, the nature of the norm, or pre-defined interests may increase parsimony, 
they reduce our understanding of the processes involved and lead to erroneous 
explanations and expectations. Decisions to defect from or comply with the 
international detention regime are not straightforward assessments; they are interactive 
processes that evolve.   
  
Scholars from the social identity approach (e.g. Haslam and Reicher, 2007) have 
highlighted the importance of considering, on the one hand, political leaders as sharing 
and being associated with certain social identities, whilst on the other managing and 
constructing this context. The significance of assessing existing constraints alongside 
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the creation of future possibilities is often missed in certain strands of constructivist 
research on norms, where the emphasis of the studies has tended to negate the 
importance of leaders and individuals, or gone too far in isolating the leader from the 
broader social identities context. The social identity approach privileges ‘doing’ as 
opposed to ‘having’ in their assessment of leadership. ‘Doing’ is a product of both the 
person and the interactive context. A reliance on personality generally misses this point, 
and would seem to run the risk of conflating personality measures with the product of 
interactions, particularly as measures of personality are often taken at the time of the 
events studied.  
 
There are certain dangers to such an approach. For example, assessments of Saddam 
Hussein (particularly those articulated by Bush and Blair) appeared to be very isolated 
from the interactive context in which he was situated. The individual is clearly 
important, however, simply attributing actions to individual personality without 
recognising the broader constraints (and enabling factors) on their behaviour can lead to 
misconceptions (see Jervis, 1976). Such a perspective is also evident in the Bush 
administration’s approach to detention, where the emphasis is on hunting down and 
hauling in the ‘evil-doers’, believing that the more who are captured, the less there are 
to fight. As mentioned previously, a reliance on this idea ignores the possibility of 
creating more terrorists. This thesis has attempted to demonstrate the importance of 
interactions and ‘doing’ processes, with regards to the contestation of detention 
standards by the USA and UK. Whilst other studies have concentrated on how these 
practices came about, I have delved deeper into the negotiation of normative constraint 
in the broad social identities context, based on the micro-foundational insights of the 
social identity approach.  
 
Despite the importance of international normative regimes, such as that prescribing 
minimum standards for detention and prohibiting torture, there will always be room for 
challenge and different interpretations regardless of how internalised at a collective 
level normative regimes appear to be; the role of individuals and interactions is very 
important. Individuals have many memberships or associations with different social 
identities to draw on. Some of these emerge in certain circumstances through individual 
interactions which are often on a small scale; others are already apparent but not salient.  
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An interesting feature of the analysis in this thesis has been the significant overlap in the 
use of the different management strategies. Both Bush and Blair employ different 
strategies concurrently with the same social identity. Indeed, certain passages that I have 
included in Chapters 4 and 5 are indicative of compartmentalisation, intersection 
representation and dominance simultaneously. Furthermore, at times, strategies such as 
intersection representation appear to facilitate dominance, and at other times, dominance 
seems to allow for compartmentalisation or vice versa. Political rhetoric does not fall 
neatly into the typology of strategies identified by Roccas and Brewer (2002). This does 
not negate the usefulness of such an approach but simply goes some way to 
demonstrating the complexity of social identity management in the political sphere. I 
have included techniques under the different strategy headings to give a clearer 
indication of variations in the use of these strategies as, whilst they are apparent, there 
are differences in how they are manifest across both time and social identity. Simply 
focusing on the strategies identified by Roccas and Brewer would have obscured some 
of the differences and nuances in this analysis. Thus, utilising these insights in the 
political realm has demonstrated their value in this complex context, but has also 
highlighted certain particularities for this type of analysis, which may also be of interest 
for social identity theorists in psychology. 
 
There are of course certain drawbacks to the approach adopted in this thesis that I must 
mention here. As I have argued, the framework provides a means by which to 
understand processes of contestation and normative influence. However, the framework 
does not generate insights in these cases that can be generalised with regards to these 
processes. Insights are contextually situated. Due to the emphasis on interactions they 
will vary both with different circumstances and actors. The social identities context, for 
example can be very different for certain states, certainly this would be very interesting 
to explore. The micro-foundational framework outlined in this thesis will still provide a 
very useful basis from which to conduct such analysis. Indeed I believe this framework 
will prove to be very valuable in understanding the different behaviours of states with 
regards to international normative regimes.   
 
There are also a variety of other ways that the research outlined in this thesis can be 
developed. For example, the social identities included for analysis are by no means 
comprehensive. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, other factors such as religion are very 
important. Whilst it has not been possible to explore any more in the confines of this 
 212 
thesis (those covered have certainly provided a very broad research project) this may be 
a consideration for future research. Although this suggests expanding the research 
further, the insights in this thesis could also be developed by deepening analysis. For 
example, investigation into interactions with the different social identities could be 
enhanced by the inclusion of interview data. For example, interview data could help to 
expand analysis by enabling us to delve deeper into the processes of contestation, to 
assess how interactions are perceived by members of these social groups, and indeed 
government officials where access is possible.  
 
One of the aims of this thesis was to bridge some of the gap between international 
normative regimes and individuals. Indeed this has tended to be the main motivational 
driver for many moves to engage more with insights from psychology in constructivist 
research. I have approached this by drawing on research in the social identity approach 
where the predominant emphasis is on understanding the relationship between the 
individual and the group, particularly social influence in this context. The micro-
foundational insights provided by social identity scholars have led me to focus on 
political elites, the processes of negotiation of normative constraint that are apparent in 
the discourse, and the interactions with the different social identities associated with the 
state. The management of these social identities has provided significant insight into the 
processes of contestation of the international detention regime in the cases of the USA 
and UK.  
 
However, moves to bridge the gap between international normative regimes and agents 
could be developed even more by interviewing individuals to further assess how 
different normative constraints and social identities are managed. Whilst access for this 
would be very difficult for political elites, this could perhaps be possible for military 
personnel who also operate in an international context with competing normative 
demands. Tracking international norms to the individual, investigating interpretations, 
as well as the management of competing normative demands and social identities, 
would also assist in advancing our comprehension of normative influence which has 
been demonstrated by constructivists to be fundamental to our understanding of 
international affairs.  
 
There are also further questions that emerge from the assessment in this thesis. For 
example, how has the negotiation of normative constraint and the management 
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strategies evident in the discourse influenced perceptions of the international detention 
regime around the world? Certainly very mixed messages have come from both of these 
countries with regards to the need to be tough on terrorism, but at the same time 
meeting human rights obligations. The emphasis on a trade-off between the two has 
been very salient, as has the hierarchical interpretation of rights, strongly privileging the 
right to life and to live free from terror above all others. The frequency of dismissals 
and denials in both the discourse of the Blair government and the Bush administration, 
in relation to the arguments of the human rights and humanitarian social group, would 
seem to have provided ammunition for other countries around the world to pursue such 
measures. As mentioned earlier, whilst both Bush and Blair employ identity-based 
reasoning to justify their own actions, the example set to others around the world has 
not featured as a significant concern. As Malinowski (2005: 141) writes: 
 
State Department officials can continue to urge Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Algeria to treat people 
humanely, but when the governments of these countries can quote U.S. government memoranda to defend 
their brutal actions, what can an American diplomat say in response? 
 
Indeed, Zayas (2005) draws attention to Malaysia’s Internal Security Act, which has 
resurrected preventive detention that was introduced as a temporary measure in 1960 to 
fight a communist rebellion. The impact of the arguments of the Bush administration 
and the Blair government on interpretations of the international detention regime by 
different political elites around the world would certainly be a fascinating, albeit very 
difficult, area to assess. This would also go some way to establishing the current state of 
this international normative regime.  
 
Additionally, it would be very interesting to consider how these management strategies 
and the arguments employed have influenced the moral standing of the UK and USA 
around the world. This is very important in terms of the social influence of political 
representatives from these states and the moral authority that their opinions on global 
problems or internal difficulties in other states, have in the future. Indeed, as recent 
assessments have recognised, human rights are crucial to the resolution of some of the 
most pressing instabilities in the world, the capacity of the USA and UK to advance this 
agenda is certainly questionable. The National Security Strategy of the UK (2008) for 
example, stresses the importance of a rule-based approach and social legitimacy is 
strongly valued, yet how far this is possible given recent actions and apparent 
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contradictions is certainly debatable. Thus, the implications of the management 
strategies employed provide several avenues for future research. 
 
This thesis has only focused on one small but significant area of concern with regards to 
the influence and contestation of international normative regimes. I have, however, 
provided further demonstration of why it is so important for constructivist scholars to 
engage with and provide robust micro-foundations for their research. Drawing from the 
social identity approach I have shown the benefits of this for understanding how 
normative constraints are influential and contested with regards to the detention policies 
of both the USA and UK. Throughout this thesis I have demonstrated that contestation 
of the international detention regime and the negotiation of its normative constraints are 
an interactive and dynamic process embedded in a broad social identities context, which 
has implications for the sustainability of counter-normative practices. I have also 
bridged some of the gap between international normative regimes and individuals, and 
hope to have provided a micro-foundational basis for many more future developments.  
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